Priority theory and utility theory
luis vargas1987, Mathematical Modelling
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Abstract
The first axiom of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) states that the pairwise comparison judgments are reciprocal. Here we explore the relationships between the reciprocal property and preference relations with and without the axiom of transitivity and point out some important distinctions between utility theory and the AHP.
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