Adaptive Magnitude and Valence Biases in a Dynamic Memory Task

2019

A common finding is that items associated with higher reward value are subsequently remembered better than items associated with lower value. A confounding factor is that when a higher value stimuli is presented, this typically signals to participants that it is now a particularly important time to engage in the task. When this was controlled, Madan et al. (2012) still found a large value-bias of memory. Their value-learning procedure, however, explicitly pitted highagainst low-value words. Our novel value-learning procedure trained words one at a time, avoiding direct competition between words, but with no difference in words signalling participants to engage in the task. Results converged on null effects of value on subsequent free recall accuracy. Re-analyses attributed Madan et al.’s value-bias to competition between choice items that were paired during learning. Value may not bias memory if it does not signal task importance or induce inter-item competition.

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2016

Prior research illustrates that memory can guide value-based decision-making. For example, previous work has implicated both working memory and procedural memory (i.e., reinforcement learning) in guiding choice. However, other types of memories, such as episodic memory, may also influence decision-making. Here we test the role for episodic memory-specifically item versus associative memory-in supporting value-based choice. Participants completed a task where they first learned the value associated with trial unique lotteries. After a short delay, they completed a decision-making task where they could choose to reengage with previously encountered lotteries, or new never before seen lotteries. Finally, participants completed a surprise memory test for the lotteries and their associated values. Results indicate that participants chose to reengage more often with lotteries that resulted in high versus low rewards. Critically, participants not only formed detailed, associative memories for the reward values coupled with individual lotteries, but also exhibited adaptive decision-making only when they had intact associative memory. We further found that the relationship between adaptive choice and associative memory generalized to more complex, ecologically valid choice behavior, such as social decisionmaking. However, individuals more strongly encode experiences of social violations-such as being treated unfairly, suggesting a bias for how individuals form associative memories within social contexts. Together, these findings provide an important integration of episodic memory and decision-making literatures to better understand key mechanisms supporting adaptive behavior.

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2015

Behavioural studies over half a century indicate that making categorical choices alters beliefs about the state of the world. People seem biased to confirm previous choices, and to suppress contradicting information. These choice-dependent biases imply a fundamental bound of human rationality. However, it remains unclear whether these effects extend to lower level decisions, and only little is known about the computational mechanisms underlying them. Building on the framework of sequential-sampling models of decision-making, we developed novel psychophysical protocols that enable us to dissect quantitatively how choices affect the way decision-makers accumulate additional noisy evidence. We find robust choice-induced biases in the accumulation of abstract numerical (experiment 1) and low-level perceptual (experiment 2) evidence. These biases deteriorate estimations of the mean value of the numerical sequence (experiment 1) and reduce the likelihood to revise decisions (experiment 2)...

Memory & Cognition, 2012

An ability to flexibly shift a decision criterion can be advantageous. For example, a known change in the base rate of targets and distractors on a recognition memory test will lead optimal decision makers to shift their criterion accordingly. In the present study, 95 individuals participated in two recognition memory tests that included periodic changes in the base rate probability that the test stimulus had been presented during the study session. The results reveal a wide variability in the tendency to shift decision criterion in response to this probability information, with some appropriately shifting and others not shifting at all. However, participants were highly reliable in their tendency to shift criterion across tests. The goal of the present study was to explain what factors account for these individual differences. To accomplish this, over 50 variables were assessed for each individual (e.g., personality, cognitive style, state of mind). Using a regression model that incorporated different sets of factors, over 50 % of the variance was accounted for. The results of the analysis describe the total, direct, and mediating effects on criterion shifting from factors that include memory strength, strategy, and inherent characteristics such as a fun-seeking personality, a negative affect, and military rank. The results are discussed with respect to understanding why participants rarely chose an optimal decisionmaking strategy and provide greater insight into the underlying mechanisms of recognition memory.

Behavioural Processes, 2011

This study characterized preferential choice in binary trials and investigated intra-session variations in response time (RT). In Experiment 1, participants (N = 77) were asked to choose the preferred of two images of body wash; all unique combinations of 19 images were presented. The results showed: (a) marked and consistent individual preferences for specific stimuli; (b) RT decreased monotonically with increasing exposure to each stimulus; (c) RT decreased exponentially as a function of relative preference ranking of the 2 images in a trial; and (d) a regression model efficiently predicted trial RT as a function of exposure and relative preference. Experiment 2 (N = 112) explored the effect of amount of exposure on RT, and relative preference as a function of the type of choice task (a previously completed vs. a new choice task). The results showed that: (a) within a single choice task, amount of exposure and relative preference between the stimuli predicted the systematic changes in RT observed in Exp. 1; and (b) when the choice task changed, the effects of previous amount of exposure, and relative stimulus preference did not transfer to the new task.

