Deleuze’s Philosophical Heritage

La Deleuziana 11 Differential Heterogenesis, 2020

«Differential calculus…is the algebra of pure thought» (Deleuze 1994:181-2). Here, in an often-overlooked passage of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze presents the model of his philosophy of difference inexplicit terms. In this context, calculus is not a simple mathematical tool but the model for the genesis of every actual reality, including thought. This model makes it possible to explain the working of the mind on the basis of sensory experience in order to produce its determinations while also grounding knowledge on a non-phenomenal reality: ideas as differentials of thought. This article will begin by clarifying how Deleuze draws from modern analysis in order to formulate the paradigm that allows him to ground knowledge on "real conditions of thought", that is, pre-individual genetic conditions rather than a priori, subjective conditions. Each engendered domain, in which dialectical Ideas of this or that order are incarnated, possesses its own calculus.

According to a severe point of view, Deleuze's texts touch on a great variety of subjects: Godel's theorem, the theory of transfinite cardinals, Riemannian geometry, quantum mechanics … But the allusions are so brief and superficial that a reader who is not already an expert in these subjects will be unable to learn anything concrete. And a specialist reader will find their statements most often meaningless, or sometimes acceptable but banal and confused. 1

Gilles Deleuze belongs to that group of philosophers, often taken to typify the continental approach to philosophy, for whom the difficulty we encounter in reading them is not simply one of the content of their claims and arguments, but also one of penetrating their style of writing itself. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that Deleuze not only seemingly employs language in order to destabilize and obfuscate his philosophical arguments, but also revises his basic philosophical terminology between his numerous writings, from the early work of intensive depth, virtuality, and preindividual singularities, to the body without organs, machinic phylum, and plane of immanence of his collaborations with Guattari. 1 This leads us to the problem of how we read Deleuze. Do we see the obfuscation of language, the various appropriations of the sciences, and the experiments in philosophical writing as attempts to cover over a paucity of argumentation? Do we take up this rejection of traditional metaphysical language, seeing it as a rejection of the tradition of metaphysics itself, or do we strip the language away in the hope of finding underneath it a philosophical position that can be distinctly expressed in another, more palatable language? Similarly, we might ask what the reason is for the proliferation of philosophical systems developed by Deleuze, both in his historical monographs and his own philosophical writings. The continual reinvention of basic philosophical concepts might be taken to signal a failure of Deleuze's philosophical enterprise, an inability to formulate a definitive yet consistent philosophical outlook. Finally, Deleuze presents us with the problem of understanding the relation of these various projects. Deleuze's engagements with the history of philosophy, science, aesthetics, and ethics seem reminiscent of the

2014

This groundbreaking book engages with the relationship between ontology, metaphysics, and epistemology in Heidegger and Deleuze. Showing that the latter are rooted in their respective ontologies not only provides a clear, detailed, and holistic outline of all three, but also reveals that Heidegger and Deleuze are highly critical of thinking that associates being with identity. While they both seek to overcome this association by affirming being as becoming, they differ in terms of what this becoming entails with Deleuze's onto-genetic account of being's rhizomic-becoming going beyond Heidegger's temporal account. However, while Deleuze attempts to think as and from difference, the relationship between identity and difference is explored to offer a tri-partite account of identity that shows that, despite his claims to the contrary, Deleuze's ontological categories continue to depend on a form of the identity he aims to overcome.

Deleuze Studies (University of Edinburgh , 2017

Is there a particular danger in following Deleuze's philosophy to its end result? According to Peter Hallward, Deleuze's philosophy has some rather severe conclusions. Deleuze has been portrayed by him as a theological and spiritual thinker of life. Hallward seeks to challenge the accepted view of Deleuze, showing that these accepted norms in Deleuzian scholarship should be challenged and that, initially, Deleuze calls for the evacuation of political action in order to remain firm in the realm of pure contemplation. This article intends to investigate and defend Deleuze's philosophy against the critical and theological accounts portrayed by Hallward, arguing that Deleuze's philosophy is not only creative and vital but also highly revolutionary and 'a part' of the given world. It then goes on to examine Hallward's distortion of the actual/virtual distinction in Deleuze because Hallward is not able to come to grips with the concept of life in Deleuze's philosophy. We live in an intensive and dynamic world and the main points of Deleuze's philosophy concern the transformation of the world. Deleuze is not seeking to escape the world, but rather to deal with inventive and creative methods to transform society.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2007

