Lyne Social Epist

Informal Logic, 1993

Prudence has long been an important topic for rhetorical theorists and its place in intellectual history is becoming increasingly well documented. This essay develops a conception of prudence as an ideological construct, a term crafted in the history of its public usages to govern the relationship between common sense and political action as enacted in the name of historically situated social actors. From this perspective, prudence represents the recursive interaction between a rhetoric of judgment and the grounds on which that rhetoric is evaluated by a historically particular community of arguers. A case study of the 1991 U.S. Senate debate regarding the authorization of offensive military action in the Persian Gulf illustrates how competing standards of prudential judgment are crafted and evaluated in discursive controversy.

1986

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2013, 2013

This article appropriates Thomas Conley’s (1990) four classical positions on the nature and function of rhetoric, and assesses their relevance vis-à-vis three contemporary normative approaches to argumentation: the epistemological approach, pragma-dialectical theory, and informal logic. In each case, the room for the integration of rhetorical insights into argument evaluation is found to be restricted by dialectical and logico-epistemic norms endorsed in these approaches. Moreover, when rhetorical insights could fit the so restricted room, then the reliability and the specificity of such insights remain inversely related, with methodologically well-hardened knowledge of what persuades remaining too general. The trade-off between reliability and specificity of suasory knowledge, or so is our thesis, undermines the claim that rhetorical insights can presently inform the evaluation of natural language arguments in these three normative approaches.

Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1974

Pragmatics & beyond, 2016

The topic of rhetoric and stylistics in philosophy opens up the broader question for the Western tradition of the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. Rhetoric can be considered in two ways: either as a separate form of discourse, used by certain individuals at certain times for certain distinct purposes (persuasion), or as a general feature of all discourse insofar as every linguistic act unfolds in a style and aims to produce an effect on the receiver (move, instruct, entertain, deceive, convince. Philosophy likewise has gone through periods of institutional and societal isolation from other forms of discourse as well as periods where it reigned as queen over all other sciences and modes of expression. In short, both can have either particular applications or universal significance. This article will pursue the different modes of interaction between rhetoric and philosophy, first historically and then in terms of systematic and conceptual issues.

Meaning and Relevance, 2012

Rhetoric is a powerful tool, perhaps the preeminent capacity of our sentient species. In this paper, I seek to: (1) Define rhetoric in some of its various associations and usages, (2) depict ways in which it is increasingly used in our modern day with destructive and calamitous consequences, and (3) discuss its ideal manifestation through examination of the works of the father of rhetoric, Marcus Tullius Cicero, and emphasize its use as a tool for the up leveling of humanity. I propose that human beings have a solemn responsibility to make an exacting examination of rhetoric. I propose that the deterioration of language leads to the devolution of humanity. I further propose that the cultivation of expansive vocabulary, the study of great rhetoricians both past and present, and a focused application of the principles of persuasive language will reorient our species towards its evolutionary path. The tyranny of space limitations in this paper makes this a daunting task. In the end, I hope to reveal some touch points that will lead the reader to further seeking and understanding.

2002

I wish to thank many people for their support and assistance in the writing of this thesis. I would like to thank my supervisor, Kate Lilley, for her advice, encouragement, and detailed and constructive comments on my work. I am indebted to her for providing the intellectual environment in which I was able to develop an eclectic and interdisciplinary thesis. I thank Melissa Hardie, who was a helpful acting supervisor, and valuable discussant throughout, and Dr Margaret Rogerson and Dr Adrian Mitchell for their assistance. Meaghan Morris has given me tremendous support and sage advice over this period and I thank her also. I wish to thank my parents, John Docker and Ann Curthoys, for their tremendous intellectual and emotional support over a long period. I could not have done this thesis without them. I feel special gratitude to Sarah Irving for all her love and inspiration over the critical latter stages of this project. Jane Bennett and Bill Connolly provided stimulating and timely suggestions, and were generous hosts during my research on Hannah Arendt in the United States. I thank Desley Deacon for her friendship and her abiding interest in my ideas. Many people have played a role in bringing this thesis about, through their friendship, conversation, and feedback. I would like to thank Alex Wolfson for our long friendship, his good humour and support. I thank my good friend Zora Simic for reading and providing insightful commentary on sections of the thesis and Monique Rooney for her continuing assistance. Many thanks to Dirk Moses, who has consistently provided me with research materials and enthusiastic intellectual conversation, and to Marina Bollinger, who has been an enthusiastic participant in discussions about rhetoric, and has greatly contributed to my historical approach.