Saving moral realism: Against Blackburn's projectivism

However, not all attitudes are so easily classifiable. In many cases we might find ourselves unable to tell whether someone's attitude is approvable or condemnable from the moral standpoint. Does this imply that, in such situations, our moral judgement is neither true nor false in a determinate way? The projectivist may handle this case by advising us to keep on doing what we often do, namely to argue about the undecidable moral judgement as if it would be either true or false, and not both. The principle of bivalence would still figure as part of the logic of moral discourse, although it would be justified as a regulative principle. 12 The above considerations show that ethical antirealism is not incompatible with the adoption of the principle of bivalence. The semantic definition of realism alleges that this principle is acceptable only by ethical realists. It seems, therefore, that the purely semantic approach to the debate over realism in ethics is wrong. In general, I would argue that the issue between ethical realists and their opponents is not whether some semantic or logical principle applies in moral discourse, but why it does so. In order to answer this question we need to take a closer look at the ontological and epistemological theses of the participants in the moral realism debate. 1.4 Ontology Whatever else it involves, realism is a claim about the reality of something. Ethical realism, at its minimum, is the claim that ethical qualities are real. The notion of 'reality' is part of the conceptual armour of ontological inquiry. Therefore, ethical realism is an ontological position. 12 Cf. Blackburn's discussion of the pragmatic considerations that may justify the adoption of the principle of bivalence in legal contexts-(1980): 23-27, (1984) sec. 6.4. The above paragraph provides a simple, intuitive way to understand realism in ethics. However, the very simplicity of the ontological definition might leave us unsatisfied, perhaps on the ground that it does not suffice to state that according to ethical realism ethical qualities are real: it should also be explained what it is for an ethical quality to be real. More accurately, we need an account of the reality of ethical qualities that would help us demarcate the doctrine of ethical realism from its rivals. A first way to clarify the claim that ethical qualities are real would be to present it as equivalent to the claim that these qualities exist. 13 The correspondent attack on the doctrine of ethical realism would be to argue that ethical qualities do not exist. 14 However, many contemporary antirealists do not dispute that, in a certain sense, ethical properties indeed exist. Therefore, the thesis that ethical properties or facts exist is not the distinguishing mark of the realist position. I shall support this claim by illustrating how prescriptivists and projectivists can argue for the existence of ethical properties without committing themselves to the ontological doctrine of ethical realism. Prescriptivists suggest that a moral property, like 'goodness' may be said to exist if it fulfils any of the following criteria: (i) we can meaningfully say of something that it is good; (ii) we can truly say of something that it is good; or (iii) 'goodness' can be referred to, i.e. it can take the subject-place in a true or false statement. 15 Prescriptivists accept (i) because they assert that judgements including ethical predicates are meaningful. They can also accept (ii) and (iii) because, as we saw earlier in this chapter, they can hold that the notion of truth is applicable in moral discourse. Therefore, prescriptivists can be happy to embrace the view that 13 Platts (1980a), Brink (1984), Dancy (1993) ch. 5. 14 Mackie (1977): 19. Note, however, that Mackie asserts that only objective values do not exist; cf. below sec. 2.2. 15 Hare (1985a): 41-43. The above considerations show that antirealists need not object to the claim that, in a certain sense, ethical properties exist. Therefore, the realist position in ethics has to involve something more than the claim that these properties exist. Dummett's account of realism seems to indicate what this 'more' could be. He claims that realism entails that the referents of statements in a given class exist independently of our knowledge of them. 19 This claim combines an ontological with an epistemological assertion. More precisely, it qualifies the ontological doctrine of the existence of certain things with an epistemological clause about the relation of those things to human knowledge. I call the latter clause 'epistemological' with some reservations, since it does not directly concern either the nature or the possibility of human knowledge. 