Who Drives Climate-relevant Policies in Brazil?

Politics & Energy eJournal, 2013

In the five-year period 2005-09, Brazil has dramatically reduced carbon emissions by around 25% and at the same time has kept a stable economic growth rate of 3.5% annually. This combination of economic growth and emissions reduction is unique in the world. The driver was a dramatic reduction in deforestation in the Amazonian forest and the Cerrado Savannah. This shift empowered the sustainability social forces in Brazil to the point that the national Congress passed (December 2009) a very progressive law internalising carbon constraints and promoting the transition to a low-carbon economy. The transformation in Brazil’s carbon emissions profile and climate policy has increased the potentialities of convergence between the European Union and Brazil. The first part of this paper examines the assumption on which this paper is based, mainly that the trajectory of carbon emissions and climate/energy policies of the G20 powers is much more important than the United Nations multilateral n...

Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 2014

Climate change has become a powerful social and political driver of our time. Within this context, progressive national and international societies are faced with a central challenge: how can reformist forces become strong enough to bypass the efforts of conservative forces and initiate a rapid and profound response to the climate crisis? This article reviews the politics of climate change in Brazil between 2005 and 2012 with reference to this central societal challenge, focusing on reformist and conservative actors such as economic and social forces, as well as the role of the government. This review identifies three periods: first, 2005-2008, when reformist forces grew strongly from a weak base; second, 2009-2010, when there was a peak in influence of reformist forces, while at the same time as conservative forces were growing strong; and third, 2011-2012, when conservative forces became predominant and were strongly supported by the government.

This book gives continuity to the commitment of the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipea) in developing studies and research in the area of climate change, which already rests on a long tradition of reflecting on topics such as: costs and benefits of mitigation and adaptation actions, environmental planning in urban and social environments, international politics, development of instruments for technological advancement and regulation of market instruments, as well as in contributing to the Brazilian delegation on the Climate Convention negotiations. This book is a joint effort of the Department of Sectorial Policies and Studies in Innovation, Regulation and Infrastructure (Diset) and the Department of Regional, Urban and Environmental Policies and Studies (Dirur). We would also like to thank very much GIZ (Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit) that provided financial resources that enabled the revision of this edition in English. 2. Beyond UNFCCC the Convention to Combat Desertification and the Convention on Biological Diversity were adopted. 3. Vulnerability resulting from very low income levels and/or the magnitude and reach of climate change impacts. There is also an alliance, The Alliance of Small Island States (Aosis), recognized by the convention. 4. Almost all developed countries listed in Annex I of the convention also appear in Annex B of the KP and are thus denominated "Annex I countries". 5. The US did not ratify the Protocol years later. 6. Carbon markets for Annex I countries and the clean development mechanism (CDM) for transactions with countries outside Annex I with the supplementary objective of promoting sustainable development. See Seroa da Motta (2002) for a discussion on the trade offs between this doubble objective.

2007

Brazil is no doubt one of the world’s most influential regions with regards to energy and climatechange. Due to its sheer size and stunning economic growth, the country is generally regarded as one of the emerging economies expected to become dominant players in the global economy. It is also thehome of one the world’s most complex ecosystems, the Amazon rainforest, which is viewed as an important component in the global climate system. With regards to energy, Brazil has for many years pursued active policies to promote hydroenergy and the use of biofuels. Consequently, it has a unique energy profile with a high degree of renewable energy. Over the years, Brazil has also played anactive role in the global climate change negotiations and was, among other things, the principal instigator of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). At the same time, the use of fossil fuels is currently growing at a rapid pace and the country recently emerged as the world’s fifth largest emitterof greenho...

