Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative

Social Science Research Network, 2002

aBstract. The meaning of " electoral governance " is often equated with " electoral administration ". The process, however, can be divided into three distinct stages: 1) formation of regulatory bodies and norms; 2) implementation of these norms; and 3) dispute resolution. Given these three parts, electoral governance amounts to much more than just administration. In this article we explain why many academic studies of electoral governance have neglected the role of conflict resolution, focusing instead on the first two elements. In this way, electoral governance is mistakenly conceived as merely a mechanism for establishing regulatory bodies and rules. Our second goal is to show readers that electoral governance is a process that starts with the enactment of legislation, continues with administrative enforcement and judicial response, and concludes when the process returns to the beginning, either through judicial interpretation or recommendation by a legislative body. Our preliminary conclusion is that a proper understanding of electoral governance must take into account the role of conflict resolution, especially for disputed elections. Lastly, consideration must be given to a final phase which incorporates a cyclical conception explaining the returning process to the legislative dimension. resuMen. La gobernanza electoral ha sido considerada como la adminis-tración de elecciones. Sin embargo, el concepto integral está compuesto por tres dimensiones: 1) el diseño constitucional y legal de los órganos reguladores y de los estándares; 2) la aplicación de reglas y 3) la resolución de disputas, consi-derando estos tres niveles la gobernanza electoral es más que la administración de elecciones. En este artículo mostramos como los estudios sobre la gobernanza electoral han olvidado la dimensión de la resolución de conflictos y se han cen-trado en las otras dos dimensiones, lo que ha propiciado que la gobernanza sea revisada solamente como un mecanismo para el diseño de órganos y reglas. Esto nos lleva al segundo propósito del trabajo: explicar cómo la gobernanza electoral es un proceso que inicia con la creación de leyes, continúa con la aplicación administrativa y con la resolución judicial, para terminar cuando el proceso reinicia el ciclo, ya sea mediante una interpretación jurisprudencial o por medio de una recomendación al órgano legislativo. Nuestra conclusión preliminar es que una noción integral de la gobernanza electoral debe considerar tanto ele-mentos teóricos como empíricos: primero, el énfasis en la dimensión de resolución de conflictos, especialmente en contextos de elecciones disputadas; segundo, la consideración de una fase final que incorpora una perspectiva cíclica que regresa el proceso a la dimensión legislativa.

What makes the sphere of opinion share in sovereignty depends…on the form the sovereign takes. Voting for or electing a representative is what makes the forum share in sovereignty and the reference point in relation to which opinion plays its role. Democratic theorists have argued, rightly, that the centrality of decision in politics makes election the only truly democratic institution. Votes are the most reliable public data at our disposal, and voting is the only formal way citizens have to punish and threaten their rulers. 'Voting is an imposition of a will over a will,' not a mere opinion; it is that which counts as a decision beyond reasonable doubt. Yet the way in which will is imposed matters a lot, as differences between direct I have added to the original list a short addendum on "lots, lotteries, and sortition in law and politics" as these remain democratic options that can either replace or (more likely) complement the use of elections in participatory, deliberative, and representative fora and settings.

The Political Review and Analytics, 2020

Democracy may not be the grant for headway, acknowledgment of its characteristics can provoke a made political structure. The political structure where these characteristics are kept up, adequate, and all-around rehearsed organization. Where there is a satisfactory organization, improvement is ensured. Head to Democracy is a political choice. Regardless, an uncommon political race, it must be an impartial, free, sensible, and substantial designated cycle. A strong political race incorporates the electorate during the time spent organization, thusly making a legitimized government. Activity with credibility, as such, ensures tremendous organization. This article keeps an eye on the features of joining the political race with respect to the improvement of the larger part rules or popular government framework and the divergences of trade and vital structures. The assistant functionalism of a state is to be used as the theoretical structure of the assessment. It is recommended that the public boss need to make selective cycles similarly as different techniques free, sensible, and legitimate by ensuring that their political choices are truly independent to lead sound political choice in all of their countries. The article wraps up by including openings making due in the general dominant part controls framework structure.

2016

Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2011

I propose a twofold classification of the main considerations underlying the choice of an election procedure: political criteria on the one hand, and social-choice criteria on the other. I formulate political dichotomies, each combination of which narrows down the choice of procedure to a sub-class of the class of all procedures. I discuss what social-choice theory has to offer in each of these.

International Journal of Legal Developments and Allied Issues, 2015

Elections lie at the heart of the democratic process as it is through the act of voting that government by consent is secured. Yet, no country has been able to solve the riddle put forward by Oliver Cromwell who stated that, "as much for government by consent as any man, but if you ask me how it is to be done, I confess I do not know." 152 Modern democracies employ a wide variety of electoral systems, but there is no general consensus on which is best. Each system has its own characteristic virtues and defects. 153

An efficient electoral system for a representative democratic government must include appropriate rules for both party representation and personal representation. Many classifications and analyses of electoral systems focus on the distinction between majority-and proportional-rules. By doing this they address only party representation, but neglect the second essential element of any electoral system: personal representation. Some basic elements of an electoral system, mainly district magnitude (or number of seats to be elected in each district) and the electoral formula, are tools to allocate seats to parties, that is, to produce party representation. The voting procedure as shaped by the ballot form, to be studied here, deals with the allocation of seats to persons in order to produce personal representation. An electoral system can include rules to allocate both seats to parties and persons in order to produce both party and personal representation.

disP - The Planning Review, 2013

2000

It is a staple assumption of current political science that rules and institutions matter. Although, which rules and institutions matter, and to what/whom they are supposed to matter, are often more muddled topics. Such a lack of clarity is not the case for the study of electoral systems, however. From Duverger's 'tendencies' onwards, it has been quite clear which institutions matter to what: the counting rules for votes matter to the outcome of the election. And a great deal of work has been devoted to showing how different players are advantaged or disadvantaged by various counting rules. This was done relatively informally by early electoral reformers such as Enid Lakeman (1974) and more formally by Rae (1967).