20 However, I admit that it might be useful to think of this claim as epistemological for two reasons. From a systematic standpoint, the claim that certain objects exist independently of human knowledge reveals something of importance about the limits of human knowledge and, hence, about its nature. From a historical standpoint, the above claim is a product of the succession of ontology by epistemology in the throne of first philosophy. As we shall see in the next section the role of knowledge in a proper definition of realism was first underlined by one of the best epistemologists of all times. 1.5 Epistemology Declarations of independence from knowledge figure predominantly in the modern discussions of metaphysical realism. Kant was probably the first to define realism as the claim that the world 19 Dummett (1982): 230. 20 For an unreserved adoption of the label, as well as of the doctrine that it expresses, see Grayling (1992). exists independently of the cognitive aspects of human mind. 21 His approach has influenced the work of several philosophers who endorse realism in ethics. 22 It may be useful, therefore, to consider some of the elements of the Kantian theory that bear directly on the problem of the definition of realism in ethics. Kant asserts that we perceive objects as existing independently of our perception of them. He calls this position "empirical realism". 23 The question he set himself to answer is how we could justify this position. There are two ways to approach this issue. One is to adopt the doctrine of "transcendental realism" according to which space, time and the things that appear in them exist independently of our cognition. 24 The other is to adopt the doctrine of "transcendental idealism" according to which things appear necessarily in ways determined by the a priori categories of human mind. 25 Kant, of course, favours the latter of the above options. Transcendental idealism states that the objects of our perception are not things "in themselves" but things in their relation to "us and [to] our sensibility". 26 Kant calls things of the former type "noumena" and of the latter type "phenomena". 27 He asserts that 21 Kant (1781/87, henceforth KrV) A 439. 22 See, for instance, Nagel (1980), McDowell (1981b), Putnam (1987). In what follows I refer only to this school of ethical realism and, in particular, to the work of John McDowell and of his realist allies. See below, secs 3.4-3.6, for a discussion of the ontological doctrines of 'Cornell' realists, and Hatzimoysis (1993) for a critical account of their epistemological doctrines. 23 KrV A 369. 24 KrV A491/B519, A543/B571. 25 KrV A26/B42-A28/B44. 26 KrV A369. 27 KrV B307-309. the dependence of phenomena on our sensibility explains how human subjects may form representations of objects, that seem to correspond to real items in the world. According to Kant, the transcendental idealist's account of the objects of our perceptions explains and, in that sense, justifies the empirical realist's claim that we perceive phenomena as existing independently of us. 28 It might help our understanding of Kant's position if we consider it in the light of the distinction between ontological and phenomenological claims. Transcendental idealism is an ontological claim about how certain objects exist : it asserts that the objects of our experience exist only in relation to our cognitive apparatus. Empirical realism is a phenomenological claim about how we experience these objects: it states that we experience spatiotemporal objects as existing 'outside us', independently of our cognition. Contemporary ethical realists employ a revised version of the above Kantian distinction in claiming that we experience the world of natural and moral facts as existing independently of us. They argue also that this claim is best supported by the hypothesis that the realm of appearances is metaphysically dependent on human mind. However, they disagree with Kant on a crucial point: whereas Kant believed that the dependence of appearances on our conceptual apparatus entails some form of idealist ontology, most contemporary ethical realists contend that such a dependence deducts nothing from the reality of ethical properties or facts. I shall now reconstruct, in outline, the main argument offered in support of their contention. The distinction between reality and appearances can be drawn only from a human standpoint, by employing the tools offered by our language or 'conceptual scheme'. We can place an object on either side of this distinction only if we can talk or reflect about that object in a 28 An examination of Kant's arguments in support of this claim is, needless to say, beyond the scope of this introduction. I have discussed some of the methodological aspects of Kant's defence of transcendental idealism in (1991): 2-9. coherent, meaningful way. However noumena are, by definition, inaccessible by means of our conceptual apparatus. Hence, noumena cannot figure in either part of the reality-appearances distinction. Therefore, this ontological distinction concerns only the realm of phenomena or, in Kant's terms, the realm of things that exist dependently on us and our sensibility. Ethical qualities are dependent on the...

