Refining the Prize: Chinese Oil Refineries and Its Energy Security

2015

China's pursuit of overseas oil resources to meet its repidly rising economic development has given rise to global concern about its intentions and the implications for the world energy market and global energy geopolitics. Yet, while security challenges posed by Chinese energy diplomacy have been well debated, most of the analyses have ignored the fact that China's apparently unscrupulous search for oil resources is factually restrained by the fundamental principles of its strategic presumptions which are based on the necessity to maintain a stable international and regional environment, reduce the negative influence of the "China threat theory", seek to avoid risks and to develop good relations with the United Steates, and insist on sovereign independence. These are the cardinal guidelines for Beijing's external behavior while sustaining its domestic development. According to Chinese strategy, "vigorous" cooperation with related countries will be th...

A team of specialists on China’s energy sector reviews a series of major transitions that have transformed that country’s oil economy over the past two decades. These include, on the demand side, (a) the increasing role of oil in the economy as a whole vis-à-vis other major energy carriers (as incomes have risen and millions of households have purchased vehicles and have also traveled by air), and (b) an increasing emphasis on energy efficiency and carbon mitigation. On the supply side, several additional transitions are discussed, namely (1) the scaling up of output from the central and western regions as well as from offshore, as the major northeastern oil fields decline after several decades of very heavy production, (2) a shift from being a major oil exporter to the world’s second-largest oil importer, (3) expansion and diversification in the number of sources from which China imports oil, (4) changes in the way imported oil enters the country (increasingly via pipelines from neighboring countries), and (5) with such heavy dependence on imports, the building of strategic petroleum reserves and an immensely enlarged refining capacity, intended to enhance the nation’s oil security.

Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 2007

Oil Crises of the 1970s and the Transformation of International Order, 2024

Oil was a blessing for China. 2 With the help of Soviet technicians, the Chinese developed Karamay and Dushanzi oilfi elds in Xiangjiang in the 1950s, shattering the Western myth that there was no oil in China. Its oil industry took off with the 1959 discovery of Daqing ("Great Celebration") in Heilongjiang, the country's largest oilfi eld until it was overtaken by the off shore Bohai oilfi eld in 2021. Daqing was quickly followed by the other two major oilfi elds in the Northeast-Shengli ("Victory") in Shandong and Dagang ("Big Port") near Tianjin. Th ese oilfi elds turned up at a perfect time. Th e deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950s precipitated a near complete break of economic cooperation in the summer of 1960, when Moscow suddenly withdrew all Soviet technicians from China. Left to itself, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under Chairman Mao Zedong, doubled down on "self-reliance" as the cannon of China's economic development. While Soviet oil exports to China tailed off in the 1960s, Beijing imported oil equipment from the Eastern bloc (Hungary, Romania, East Germany, Albania, etc.) and the Western bloc (France, Italy, Japan, etc.) to develop the newly found oilfi elds, attaining self-suffi ciency in oil in the early 1960s. 4 Between the mid-1960s and the late 1970s, Chinese oil production increased more than tenfold, from 0.2 million bpd (barrels per day) to more than 2.1 million bpd. China seemed to be on its way to being an oil giant.

Journal of Global Policy and Governance

The oil and gas resources at stake in China's maritime disputes in the South China Sea are among the key drivers of conflict in this domain, but little is known about their underlying value and potential to address claimant states' energy security dilemmas. There appear to be significant opportunity costs in China's approach to these disputed zones and resources, both in the form of damaged regional political relationships and foregone opportunities to exploit more lucrative resources. This essay offers an explanation of China's behavior with respect to these resources, finding structural conditions in the regional political and economic environment to be a central concern for Chinese leadership and energy firms. Uncertainty about world energy markets and vulnerability to American market and military power are forwarded as crucial drivers of China's efforts to secure control over offshore hydrocarbons. This argument is developed through comparison to Japan's management of energy security, and evaluation of the geostrategic circumstances that shape China's approach to world energy markets.

