Skilful Reflection

We argue that skilful reflection makes a positive epistemic contribution to epistemic standings. We begin by setting out the dialectical context of our discussion of skilful reflection. In particular the significance of reflection for Sosa's account of knowledge and the charges laid against philosophers' use of reflection by Kornblith. In order to advance our thesis while being responsive to the dialectic we develop an account of skilful reflection. We do so by hypothesising that reflection involves both Type 1 and Type 2 processes, while remaining neutral to the charge that reflection simpliciter doesn't make a positive epistemic contribution. Drawing on our dual process hypothesis of reflection, we then outline how reflection can be skilful. Having provided an account of skilful reflection and having made the case that skilful reflection can make a positive contribution to our epistemic standings, we make the case for a Confucian based account of skilful reflection as an epistemic virtue. On this account, a central feature of such a character trait is that reflection is informed by both retrospective and perspective considerations. We next briefly assess how skilful reflection can make an epistemic contribution in a number of different domains. We return to Sosa's account of knowledge and show the role that our account of reflection as an epistemic virtue can play. More specifically, we show how both our account of skilful reflection based on the dual process theory and the Confucian based account of the epistemic virtue of reflectiveness can significantly develop Sosa's account of knowledge.

2018

I discuss reflection as a means to achieve true belief and avoid error. I argue in the first section how can this be treated as a separate problem. In the second section, I discuss Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology approach to the epistemic value of reflection. In the third, I raise problems for this view and argue that, if ignorance possess epistemic value, it is an interesting form of dealing with these difficulties.

Philosophical Studies, 2011

In his volume reflective knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers an account of knowledge, an argument against internalist foundationalism, and a solution to the problem of easy knowledge. This paper offers challenges to Sosa on each of those three things.

Erkenntnis, 2020

Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option.

Philosophical Studies, 2013

Sosa's newest book, Knowing Fu! We! 1 , is an impressive contribution to the field. It displays a remarkable breadth of focus, weighing in on a wide range of issues in contemporary epistemology, from the value problem and the bootstrapping problem, to contextualism and knowledge as the norm of assertion. The unifying theme in all this is Sosa's virtue theoretical idea of knowledge as successful performance: epistemic normativity, on his view, is a species of performance normativity; performances more generally are evaluable with respect to whether they succeed in their aims by manifesting a competence, and epistemic evaluation is just a special case where the performance is belief with the aim of truth. In typical Sosa fashion, the contemporary problems are not treated as isolated puzzles, but are connected with and brought to bear on the central traditional concerns of epistemology, tracing back through Moore and Descartes. ! There are too many themes here for me to discuss more than a few in any detail, so I want to focus on the titular topic of knowing full well and the related topics of animal and reflective knowledge. Animal and reflective knowledge have obviously played an important role-and perhaps different roles-in Sosa's epistemology over the years, and I won't try to trace in any detail the evolution of his views on this distinction; I focus mainly on where it stands now. ! Let me start with a simplified overview. Animal knowledge is first-level unreflective knowledge, which is a matter of getting things right through the exercise or manifestation of a skill or competence. In the triple-A terminology Sosa uses, a belief can be "accurate" (true), "adroit" (competently/reliably produced), and, most importantly, "apt" (accurate because adroit). Animal knowledge is thus apt belief. Reflective knowledge is, roughly (more on this shortly), apt belief aptly noted; not only is the agent getting things right at the object level as the result of a cognitive competence, but the agent is manifesting

In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections. Many have found it helpful to posit a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. On such accounts, animal knowledge is a kind of low-grade externalist knowledge that non-human animals and children are capable of possessing. In contrast, reflective knowledge is a more valuable state that requires the subject to have a certain perspective on her belief. It is intuitive to think that subjects capable of reflective knowledge sometimes only have animal knowledge with respect to some proposition; that is, that they have animal knowledge that p while simultaneously failing to have reflective knowledge that p. We argue that this intuitive thought is mistaken. We utilize plausible considerations about defeat and higher-order evidence to make the case that reflective subjects that lack reflective knowledge thereby have a defeater which prevents them from having mere animal knowledge.

