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2008, Journal of the History of Ideas
This paper explores political fear in classical thought. Through an analysis of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, and Sallust, I discuss two broad uses of fear: fear as a source of unity and of moral energy. In addition, the paper addresses the enervating role of political fear in Tacitus’ writings. The discussion centers on three issues: first, I draw attention to an important and often neglected set of themes in classical thought; second, I provide a historical resource for contemporary discussions of political fear; third, I argue that fear’s multiple uses in political theorizing ought to be a focus of scholarly inquiry.
Communicating Public Opinion in the Roman Republic Edited by Cristina Rosillo-López Historia -Einzelschriften -Band 256, 2019
This paper examines the concept of political fear, its background and usage in the history of political thought. Fear is an emotion, which is caused by an anticipation of harm from a possible (or maybe imaginary) danger. According to Robin, what makes political fear differentiated from personal fear is that political fear "emanates from society or have consequences for society [...] Political fear arises from conflicts within and between societies." 1 The fear in everyday relations between individuals can be political as well, as they rely on the inequality and traditions of that society, which are created or at least supported by governmental policies.
assistance of a soothsayer (Alexander), and were met with success: Alexander was victorious and Theseus' war was concluded upon a treaty. 34
Philosophical Inquiry, 2018
Can Aristotle's reflections on fear explain fear-begotten activity? How and how well can any explanation offered be utilized in the diverse settings in which he takes fear to arise, e.g. on the battlefield, in the courts, aboard a storm-ravaged ship, in the face of illness, upon viewing a tragedy? These questions are worth pursuing not only insofar as they can help us to appreciate Aristotle's thinking on the nature and roles that fear can take in our lives, but also because his thought contrasts interestingly with some common suppositions of our own. Indeed, it may help to reveal the direction and originality of Aristotle's reflections by beginning with our common suppositions.
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2025
What does it mean to say that one 'ought' to undergo an emotion? In The Imperative of Responsibility, Hans Jonas provocatively asserts that 20th-century citizens 'ought' to fear for the well-being of future generations. I argue that Jonas' demand is not straightforwardly reducible to claims about the fittingness, expedience, or aretaic desirability of fear, and I present an interpretation of its content and coherence using Aristotle's moral psychology of fear in the Rhetoric, Politics, and Nicomachean Ethics as a framework. Aristotle's account of fear as an anticipatory, imaginative stance that alters perception and judgment helps to clarify that Jonas' demand concerns acts of affect-laden, imaginative reflection through which one might revise one's affective sensibilities with regard to future persons. I conclude by considering several objections to Jonas' first-order argument, and indicating several clarifications and caveats that are important for formulating strong normative assertions about political emotions more generally.
Within Sophocles' Ajax, Menelaus is generally regarded as an unsympathetic, authoritarian, and typically Spartan character. Indeed, scholars have often treated him as a common despotic ruler who, despite his wise words about civic order, was inevitably hated by the audience. The first part of this paper contextualises Menelaus' speech on the principles of fear of and respect for the law within the πόλις, suggesting it was actually a rather legitimate statement which included universally shared (i.e. Panhellenic) political views paralleled by several fifth-and fourth-century BC historical, philosophical and literary sources. While appreciating Sophocles' technique in portraying 'negative' mythological figures and assigning 'positive' features, the second part of this discussion analyses the resulting conflict between the particular situation of the tragic world and the universal principle of fearing and respecting the law, which may have led the audience to wonder about the possible injustices ensuing from the creation of a world governed by such an extreme and prevailing principle theorised by Menelaus.
Vox Patrum 35 (2015) t. 63, 2015
The purpose of this piece is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of fear and how it affected the battlefields of antiquity -that would require at least a monograph, which is yet to be written 1 . The subject of study needs to be narrowed down, allowing us to concentrate on a single historical source and provide a concise analysis of the issue. Every scholar dealing with the past is aware that talking about the feelings of people in ancient times is difficult and oftentimes impossible 2 . By using analogies we may describe what it felt like for a legionnaire to face down the terrifying barbarian hordes with a sword in hand 3 , surrounded by brothers-in-arms from his contubernium, but still these would be only speculations. It is difficult to account for all the cultural factors, just as it is hard to fully trust analogies. We can, however, by applying the concepts of social psychology, new military history and other fields of science, attempt to understand individual points of view and factors determining specific behaviors. Let's take, for example, melee combat -one of the most harrowing experiences that a soldier might be subjected to. He must stand face to face with the enemy, endure the mental and physical pressure and survive by killing his adversary. The feelings accompanying the act couldn't have changed much throughout the years, especially when we look at the course of numerous battles of late antiquity, which often ended with one side, whose morale
Epicurus often serves as the standard-bearer for the view that we can and should use our rational capacities to eliminate our fear of death. Although Epicurus clearly thought that many varieties of the fear of death arise from errors in reasoning, I argue that he believed that the fear of violent death is ineliminable and sometimes even advantageous. Humans have a natural and necessary desire for physical security, and the prospect that this desire might be frustrated causes fear. Thus, the best way to manage (though not eliminate) one's fear of a violent death is to establish favorable political circumstances rather than employ arguments against false beliefs.
