A THEORY OF JUSTICE

This paper presents an interpretation of the slogan "Justice as fairness." Consider two people share a concept of justice, but have rival theories of when there is justice, rival conceptions. We can label the theories, e.g. theory 1 and theory 2, or theory A and theory B, and Rawls is using "fairness" as a label for his theory. The utilitarian would say, "My theory is really what fairness is."

2020

This chapter introduces the idea of distributive justice. It identifies several different views of what characterizes distributive justice, as opposed to other types of justice and to nonjustice-based moral demands. The preconditions of distributive justice, its primary sub ject and its object, and its normative significance are discussed. The chapter then sug gests that bringing the diversity of usages of the concept of distributive justice into view helps cast light on some of the many contemporary debates about distributive justice and its limits. This chapter also introduces and outlines the different topics covered by the dif ferent sections and chapters of the book.

Abstract The main goal of this dissertation is to present an interpretation of what it should mean for a society to fulfil the ideals of freedom and equality. I argue that society should equalise levels of individual freedom. I defend this thesis in three stages, which are associated to the three parts of the dissertation. Part (A) is devoted to the elaboration of a new conception of freedom. The objective is to rehabilitate the intuitive idea that associates individual freedom with the ability to do or be what one wants. In chapter 1, I engage with the analytical literature on freedom and develop a conception of freedom according to which individuals are free overall to the extent that they have the specific freedoms they authentically prefer, where a specific freedom is defined by the probability that the agent will realise a phenomenon. The extent of one’s freedom is thus made to depend on how reality relates to what one authentically wants it to be. In chapter 2, I offer a method for the measurement of freedom so conceived. According to this method, a person’s level of overall freedom is obtained by multiplying the physical extent of her actual specific freedoms by the evaluative extent to which these actual specific freedoms correspond to her authentically preferred ones. In part (B), I defend the claim that a strictly and continuously equal distribution of this individual freedom is the best embodiment of moral equality. Firstly, in chapter 3, I argue that freedom is a better egalitarian currency than welfare, resources, capabilities and pluralist alternatives because freedom’s anti-perfectionism, anti-fetishism and flexibility make it an optimal tool for the pursuit of any life plan. Freedom supports equally moral persons regardless of the ends they require, the means they need or the relative value they assign to these means. Secondly, in chapter 4, I defend strict and continuous equality as a distributive criterion over time. I show that efficiency-based and responsibility-based arguments in favour of inequalities are incompatible with the equal respect owed to moral persons. As long as individuals qualify as moral persons, they are owed equal respect and hence equal amounts of overall freedom. Thirdly, I address the famous claim according to which freedom and equality are conflicting ideals. I argue that this claim either stems from mistaking a conceptual distinction between a currency and a distributive criterion as a conflict of ideals, or expresses deeper disagreement over the meaning of freedom or the role of aggregative considerations in moral distributions. In any case, the claim is seriously weakened if not entirely destroyed. Parts (A) and (B) form the ideal theory of Equal Freedom. In part (C), which is constituted by chapter 5, I try to show how this ideal theory can guide us in nonideal circumstances. Firstly, I suggest a model to understand the relation between ideal and nonideal theory. I argue that nonideal theory is best understood as involving the maximisation of the realisation of the ideal under feasibility constraints and moral constraints imposed by the very nature of the ideal. Secondly, I apply this model to Equal Freedom. The main result is a radically egalitarian balance between concerns for feasibility, relative and absolute levels of overall freedom. Thirdly, I discuss in more detail policy strategies and proposals to equalise freedom in nonideal circumstances. As an example, I assess the desirability and feasibility of a ‘right to be heard’, which is an enforceable right given to employees that provides them with a capacity to alter their workplace environment in accordance with their life plans. This evaluation concludes my defence of Equal Freedom as the core of a theory of social justice. Résumé Le principal objectif de cette thèse est de présenter une interprétation de ce que devrait être une société qui réalise les idéaux de liberté et d’égalité. J’y défends l’idée selon laquelle une telle société devrait égaliser la liberté individuelle. Cette défense s’articule en trois moments, qui correspondent aux trois parties de la thèse. La partie (A) est consacrée à l’élaboration d’une nouvelle conception de la liberté. Il s’agit de réhabiliter l’intuition qui associe la liberté individuelle à la capacité de faire ou d’être ce que l’on veut. Dans le chapitre 1, je me sers de la littérature analytique portant sur la liberté pour développer une conception de la liberté selon laquelle les individus sont libres dans la mesure où ils possèdent les libertés spécifiques qu’ils préfèrent authentiquement, considérant qu’une liberté spécifique se définit par la probabilité qu’un agent réalisera un phénomène. L’étendue de la liberté d’une personne dépend donc du degré de correspondance entre la réalité et ses préférences authentiques portant sur la réalité. Dans le chapitre 2, je propose une méthode pour mesurer cette liberté. Selon cette méthode, le niveau de liberté globale d’une personne s’obtient en multipliant l’étendue physique de ses libertés spécifiques actuelles par le degré de correspondance entre la valeur de ces libertés spécifiques et celle des libertés qu’elle préfère authentiquement. Dans la partie (B), je défends l’idée qu’une égalisation stricte et continue de cette liberté individuelle est la meilleure interprétation de l’égalité morale. Premièrement, dans le chapitre 3, je suggère que la liberté est une meilleure unité de comparaison pour l’égalitarisme que le bien-être, les ressources, les capabilités et les alternatives pluralistes car son anti-perfectionnisme, son anti-fétichisme et sa flexibilité en font un outil optimal pour la poursuite de tout plan de vie. La liberté offre en effet un soutien égal aux personnes morales sans égard aux fins qu’elles poursuivent, aux moyens qu’elles requièrent ou à la valeur relative qu’elles accordent à ces moyens. Deuxièmement, au chapitre 4, je propose l’égalité stricte et continue comme critère s’appliquant aux distributions ayant une dimension temporelle. Je montre que les arguments qui justifient des inégalités en se fondant sur des considérations d’efficacité ou de responsabilité sont incompatibles avec l’égal respect qui est dû aux personnes morales. Tant et aussi longtemps que des individus se qualifient comme personnes morales, on leur doit un égal respect et par conséquent, des quantités égales de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je traite de la fameuse idée selon laquelle la liberté et l’égalité sont des idéaux qui s’opposent. Je soutiens que cette idée découle soit d’une méprise concernant la distinction conceptuelle entre une unité de comparaison et un critère distributif, ou d’un désaccord plus profond portant sur le sens de la liberté ou le rôle de considérations agrégatives dans la détermination des distributions morales. Dans tous les cas, cette idée en sort sérieusement affaiblie sinon complètement anéantie. Les parties (A) et (B) constituent la théorie idéale d’Égale liberté. Dans la partie (C), qui est formée du chapitre 5, je tente de montrer comment cette théorie idéale peut nous guider dans des circonstances non-idéales. Premièrement, je suggère un modèle pour comprendre la relation entre la théorie idéale et la théorie non-idéale. Je soutiens que la théorie non-idéale doit être comprise comme impliquant la maximisation de la réalisation de l’idéal moyennant le respect des contraintes de faisabilité ainsi que des contraintes morales imposées par la nature même de l’idéal. Deuxièmement, j’applique ce modèle à l’idéal d’Égale liberté. Le résultat principal de cette application est un équilibre radicalement égalitaire entre l’importance à accorder à la faisabilité, aux niveaux relatifs ainsi qu’aux niveaux absolus de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je discute plus en détail de stratégies et de propositions de politiques publiques pouvant égaliser la liberté dans des circonstances non-idéales. En guise d’exemple, j’évalue la désirabilité et la faisabilité d’un « droit d’être entendu », qui est un droit destiné aux employés afin de leur offrir une capacité de modifier leur environnement de travail en conformité avec leur plan de vie. Cette évaluation conclut ma défense d’Égale liberté en tant que composante essentielle d’une théorie de la justice sociale.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2012) 15: 7-21

