Can virtue be taught?
Thomas Zinner2024, Can virtue be taught?
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Abstract
In the history of philosophy there have been many attempts to define virtues and answer the fa-mous question if virtue can be taught or not. The ancient Greek philosophers struggled with this question in the same manner as we struggle with it today. The problem is the definition of virtues and their complex development. Nonetheless is there an importance to the ability to teach vir-tues, even though nobody can define what a school of virtues could look like. In this essay we are going to look at the different arguments and try to get as near as possible to an answer to the question “Can virtue be taught?”.
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