2018
This essay is devoted to a short exposition on fear. It derives its inspiration from biblical stories. The reason is that often time when God commissioned a servant, the question of fear came up. In fact, the greater the mission, the more likely God addressed the problem caused by fear, or at least warned against it. To state a simple fact about humans, most of us fear at some point. No one is a stranger to fear. The great thing about fear is that it can help or hobble us. Fear is a God-given emotion that, when rightly operating, helps us, warning us of potential danger. But, like all emotive responses, when it gains mastery over us, when it rules without the influence of reason or wisdom, fear can quench hope and hobble faith. It should be no surprise then that over and over, God tells those he has called to his service to "Fear not." This text will begin by looking at a story that is reported in 2 Chronicles in the 20th chapter. A close scrutiny will illustrate why fear is a double-edged sword. What is important is not the presence of fear but how one responds to fear. The command, "Do not fear" "occurs 365 times in the Bible, one for every day of the year." Another commentator observed that, God specifically told His finest, "Do not be afraid!" A brief look at the Old and New Testament personalities will suffice to show how God dealt with his prophets and disciples.
Presented to the Muslim Student Organization and the Hispanic-American Student Association at the University of Detroit Mercy, November 16, 2010
2021
The last months disclose not only the fatal consequences of a global pandemic 1 but also the tight link between collective fear and social behavior, as well as power structures and political decision making. 2 The recent global events vividly illustrate how differently individuals and social groups perceive such threats and how differently they respond to it depending on cultural conditions and political climates in states, societies, and individual sub-cultural groups. Fear was and is omnipresent-everywhere and always. Thinking of plagues like the Black Death and the Spanish Flu, of periods of war like the Thirty Years' war and the First and Second World War, or local events with a more or less global impact, like terrorist attacks and natural catastrophes (droughts, floods, tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, volcanic eruptions, etc.) collective states of fear have been known and dealt with throughout history. They have made an irreversible impact on collective memories and they illustrate how fear can be used and misused. Effects and coping are dependent on the collective state of mind of a certain social group as well as contingent on the emotional climate prevailing and the emotional regime established. In the wake of these recent events, it seems somewhat timely to take a look at the phenomenon of collective fear in ancient cultures and how this fear was dealt with on both a non-recurring and daily basis. 1 This refers to the global COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic status has been declared by the WHO on the March 11 th , 2020. https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-generoal-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19-11-march-2020. Last time assessed 06.08.2020. 2 First studies analyzing the effect of fear of an infection with Covid-19 virus have already been issued in the fields of psychology and medicine in general. See, e. g., D.
Philosophica 4 , Ed. Ca' Foscari, 2019
In the discussion on bravery in Eth. Eud., III, 1 Aristotle determines the objects that are absolutely dreadful by means of an explicit reference to 'human nature'. This reference has not received much consideration from scholars in the field. The present paper argues that the reference under discussion entails a notion of 'human nature' that corresponds to a human being's psychological disposition to endure fearful emotions-that is to say, painful emotions that imply the representation of a pain capable of destroying a human being-up to a certain degree of intensity. Furthermore, this article claims that the same notion of 'human nature' is implied in Eth. Eud., II, 8 in the discussion of involun-tariness concerning the cases of mixed actions where Aristotle refers to the 'nature' of the agent as a criterion to determine the involuntariness of an action.
The Triumviral Period: Civil War, Political Crisis and Socioeconomic Transformations, éd. par Fr. Pina Polo, Séville, p. 229-248, 2020
2014
Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian war was the arena for a dramatic battle between politics and religion in the hearts and minds of the people. Fear and Loathing in Ancient Athens, originally published in German but now available for the first time in an expanded and revised English edition, sheds new light on this dramatic period of history and offers a new approach to the study of Greek religion. The book explores an extraordinary range of events and topics: impiety charges and prosecutions; the horrors of the plague; the mutilation of hermai and the profanation of the mysteries; the controversy created by the adoption of new gods; the impressive architectural structures of the sculptor Phidias; the military conflicts of the Peloponnesian war; and the thoughts of the mysterious philosopher Socrates. Fear and Loathing in Ancient Athens will be an indispensible study for students and scholars studying Athenian religion and politics.
