On the functionalization of pluralist approaches to truth

Philosophical Books 46: 311-330., 2005

In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates . New York: Oxford University Press, 2013

The past decade has marked a period of significant development for pluralist theories of truth. This paper utilizes several distinctions to categorize the current theoretical landscape, and then compares the theoretical structure of four pluralist theories-namely, strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism. We conclude by arguing that it is difficult for adherents of the three other pluralist views to reject the viability of some form of alethic disjunctivism. By this we mean that, by the lights of each of these other views, there is a disjunctive truth property that ought to qualify as a legitimate truth property. for discussion. We are especially grateful to Doug Edwards and two anonymous referees for extensive written comments. 1 Note that monism does not entail that all discourse is truth-apt, but rather, that any and all discourse, when truth-apt, must be so in the same way. Thus, monists aren't committed, by their theory of truth, to the truth-aptitude of any or all particular kinds of discourse-they can happily grant the denial of truth-aptness to propositions in normative ethics and moral theory, for example.

A common objection to deflationism is that it is unable to account for the normative import of truth as a norm for assertion and belief. Most of the versions of truth pluralism agree, against deflationsim that the normativity of truth is a substantive feature of it. Alethic functionalism, as defended by Lynch (2009) includes it among the platitudes characteristic of the role of truth which are manifested differently in various domains. But I argue that this multiple manifestation is incompatible both with the uniformity and the substantiveness of the norm of truth for belief. Either alethic functionalism has to reject the first, but then it cannot maintain the view that the same norm of truth applies across domains, or it gives up the second, and comes dangerously close to deflationism.

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2012

According to Alethic Functionalism, the theory of Truth Michael P. Lynch advocates in his impressive book Truth as One and Many, 'Truth is an immanent functional property that is variably manifested' 1. That Truth is a functional property means that it is the property which essentially realises a conceptual role, the truth-role. This role is individuated by what Lynch calls 'truisms', that is to say a core of conceptual, commonsense truths about truth. These are: Objectivity (if a proposition is true things are as the proposition says they are); Norm of belief (we should believe only true propositions); Aim of Inquiry (other things being equal, believing true propositions is a worthy aim of our inquiries). That Truth is variably manifested means that there are different properties which play the truthrole in different domains of discourse and which therefore realise Truth in those domains. Alethic Functionalism, it is argued, overcomes the main problems of traditional Alethic Monism, according to which there is only one property which plays the truth-role, and standard Alethic Pluralism, advocated by Crispin Wright, according to which truth-bearers in different domains of discourse are true in different ways and there is no single truth-property that all true truth-bearers share 2. The main problem of Alethic Monism is, according to Lynch, the so-called 'scope problem', i.e. that whatever property the monist chooses to identify with truth (for instance correspondence or an epistemically constrained property such as Wright's superassertibility or Lynch's superwarrant) is at best able to account for the truth of truth-bearers belonging to some specific domain of discourse. One of the main problems of standard Alethic Pluralism is, on the other hand, that of accounting for the truth of mixed compounds (complex propositions whose 1 M.

Philosophy in review, 2015

(hereafter C.D. Wright). The edited volume contains an introduction and sixteen essays dealing with alethic pluralism. The book has three thematically organized parts. I will discuss some issues raised in part one of the volume in more detail below. However, first I provide a very brief statement of the topics covered in each of the sixteen essays in the anthology. Part one contains essays by Michael Lynch, Pedersen and C.D. Wright, Douglas Edwards and Crispin Wright (hereafter Wright). Most of the discussions in part one deal with a tradition of work on alethic pluralism that originates with Wright's pioneering Truth and Objectivity and Michael Lynch's influential functionalist variant of alethic pluralism discussed primarily in his Truth as One and Many. In an earlier helpful review of this anthology Matti Eklund calls this tradition Wright-Lynch pluralism. Part one also contains two papers by Marian David and Pascal Engel that raise critical challenges for Wright-Lynch pluralism.

Analytic Philosophy, 2011

In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates . New York: Oxford University Press, 2013

Synthese, 2005

According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the view's main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes ''true'' as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.

Synthese, 2024

Within the secular and still ongoing discussion about truth, what is by now known as alethic pluralism has proved to be one of the most interesting proposals advanced in the field. Indeed, from the last decade of the last century onwards, the field of theories about truth has been enriched with the idea that truth is not only one but also many-many alethically potent properties that differently characterise different domains of discourse. Moreover, thirty or so years of discussions have also shown that alethic pluralism itself is many rather than one-a family of views with different metaphysical commitments. As it may happen in all good families, though, some members are neglected or overshadowed. This is the case with the view called "simple alethic pluralism", and this paper seeks to remedy this. Accordingly, a new kind of simple alethic pluralism (termed "Plain Alethic Pluralism") is advanced. It highlights the features of the meaning of the word "true", in particular its focal meaning, while reaffirming the dependence of truth on the world. In drawing attention to the way speakers use the truth-predicate, making it acquire the meaning it has, it intends to qualify as a conception of truth with a human face.

In this short paper I restrict my focus to Lynch’s formulation of alethic pluralism - the view which he calls ‘alethic functionalism’ - and to address the issue of just how different it is from deflationary theories of truth. I suggest that, using Lynch’s framework, we can construct a view – ‘deflationary functionalism’ - which shares the main features of alethic functionalism, yet seems very close to a deflationary view. Given – as I argue - that deflationary functionalism shares the distinctive features of alethic functionalism, we are entitled to wonder whether alethic functionalism ends up far closer to deflationism than Lynch would like to allow.