This paper advances the claim that skilful reflection is a master virtue in that skilful reflection shapes and corrects the other epistemic and intellectual virtues. We make the case that skilful reflection does this with both competence-based epistemic virtues and character-based intellectual virtues. In making the case that skilful reflection is a master virtue, we identify the roots of ideas central to our thesis in Confucian philosophy. In particular, we discuss the Confucian conception of reflection, as well as different levels of epistemic virtue. Next we set out the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, which provides an explanation of the workings of reflection in relation to Type 1 and Type 2 cognitive processes. In particular, we flag how repetition of Type 2 processes may eventually shape Type 1 processes and produce what we call downstream reflection. We distinguish competence-based epistemic virtues from character-based intellectual virtues. We also explain how our metacognition account of reflection, drawing on a Confucian conception of reflection and the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, explains skilful reflection as a master virtue. Finally we outline an application of our metacognition account of reflection to a current debate in epistemology.

Philosophical Issues, 2019

Ernest Sosa has suggested that we distinguish between animal knowledge, on the one hand, and reflective knowledge, on the other. Animal knowledge is direct, immediate, and foundationally structured, while reflective knowledge involves a knower's higher-order awareness of her own mental states, and is structured by relations of coherence. Although Sosa's distinction is extremely appealing, it also faces serious problems. In particular, the sorts of processes that would be required for reflective knowledge, as Sosa understands it, are not processes that are instantiated in human cognition.

In this paper, I will be arguing for a view of knowledge as a true belief that manifests a competent (epistemic) agency. Beyond a mere juxtaposition of performing skills, epistemic competent agency requires an integration of faculties at a personal level that is sufficient to evaluate the agent's epistemic risk in particular situations. I will propose that, in order to meet this requirement, agency must scale to a personal level where the agent's engagement in epistemic situations manifests a competent endorsement of her beliefs. This view can deal with the predicaments of Virtue Epistemology in a naturalistic atmosphere by changing the emphasis from representation to agency, and by considering knowledge as an expression of achievement. This interpretation faces two related problems: first, the issue of self-knowledge in agency, and second, the problem of the integration of competencies from the personal standpoint of a unified agent. In this paper, I will only be dealing with the second problem.

Cognitio, 2020

In contemporary analytic philosophy, while some epistemologists claim that reflection-understood as a critical self-examination of belief-is a necessary condition for the attribution of valuable epistemic states, others reject this claim and maintain that philosophers tend to overestimate the value of reflection in their reports of epistemological phenomena. In this essay, we present a brief overview of this debate and outline the elements that constitute disagreement between epistemologists. Our diagnosis is that, despite radical disagreement, these positions converge, because they deal with reflection from an individualistic point of view, defining it as an agent's private metacognitive performance of her own epistemic states. As well as being a reason for disagreement, this conception of reflection may be the reason that epistemologists misunderstand its place and value. Resumo: Na filosofia analítica contemporânea, enquanto alguns epistemólogos afirmam que a reflexão-entendida como autoexame crítico das crenças-é uma condição necessária para a atribuição de estados epistêmicos valiosos, outros rejeitam essa afirmação e sustentam que os filósofos tendem a superestimar o valor da reflexão em seus relatos de fenômenos epistemológicos. Neste ensaio, apresentamos um breve panorama desse debate e indicamos os elementos que constituem o desacordo entre epistemólogos. Nosso diagnóstico é que, a despeito do radical desacordo, essas posições convergem porque tratam a reflexão de um ponto de vista individualista, uma vez que a definem como uma performance metacognitiva privada de um agente sobre os próprios estados epistêmicos. Além de ser um motivo de desacordo, essa concepção de reflexão pode ser a razão de uma compreensão equivocada dos epistemólogos sobre o lugar e valor da reflexão.