Amartya Sen argues that for the advancement of justice identification of ‘perfect’ justice is neither necessary nor sufficient. He replaces ‘perfect’ justice with comparative justice. Comparative justice limits itself to comparing social states with respect to degrees of justice. Sen’s central thesis is that identifying ‘perfect’ justice and comparing imperfect social states are ‘analytically disjoined’. This essay refutes Sen’s thesis by demonstrating that to be able to make adequate comparisons we need to identify and integrate criteria of comparison. This is precisely the aim of a theory of justice (such as John Rawls’s theory): identifying, integrating and ordering relevant principles of justice. The same integrated criteria that determine ‘perfect’ justice enable us to compare imperfect social states. Sen’s alternative approach, which is based on social choice theory, is incapable of avoiding contrary, indeterminate or incoherent directives where plural principles of justice conflict.

2013

Some of the earliest Western ideas about the virtues of character gave justice a prominent position, but if moral philosophy has made any progress at all in the past two centuries, we might think it worthwhile to reconsider what that virtue involves. Kant seems (even to most nonKantians) to have crystallized something important to our relations with others in formulating a proscription against treating others merely as means. And twentiethcentury moral and political theory put the justice of social institutions in the spotlight in an unprecedented way. Here I explore the signi! cance of these developments for what it is to be a just person (the nature of “individual justice”) as it was originally understood, within the eudaimonist virtueethical theories of the ancient Greeks. By any standard, ancient thinking about individual justice seems to have been incomplete in important ways; perhaps, in virtue of these advances in moral theory, we are in position to enrich our thinking about ...

Queen's University, 2015

In contemporary debates about justice, political philosophers take themselves to be engaged with a subject that’s narrower than the whole of morality. Many contemporary liberals, notably John Rawls, understand this narrowness in terms of context specificity. On their view, justice is the part of morality that applies to the context of a society’s institutions, but only has indirect application to the context of citizens’ personal lives (unlike the rest of morality). In contrast, many value pluralists, notably G.A. Cohen, understand justice’s narrowness in terms of singularity against a plural background. On their view, justice is one fundamental value amongst a plurality of fundamental values. The purpose of my thesis is to establish that the pluralist conception of justice’s narrowness is (a) theoretically significant and (b) true. To establish its theoretical significance, I argue that proper attention to the ways in which different understandings of narrowness inform the work of contemporary egalitarians explains a considerable amount of disagreement between them concerning the content and scope of distributive justice. On the one hand, I’ll argue that if we understand justice’s narrowness in the manner Cohen and other pluralists do, i.e., understand a conception of justice to be a conception of a particular fundamental value, then both luck-egalitarianism and the claim that justice extends to the personal context are compelling. On the other hand, I’ll argue that if we understand justice’s narrowness in a contextual manner, i.e., understand justice to comprise one or more all-things-considered principles adopted for the institutional context, then both luck-egalitarianism and the claim that justice extends to the personal context prove implausible. To establish the truth of the pluralist conception of narrowness, I argue first, that the contextual understanding is only plausible if fairness should be understood procedurally instead of substantively; and second, that substantive fairness cannot be eliminated, as specifying the content of procedural fairness requires a substantive criterion. The upshot is that justice’s narrowness is best understood in terms of singularity against a plural background, rather than in terms of context specificity.