2017
While scholars in the field of ancient Near Eastern Studies without doubt focus on the physical evidence of past human cultures, some core issues of personhood have rarely come to their attention. Investigating human cultures in the past or present, however, inevitably raises the subject of emotions, especially the issues surrounding fear, including its stimulation, appraisal, coping/management and prevention. Moreover, the investigation of humans as social creatures leads to the question of collective fear. Collective fear – or more precisely the preventive behavior associated with collective fear – is a strong driving force in social, religious and political behavior. While collective fear may be a universal human characteristic, its stimuli, management, and prevention take different shapes throughout time and space. This paper resorts to both texts, as the most obvious and ostensibly most direct sources, and to the archaeological record that has not yet played a substantial rule in the reconstruction of emotions. In this respect, this paper provides a methodological perspective on the whole matter of collective fear in the ancient Near East. Thus, it explores the potential of textual and material sources, the approaches that can be taken, and the insights we can gain with respect to the social and political structures of past societies, especially those of the ancient Near East, where collective fear clearly played an important role that extends deeply into the domains of power, politics and religion.
Fear is one of the strongest motivations and incentives for human actions. A basic or primary emotion, fear does not only govern reactions to immanent stimuli, but it also influences reactions and decisions that concern situations that are yet to happen. The human capacity to anticipate future events and to act prophylactically on them are considerably fostered by fear: Fear of what could potentially happen. Collective fear is especially entangled with its sociocultural and historical embedding. It feeds to a large extent (also not exclusively) on shared social self-images, mutual ideologies and common values. Religious and political world views as well as current discourses and established power structures determine how fear is appraised and how strategies are developed to face it. In past and present times, people cope with collective fear and anxiety on very different levels. In our days, state-run risk and hazard analyses, counter terrorist measures, and disaster control can be mentioned. Likewise, we observe engagements with dystopia in movies, literature, and the fine arts. How fear and anxiety based on (alleged) knowledge of events of the past and their possible reoccurrence have been expressed, mastered, managed, exploited, or tabooed, is a desideratum for research in the study of the Ancient Near East. In this vein, this workshop proposes to tackle these issues through the different and complementary perspectives of the text and material based sciences. It hopes to bring into focus such phenomena as coping with fear (e.g. laments and myth), preventing damaging incidents and situations (e.g. rituals, the construction of defense and protection architecture, building up stocks), and dispelling the instrumentation of fear and anxiety (e.g. threat of divine punishment and of losing divine favor). By taking the different perspective of material and text studies and by looking at various socio-cultural circumstances, we hope to gain insight into the omnipresent relationship of humankind and collective fear that has been politically and ideologically (mis-)used until present times
In the present paper, I argue that the Stoic view of the world, based on reason (λόγος) and providence (πρόνοια) – which complement each other – had a massive influence on Epictetus' conception of fear. Thus, fear is generally treated in his works as one of the most common manifestations of errors in logic. Fear without an explicitly named agent, fear of the decay of the body or diseases, of the tyrant or the loss of property and means, as well as fear with respect to family, or friends, and especially regarding one's own death can be reduced to the lack of adequate knowledge that ultimately leads to errors of judgment.
In Laws 646e4, right after the puppet allegory, the Athenian introduces a distinction between ‘two virtually opposite kinds of fear’ (δύο φόβων εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐναντία). The first is described very generally as the expectation of evils, whereas the second refers, more specifically, to the fear of a bad reputation, also called ‘shame’ (αἰσχύνη; αἰδώς). Contrary to common fear, this second kind is to be fostered in the citizens’ souls. Based on this positive account of the emotion of shame and the considerable emphasis it receives throughout the dialogue, this paper offers a close reading of the relevant context that precedes this passage, leading to the assumption that in the Laws certain emotions not only help to acquire virtue, but actually partake in virtue. Furthermore, an analysis of the connection between the introduction of two kinds of fear and the puppet image reveals a reverse analogy between courage and moderation, and moreover, of no less importance, strongly suggests that in the Laws the tripartition of the soul continues to be Plato’s underlying thought pattern in regard to psychology.
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