GIGA Focus Lateinamerika, 2021

Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has been characterised by a sharp increase in deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions, support for agribusiness, and the repression of indigenous peoples and environmental activists. At the Glasgow COP26 climate conference this November, however, Brazil presented itself as more willing to compromise. Yet, the reasons for new pledges do not indicate a changed mindset, but rather an increasing commodification of climate protection that serves economic interests. Brazil’s contribution to international climate protection is urgently needed. At first sight, the promises made by the Brazilian government at the Glasgow climate conference seem surprising, as Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has been marked by increasing deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions and reduced climate protection measures. A closer look at the government’s record and its new pledges reveals that they do not represent a real shift in the country’s climate policy. Greenwashing rhetoric aside, the latest pledges also need to be understood as an attempt to secure profits from financialised conservation mechanisms such as voluntary carbon markets. Chances for a real turnaround in Brazil’s domestic and international climate approach will come only with a change of president in the upcoming elections in October 2022. Until then, the hopes for climate action lie with Brazil’s federal states and with civil society organisations, both of which have been implementing climate initiatives on the subnational level and demonstrated strong unity and commitment at the Glasgow summit.

Because of Brazil’s ecological vulnerability and traditional insistence on national sovereignty, the right to development and the “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBRD) principle, one would expect a Brazilian approach to climate change talks that rejects binding agreements and any interference with domestic policy. However, Brazil has shifted its position in recent years, particularly since 2009, from a rejection of any binding commitments to a reluctant acceptance of a higher level of responsibility for major developing countries, which was especially evident in Brazil’s active role in the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009 and during the 2011 Durban Climate Change Convention when it helped to negotiate a legally binding agreement to follow the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2020. This chapter argues that rather than constituting a minor concern or component of Brazil’s foreign policy agenda, environmental issues are increasingly significant and have allowed the country to showcase its claims about the effectiveness of Brazil’s own climate change policies and its ability to broker international deals on thorny topics while bridging the interests of developed and developing countries. Brazilian global leadership ambitions involve projecting its domestic climate change policy on a global stage through active participation in climate change negotiations and the promotion of climate change monitoring and renewable energy. Environmental foreign policy can help legitimise Brazil’s ambitions to become a global and regional leader but discrepancies with domestic environmental policies and development goals have the potential to undermine this agenda. Using a constructivist explanatory approach to the role of ideas, norms and identities in foreign policy, the first section of this chapter argues that environmental leadership has become a significant concern for Brazil. Legitimacy is a major incentive for emerging powers to engage in international climate change governance, which in the case of Brazil is based on claims about the effectiveness of the domestic climate change agenda. The second section demonstrates that these environmental leadership ambitions are also in line with the expansion of renewable energy to support national economic development and wider foreign policy ambitions. The third section argues that Brazil’s projected carbon emissions reductions by 2020 rely heavily on efforts to reduce deforestation, which is a source of considerable international legitimacy. The final section explains how these tensions and dilemmas have been translated into Brazil’s position in recent climate talks, arguing that the shift towards nationally differentiated but binding commitments is rooted in Brazil’s domestic climate change agenda and foreign policy ambitions. The country’s position also reflects that its environmental foreign policy continues to be framed by ideas about economic development which are not necessarily sustainable. Although renewable energy and deforestation policies are a key part of Brazil’s efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change, they have also provoked vocal international and domestic opposition due to their high environmental and social costs.

International Journal for Innovation Education and Research, 2020

Considering the interaction between climate and energy policies, this paper analyzes the activities of Carbon Capture and Storage in the Brazilian context of public choices. The methodology of the work consists of normative and bibliographical revision, using the qualitative and deductive methods. The hypothesis of this research corroborates the thesis that the governance of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage activities in Brazil is found in the already existing configuration proposed for public policies directed to climate and energy changes in the country.

A Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI) é uma publicação semestral do Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI) dedicada a promover a reflexão, a pesquisa e o debate acadêmico sobre relações internacionais e sobre a política exterior do Brasil.

2019

This paper analyzes the emergence of Brazil's climate adaptation agenda and discusses its divergences regarding the climate mitigation program and the missed goal of the National Adaptation Plan to promote the integration of sectoral agendas. Additionally, drawing on on-the-ground surveys and analyses of institutional documents, this paper examines the combinations of policy instruments that have helped rural populations in the semiarid region of Pernambuco adapt to climate events. It draws on a sociopolitical approach to policy integration, especially the analysis of policy processes affecting decisions and patterns of coordination.

Climate and Development, 2013

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