2020

While making decisions, humans and other animals always need to balance the desire to gather sensory information (to make the best choice) with the urge to act, facing a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Given the ubiquity of the SAT across species, extensive research has been devoted to understanding the computational mechanisms allowing its regulation at different timescales, including from one context to another, and from one decision to another. However, in dynamic environments, animals often need to change their SAT on even shorter timescales – i.e., over the course of an ongoing decision – and very little is known about the mechanisms that allow such rapid adaptations. The present study aimed at addressing this issue. Human subjects performed a modified version of the tokens task, where an increase or a decrease in penalty occurring halfway through the trial promoted rapid SAT shifts, favoring speeded decisions either in the early or in the late stage of the trial. Importantly, t...

Social Cognition, 2021

The current research presents a novel perspective regarding individual differences in intertemporal choice preferences. We postulate that such differences are partly rooted in individuals’ valence weighting proclivities—their characteristic manner of weighting positive and negative valence when constructing an initial evaluation. Importantly, valence weighting bias should predict intertemporal choice most strongly (a) for those who are relatively low in trait self-control and (b) when the magnitude of the available rewards is relatively small, because these two factors are associated with lesser motivation/resources to deliberate extensively about one's decision. More specifically, we propose that those with a more positive weighting bias give greater weight to the clearly positive immediate reward that is under consideration, and under these conditions, the resulting appraisal shapes choice more strongly. Using a performance-based measure of valence weighting tendencies, a hypothetical intertemporal choice task, and a self-report measure of trait self-control, we provide evidence for our hypothesis.

Cognitive Psychology, 2022

Many real-world decisions must be made on basis of experienced outcomes. However, there is little consensus about the mechanisms by which people make these decisions from experience (DfE). Across five experiments, we identified several factors influencing DfE. We also introduce a novel computational modeling framework, the memory for exemplars model (MEM-EX), which posits that decision makers rely on memory for previously experienced outcomes to make choices. Using MEM-EX, we demonstrate how cognitive mechanisms provide intuitive and parsimonious explanations for the effects of value-ignorance, salience, outcome order, and sample size. We also conduct a cross-validation analysis of several models within the MEM-EX framework. We compare these to three alternative models; two baseline models built on the principle of expected value maximization, and another employing a suite of choice methods previously shown to perform well in prediction tournaments. We find that MEM-EX consistently outperforms these competitors, demonstrating its value as a tool for making quantitative predictions without overfitting. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of the interplay between attention, memory, and experience-based choice.

Previous studies suggest that factual learning, that is, learning from obtained outcomes, is biased, such that participants preferentially take into account positive, as compared to negative , prediction errors. However, whether or not the prediction error valence also affects counterfactual learning, that is, learning from forgone outcomes, is unknown. To address this question, we analysed the performance of two groups of participants on reinforcement learning tasks using a computational model that was adapted to test if prediction error valence influences learning. We carried out two experiments: in the factual learning experiment , participants learned from partial feedback (i.e., the outcome of the chosen option only); in the counterfactual learning experiment, participants learned from complete feedback information (i.e., the outcomes of both the chosen and unchosen option were displayed). In the factual learning experiment, we replicated previous findings of a valence-induced bias, whereby participants learned preferentially from positive, relative to negative, prediction errors. In contrast, for counterfactual learning, we found the opposite valence-induced bias: negative prediction errors were preferentially taken into account, relative to positive ones. When considering valence-induced bias in the context of both factual and counterfactual learning, it appears that people tend to preferentially take into account information that confirms their current choice. While the investigation of decision-making biases has a long history in economics and psychology, learning biases have been much less systematically investigated. This is surprising as most of the choices we deal with in everyday life are recurrent, thus allowing learning to occur and therefore influencing future decision-making. Combining beha-vioural testing and computational modeling, here we show that the valence of an outcome biases both factual and counterfactual learning. When considering factual and

Journal of Memory and Language, 2010

A hybrid evaluative-conditioning/source-monitoring paradigm is put forward as an alternative to the standard evaluative-conditioning paradigm. The first experiment paired brand names with a small number of attractive or unattractive female faces and used a likeability rating task as well as a source monitoring task. The second experiment paired words which differed along a masculine-feminine dimension with male and female faces, and used a speeded judgment about whether words were stereotypically masculine or feminine. The third experiment paired words that differed along an active-inactive dimension with male and female faces and used a variation of the Implicit Association Test where judgments about whether words were active or inactive were mixed with judgments about whether faces were male or female. In all three experiments, we observed transfer between the recently acquired information and the judgment task. In addition, the three experiments progressively reduce the probability of demand characteristics. We explain the results in this paradigm, and in many other paradigms, as a breakdown in access control. We also point to several similarities between existing theories of evaluative conditioning and memory phenomena/theories that have gone unnoticed in the evaluative conditioning literature.