A Criticism of the IASP's Definition of Pain

Pain reports, 2018

The definition of pain promulgated by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) is widely accepted as a pragmatic characterisation of that human experience. Although the Notes that accompany it characterise pain as "always subjective," the IASP definition itself fails to sufficiently integrate phenomenological aspects of pain. This essay reviews the historical development of the IASP definition, and the commentaries and suggested modifications to it over almost 40 years. Common factors of pain experience identified in phenomenological studies are described, together with theoretical insights from philosophy and biology. A fuller understanding of the pain experience and of the clinical care of those experiencing pain is achievable through greater attention to the phenomenology of pain, the social "intersubjective space" in which pain occurs, and the limitations of language. Based on these results, a revised definition of pain is offered: Pain is a...

1996

Pain Reports, 2018

Introduction: The definition of pain promulgated by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) is widely accepted as a pragmatic characterisation of that human experience. Although the Notes that accompany it characterise pain as “always subjective,” the IASP definition itself fails to sufficiently integrate phenomenological aspects of pain. Methods: This essay reviews the historical development of the IASP definition, and the commentaries and suggested modifications to it over almost 40 years. Common factors of pain experience identified in phenomenological studies are described, together with theoretical insights from philosophy and biology. Results: A fuller understanding of the pain experience and of the clinical care of those experiencing pain is achievable through greater attention to the phenomenology of pain, the social “intersubjective space” in which pain occurs, and the limitations of language. Conclusion: Based on these results, a revised definition of pain is offered: Pain is a mutually recognizable somatic experience that reflects a person's apprehension of threat to their bodily or existential integrity.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

One use of the noun ‘pain’ is exemplified in sentences like ‘There is a pain in my foot’. According to the Experiential Theory, ‘pain’ in this context refers to an experience located in the mind or brain. According to the Bodily Theory, it refers to an extra-cranial bodily occurrence located in a body part. In this paper, I defend the Bodily Theory. Specifically, I argue that pains are proximal activations of nociceptors that cause experiences of pain. This view is preferable to the Experiential Theory, because it accords better with common sense and offers a better interpretation or semantics of ordinary pain reports.

This chapter defends an axiological theory of pain according to which pains are bodily episodes that are bad in some way. Section 1 introduces two standard assumptions about pain that the axiological theory constitutively rejects: (i) that pains are essentially tied to consciousness and (ii) that pains are not essentially tied to badness. Section 2 presents the axiological theory by contrast to these and provides a preliminary defense of it. Section 3 introduces the paradox of pain and argues that since the axiological theory takes the location of pain at face value, it needs to grapple with the privacy, self-intimacy and incorrigibility of pain. Sections 4, 5 and 6 explain how the axiological theory may deal with each of these.

Filozofia, 2024

The aim of this article is to show how the inseparability of its objective and subjective dimensions renders pain such a complex phenomenon that it poses a challenge for both the biomedical sciences and philosophy. Neurophysiology has ascertained the variability of the relationship between damage and pain, showing that it is the result of interaction between the sensory and affective-emotional constituents of the human being. However, the process of defining the clinical concept of suffering appears comprehensively laborious and ongoing. Philosophy, while declaring the impossibility of identifying the essence of pain, makes a valuable contribution to the discovery of the singularity of the experience, thanks to the phenomenology of the homo patiens. Finally, we examine the debate on the possibility and the different ways of narrating and appraising suffering, a need with obvious ethical implications, perceived more and more within the field of care, also given the chronicity of many medical conditions.

Pain Forum, 1999

Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2018

In this paper the complex phenomenon of pain is discussed and analysed along different theoretical paths: cognitivism, hermeneutics, phenomenology. The neuro-cognitive approach is exemplified through Paul and Patricia Churchland's writings; then H.-G. Gadamer's hermeneutical approach is evaluated. While apparently opposite, they share a common assumption, namely that the body is basically to be conceived of as not really different from the Cartesian Res extensa. Some problems thus arise: in particular, the aspect of reflexivity implied in any experience of pain is overlooked. Accordingly, an adequate approach to feeling pain must take the phenomenological path. This means to discuss Husserl's but also Scheler's and Heidegger's contributions, in order to bring to the fore the complexity of the phenomenon of pain, which shows a particular and paradoxical structure: exposing the subject feeling pain to its own internal exteriority.

Gestalt Theory, 2017

This paper develops a phenomenological approach of pain, which highlights the main presuppositions that underlie pain research undertaken both in the natural and in the socio-historical sciences. My argument is composed of four steps: 1) only if pain is a stratified experience can it become a legitimate theme in both natural and socio-historical sciences; 2) the phenomenological method is supremely well suited to disclose the different strata of pain experience; 3) the phenomenological account here offered identifies three fundamental levels that make up the texture of pain experience: pain can be conceived as a pre-reflective experience, or as an object of affective reflection, or as an object of cognitive reflection; 4) such a stratified account clarifies how pain can be a subject matter in the natural and socio-historical sciences. Arguably, the natural and socio-historical sciences address pain at different levels of its manifestation. While the natural sciences address pain as an object of cognitive reflection, socio-historical sciences first and foremost deal with pain as a pre-reflective experience and as an object of affective reflection.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2021

Pain is often used as the paradigmatic example of a phenomenal kind with a phenomenal quality common and unique to its instantiations. Philosophers have intensely discussed the relation between the subjective feeling, which unites pains and distinguishes them from other experiences, and the phenomenal properties of sensory, affective, and evaluative character along which pains typically vary. At the center of this discussion is the question whether the phenomenal properties prove necessary and/or sufficient for pain. In the empirical literature, sensory, affective, and evaluative properties have played a decisive role in the investigation of psycho-physical correspondence and clinical diagnostics. This paper addresses the outlined philosophical and empirical issues from a new perspective by constructing a multidi-mensional phenomenal space for pain. First, the paper will construe the phenomenal properties of pains in terms of a property space whose structure reflects phenomenal similarities and dissimilarities by means of spatial distance. Second, philosophical debates on necessary and sufficient properties are reconsidered in terms of whether there is a phenomenal space formed of dimensions along which all and only pains vary. It is concluded that there is no space of this kind and, thus, that pain constitutes a primitive phenomenal kind that cannot be analyzed entirely in terms of its varying phenomenal properties. Third, the paper addresses the utility of continued reference to pain and its phenomenal properties in philosophical and scientific discourses. It is argued that numerous insights into the phenomenal structure of pain can be gained that have thus far received insufficient attention.