Philosophical Studies, 2005

Simon Blackburn Encountering Chinese Philosophy, 2024

Generally speaking, moral realism is a position good to take but difficult to defend. It is good to take because it provides a solid foundation for our moral judgements about the rightness and wrongness of actions. It is difficult to defend because it needs to explain away the apparent difference between non-moral claims such as “someone steals” and moral claims such as “it is wrong for the person to steal”; indeed, any attempts to do so have to surmount the almost insurmountable blocks piled up by moral anti-realists such Is-Ought problem, open question argument, argument from queerness, argument from relativity, and argument from evolution, to name just a few. In contrast, moral anti-realism is a position easy to defend but not good to take. It is easy to defend because it simply accepts the apparent difference between non-moral claims and moral claims as given, explaining that, while the former describes the world, the latter prescribes it. It is a position not good to take, however, because if moral anti-realism is true, then there is no clear way for us to determine whether a particular moral claim is true, and even if there is a way to do it, it is difficult to prevent it from falling into the hopeless moral relativism. In this chapter, we are going to examine two strategies to eat the cake and have it. Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism takes an anti-realist position, claiming that our value judgements are expression of our attitudes instead of description or representation of the reality, and yet still aims to earn the right to talk of moral truth, which he does by appealing to coherentism, pragmatism, and what I consider to be realism of another brand. The last one is most significant: our moral claims as expressions of our attitudes are true not in terms of their accurate representation of the external reality but in terms of their correspondence with our human nature. While we can only find some hint to this most promising approach in Blackburn, who is indeed quite unsure about it, it is Wang Yangming who develops a full-blown version of moral realism of that brand, which is primarily concerned with moral properties of goodness and badness of a person, in contrast to the familiar type of moral realism, which is primarily concerned with moral properties of rightness or wrongness of action. Elsewhere I characterize it as an agent-focused moral realism in contrast to the action-focused one (Huang 2024).

Philosophy Compass, 2007

This article explains for a general philosophical audience the central issues and strategies in the contemporary moral realism debate. It critically surveys the contribution of some recent scholarship, representing expressivist and pragmatist nondescriptivism (Mark Timmons, Hilary Putnam), subjectivist and nonsubjectivist naturalism (Michael Smith, Paul Bloomfield, Philippa Foot), nonnaturalism (Russ Shafer-Landau, T. M. Scanlon) and error theory (Richard Joyce). Four different faces of 'moral realism' are distinguished: semantic, ontological, metaphysical and normative. The debate is presented as taking shape under dialectical pressure from the demands of (i) capturing the moral appearances; and (ii) reconciling morality with our understanding of the mind and world.

Philosophical Studies, 2005

Philosophical Studies

This paper responds to a recently popular objection to non-naturalist, robust moral realism. The objection is that moral realism is morally objectionable, because realists are committed to taking evidence about the distribution (or non-existence) of non-natural properties to be relevant to their first-order moral commitments. I argue that such objections fail. The moral realist is indeed committed to conditionals such as “If there are no non-natural properties, then no action is wrong.” But the realist is not committed using this conditional in a modus-ponens inference upon coming to believe its antecedent. Placing the discussion in a wider epistemological discussion – here, that of “junk-knowledge”, and of how background knowledge determines the relevance of purported evidence – shows that this objection does not exert a price from the realist.

ETHOS: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social sciences , 2024

This paper attempts to deconstruct anti-realist's denial of moral facts. One of the controversial issues in meta-ethics is the debate about the ontological status of moral facts. This is an issue between moral realists and moral anti-realists. While moral realism affirms the existence of moral facts, moral anti-realism on the other hand is often interpreted as a thesis that denies the existence of moral facts. Thus, the fundamental problem however, is how to interpret this denial. This question is so pertinent because taking the debate at face value, scholars do not always pay attention to different ways by which this denial could be interpreted. This paper intends to fill the gap. The paper argues that contrary to the parochial way of looking at the anti-realist's denial of moral facts mainly from the absolute sense, there is another possible way by which the denial could be understood, which is the non-absolute sense. Essentially, in deconstructing moral anti-realist's denial of moral facts, this paper clarifies and examines (i) idealist-antirealists' argument, (ii) logical positivists' claim in defense of moral anti-realism.