The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze is not the easiest of philosophers to pigeonhole. Being French, he is often lumped together with other French philosophers of his generation under labels such as post-structuralism and post-modernism, whether these be taken as terms of abuse by detractors or terms of self-definition by admirers. He, no doubt, would have rejected all these attempts at such a simplistic and lazy categorization of his work. When asked what it was he was doing in his work he answered 'philosophy, nothing but philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word'. 1 This statement may be taken in a number of ways. On the one hand his work is deeply concerned with ontology in a very traditional sense, and his principal work on this topic, Difference and Repetition, refers to a wide range of very traditional texts from the history of philosophy, including Plato, Aristotle, Duns Scotus and Spinoza, as well as more recent philosophers such as Bergson and Whitehead. 2 On the other hand his work also appeals to a very traditional conception of philosophy -one arguably going back to Socrates -in which thought and life are united. This is one of the reasons behind his interest in the ancient Stoics. 3 It is clearer still in his works on Spinoza, especially Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, and it may well have been Spinoza's special combination of a complex theoretical ontology with a practical concern with an individual's mode of existence or way of life that led Deleuze (no doubt with a wry smile on his face) to proclaim Spinoza as 'the Christ of philosophers'. 4 1 This comes from an interview in L'Arc 49 (rev. edn, 1980), 99-102, at 99, reprinted in Deux re´gimes de fous, Textes et entretiens 1975Textes et entretiens -1995

Deleuze and Metaphysics, 2014

Deleuze remains indifferent to the ambient pathos related to the end of metaphysics and compares the undertakings of destruction, overcoming and deconstruction of metaphysics with the gestures of murderers. He considers himself “a pure metaphysician,” which is rather unique in the contemporary philosophical landscape. What are we to make of this and similar claims? What do they mean in light of the effort made during the last several centuries to overcome, overturn, destroy, or deconstruct metaphysics? If we consider Deleuze’s work more closely, might find him engaging in the kind of thinking that is commonly referred to as metaphysical? And if Deleuze is indeed a metaphysician, does this undercut the many insightful contributions of the twentieth century philosophers who dedicate their thought to bringing down Western metaphysical tradition? Or does it suggest that there is a sense of metaphysics that should nevertheless be preserved? These and similar questions are addressed in this volume by a series of international scholars. The goal of the book is to critically engage an aspect of Deleuze’s thought that, for the most part, has been neglected, and to understand better his “immanent metaphysics.” It also seeks to explore the consequences of such an engagement.

Culture, Theory and Critique, 2011

In spite of common assumptions to the contrary, the debt to religion found in Deleuze’s philosophy is undeniable when one considers his use of the concept of univocity, which he takes primarily from Duns Scotus and finds at work in Spinoza. It seems to be generally accepted, however, that this concept is abandoned in Deleuze’s later career along with many of the religious overtones that necessarily accompanied this concept in his earlier work. Given that the general doxa around Deleuze is that God’s only place in Deleuze’s latter work is as the source of judgements we must resist (an interpretation that owes as much to Nietzsche as to Artaud), this is, perhaps, understandable. However, this doxa is not fair to the extent of the debt Deleuze owes to theology so, whilst Deleuze scholarship has recently turned its attention to the religious underpinnings of much of Deleuze’s thought, in this paper we wish not only to retrace these theological antecedents but to also examine the ways in which a specific concept that is rooted in philosophical theology is unpacked in the very genesis of Deleuze’s own thought. In doing this, we will ascertain the extent to which Scotus’ conception of univocal predication can be said to infuse Deleuze’s entire philosophical project, rather than just a specific portion of it, and how, then, God always inhabits the Deleuzean system even after Deleuze has forsaken an explicitly theological vocabulary.