2014

Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internationales y …, 2005

China Quarterly, 2004

China's shift to a net oil importer has generated much speculation outside China about how China's growing dependence on foreign oil will affect its international behaviour. This discussion is framed by two competing models of China's future approach to energy security: one that foresees deeper integration into global energy markets and another that predicts efforts to minimize reliance on these markets in potentially destabilizing ways. Less attention has been paid, however, to the parallel debate unfolding inside China over how to ensure the country's oil needs are met without undermining national security. This article introduces the main participants in the debate, how the debate relates to energy security decision-making, and some of the measures to enhance energy security under consideration. It concludes with a discussion of some of the factors that will shape China's emerging approach to energy security.

Energy Policy, 2011

The integration of China into the world oil market is an important issue for at least two reasons. First, the influence of the country on the world oil market is dependent on the level of the integration. Second, integration into the world oil market means that China is opening itself up to potential disturbances in the world market and this leads to significant energy security concerns for the country. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether or not China is an integral part of the world oil market. By reviewing the relevant trade and pricing policies of the Chinese government as well as the behavior of the Chinese national oil companies, we find that China is actively engaging itself in the world oil market. Our time-series results show that the Chinese oil price is cointegrated with the major oil prices in the world and a high degree of co-movement between the prices is found. Causality between the price pairs is found to be bi-directional in most cases. The empirical results suggest that China is now an integral part of the world oil market.

China Journal, 2011

2012

Abstract: The dramatic increase in investment by Chinese SOEs in overseas oil assets is primarily driven by energy security concerns. Whether such investment will benefit or harm energy security of other countries is hotly contested. On one hand, this investment can supplement the overall lack of investment in the sector, benefiting all consumers. On the other hand, it may exacerbate environmental and political problems associated with fossil fuels.

Energy Policy, 2011

China, now the world's second-largest economy, is worried about energy security, which underpins the core objectives of Beijing and the political legitimacy of the Communist Party of China. The purpose of this study is to explore certain popular myths about China's energy security. The study consists of six parts. After the introduction, it formulates the obscure concept of ''energy security'' and attempts to contextualize it with ''Chinese characteristics.'' Then it explicitly points out that the largest driver of oil demand by China as the ''World's Factory'' is transport instead of industry. Next, it explores the effectiveness of transnational pipelines as a measure of energy security and explains why they are less effective than many observers have previously assumed. Furthermore, it investigates the global expansion of Chinese national oil companies and questions their actual contribution to energy security. A few concluding remarks then follow.

2021

This book examines the development of bilateral energy relations between China and the two oil-rich countries, Kazakhstan and Russia. Challenging conventional assumptions about energy politics and China's global quest for oil, this book examines the interplay of politics and sociocultural contexts. It shows how energy resources become ideas and how these ideas are mobilized in the realm of international relations. China's relations with Kazakhstan and Russia are simultaneously enabled and constrained by the discursive politics of oil. It is argued that to build collaborative and constructive energy relations with China, its partners in Kazakhstan, Russia, and elsewhere must consider not only the material realities of China's energy industry and the institutional settings of China's energy policy but also the multiple symbolic meanings that energy resources and, particularly, oil acquire in China. China's Energy Security and Relations with Petrostates offers a nuanced understanding of China's bilateral energy relations with Kazakhstan and Russia, raising essential questions about the social logic of international energy politics. It will appeal to students and scholars of international relations, energy security, Chinese and post-Soviet studies, along with researchers working in the fields of energy policy and environmental sustainability.

2012

Appendix 5.2. China's Outward Foreign Direct Investments and Policies Appendix 5.3. Perspectives in China's Outward Mergers and Acquisitions by Sector Appendix 5.4. Chinese Regulatory Bodies for Overseas Investments Appendix 5.5.

Chinese Economic Statecraft from 1978 to 1989: The First Decade of Deng Xiaoping’s Reforms, 2022