The realist belief in robustly attitude-independent evaluative truths – more specifically, moral truths – is challenged by Sharon Street’s essay “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value”. We know the content of human normative beliefs and attitudes has been profoundly influenced by a Darwinian natural selection process that favors adaptivity. But if simple adaptivity can explain the content of our evaluative beliefs, any connection they might have with abstract moral truth would seem to be purely coincidental. She continues the skeptical attack in “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It”, concentrating on the intuitionist realism of Ronald Dworkin. The latter sees the issue fundamentally as a holistic choice between moral objectivity and the genocide-countenancing consequences of abandoning objective standards. Street counters that, because of realism’s skeptical difficulties, Dworkin’s Choice (as I call it) actually works in favor of her Euthyphronic antirealism. I will argue that she misrepresents the realist’s skeptical challenge, and that clarifying the character of that challenge renders the case for normative realism much more appealing. Indeed, I claim that Street fails to exclude the genuine possibility of a rational basis for moral truth.

The Philosophical Review, 1986

to provide an analysis of epistemology or ethics that permits us to see how the central evaluative functions of this domain could be carried out within existing (or prospective) empirical theories. Second, he attempts to show how traditional nonnaturalist accounts rely upon assumptions that are in some way incoherent, or that fit ill with existing science. And third, he presents to the skeptic a certain challenge, namely, to show how a skeptical account of our epistemic or moral practices could be as plausible, useful, or interesting as the account the naturalist offers, and how a skeptical reconstruction of such practices-should the skeptic, as often he does, attempt one-could succeed in preserving their distinctive place and function in human affairs. I will primarily be occupied This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Wed, 05 Aug 2020 21:59:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MORAL REALISM they revealed by reason or by some special mode of apprehension? (7) Bivalence-Does the principle of the excluded middle apply to moral judgments? (8) Determinateness-Given whatever procedures we have for assessing moral judgments, how much of morality is likely to be determinable? (9) Categoricity-Do all rational agents necessarily have some reason to obey moral imperatives? (10) Universality-Are moral imperatives applicable to all rational agents, even (should such exist) those who lack a reason to comply with them? (11) Assessment of existing moralities-Are present moral beliefs approximately true, or do prevailing moral intuitions in some other sense constitute privileged data? (12) Relativism-Does the truth or warrant of moraljudgments depend directly upon individually-or socially-adopted norms or practices? (13) Pluralism-Is there a uniquely good form of life or a uniquely right moral code, or could different forms of life or moral codes be appropriate in different circumstances? Here, then, are the approximate coordinates of my own view in this multidimensional conceptual space. I will argue for a form of moral realism which holds that moral judgments can bear truth values in a fundamentally non-epistemic sense of truth; that moral properties are objective, though relational; that moral properties supervene upon natural properties, and may be reducible to them; that moral inquiry is of a piece with empirical inquiry; that it cannot be known a priori whether bivalence holds for moral judgments or how determinately such judgments can be assessed; that there is reason to think we know a fair amount about morality, but also reason to think that current moralities are wrong in certain ways and could be wrong in quite general ways; that a rational agent may-fail to have a reason for obeying moral imperatives, although they may nonetheless be applicable to him; and that, while there are perfectly general criteria of moral assessment, nonetheless, by the nature of these criteria no one kind of life is likely to be appropriate for all individuals and no one set of norms appropriate for all societies and all times. The position thus described might well be called 'stark, raving moral realism', but for the sake of syntax, I will colorlessly call it 'moral realism'. This usage is not proprietary. Other positions, occupying more or less different coordinates, may have equal claim to either name.

If what we want from moral inquiry were the obtainment of objective moral truths, as moral realism claims it is, then there would be nothing morally unsatisfactory or lacking in a situation, in which we somehow had access to all moral truths, and were fundamentally finished with morality. In fact, that seems to be the realists’ conception of moral heaven. In this essay, however, I argue that some sort of moral wakefulness – that is, always paying attention to the subtleties of life and people, and never taking for granted what their moral significance can possibly be – is an essential moral value, and, therefore, moral realism, which promotes a moral ideal that allows such moral lethargy and inattentiveness is morally objectionable.