US-Russian nuclear arms control and disarmament

Petr Topychkanov

US-Russian nuclear arms control and disarmament

2019, SIPRI Yearbook 2019

Abstract

Chapter by Petr Topychkanov, Shannon Kile and Ian Davis. In 2018 Russia and the United States completed the implementation of the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). In February, the two countries announced that they had achieved the final New START force reduction limits by the specified deadline. However, the prospects for sustaining this progress appeared increasingly remote, given the political and military differences between the two countries. New START will expire in 2021 unless both parties agree to extend it, but there were no discussions in 2018 about doing so.

Figures (1)

ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; New Start = 2010 Russian-US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991; it entered into force in December 1994 and is due to expire in December 2009. The United States and Russia have held several meetings to discuss options for continuing their arms control relationship. They are currently negotiating a new Treaty that would replace START. START counts each deployed ICBM, SLBM, bomber as a single delivery vehicle under the Treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and attributes an agreed number of warheads to each deployed delivery vehicle. This attribution rule provides the total number of warheads that count under the 6,000 warhead limit in the Treaty. To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the numbers and locations of ballistic missiles, launchers and heavy bombers deployed by the other country. The parties use a wide variety of means to collect information-or monitor-these forces and activities. Some of these monitoring systems, such as overhead satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties. They also have also been required to exchange copious amounts of data on locations, operations, and technical characteristics of the treaty-limited items. This verification regime has allowed the parties to remain confident in each other's compliance with the Treaty. The United States and Russia began to discuss their options for arms control after START in mid-2006. During the Bush Administration, they were unable to agree on a path forward. Neither side wants to extend START in its current form, as some of the Treaty's provisions have begun to interfere with some military programs on both sides. Russia wants to replace START with a new Treaty that would further reduce deployed forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules in START. The United States initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty, but, under the Bush Administration, would have been willing to extend, informally, some of START's monitoring provisions. In 2008, the Bush Administration agreed to conclude a new Treaty, with monitoring provisions attached, but this Treaty would resemble the far less formal Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that the two sides signed in 2002. In December 2008, the two sides agreed that they wanted to replace START before it expired, but acknowledged that this task would have to be left to negotiations between Russia and the Obama Administration. President Obama and President Medvedev agreed at their meeting on April 2, 2009, to pursue "new and verifiable reductions" in their strategic offensive arms. The two sides are now pursuing negotiations on the new Treaty. The United States and Russia could choose from a number of options for the future of their arms control relationship. They could allow START to lapse or they could extend START for five years. They could extend START, then amend it to ease some of the outdated provisions. They could negotiate a new Treaty, or they could pursue less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. Moreover, if a new treaty included further reductions in nuclear weapons, it could use some START definitions and counting rules or the less formal Moscow Treaty declarations. This report will be updated as needed.

The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee both held hearings on the treaty. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament-the Duma and Federation Councilapproved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification. New START provides the parties with seven years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. New START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty's Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits. The monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side's forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges. New START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force. The Obama Administration and outside analysts argue that New START will strengthen strategic stability and enhance U.S. national security. They contend that New START will contribute to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals by convincing other nations that the United States is serious about its obligations under the NPT. This might convince more nations to cooperate with the United States in pressuring nations who are seeking their own nuclear weapons. Critics, however, question whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Some also consider the U.S.-Russian arms control process to be a distraction from the more important issues on the nonproliferation agenda.

On November 13, 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to reduce U.S. strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,000 operationally deployed warheads. He noted that he would make these reductions unilaterally, without pursuing a formal arms control agreement with Russia. President Putin welcomed the proposed reductions, but argued that they should be made through a formal treaty. Officials in the Bush Administration have frequently argued that the United States should not be bound by many of the formal arms control treaties considered or signed by previous administrations. It argues that these agreements do too little to limit threats to the United States and go too far in restricting U.S. flexibility in ensuring its national security. But, the absence of formal arms control treaties would bring about changes in the role of Congress; the Senate has a constitutionally-mandated role in giving advice and consent to the ratification of formal treaties but would have no role in approving informal agreements. This approach would also change the role of arms control in the relationship between the United States and Russia. The United States and Soviet Union used negotiated treaties and unilateral measures to reduce their nuclear forces. The START I Treaty, which reduced strategic offensive nuclear weapons, and START II Treaty, which did not enter into force, are examples of the former; the 1991 Presidential nuclear initiatives, which eliminated non-strategic nuclear weapons, are an example of the latter. A review of these cases highlights relative strengths and weaknesses of these two mechanisms. Formal treaties allow the participants to understand and predict future changes in forces and threats, allow for transparency in monitoring those forces, and allow for balanced and equitable trades between the forces of the participating parties. On the other hand, the search for balanced trades and the need for detailed definitions tends to lengthen the negotiating process, while the detailed provisions and requirements lengthen and add to the cost of the implementation process. Unilateral measures, on the other hand, can be devised and implemented more quickly, allow for more "sweeping changes," and provide the participants with the flexibility to reverse their reductions, if necessary. However, they often do not provide transparency or predictability, and there is the potential for destabilizing reversals. The Bush Administration's proposals demonstrates many, but not all of these characteristics. The President announced his proposed reductions relatively quickly, but he plans to implement them at a slow pace, over 10 years. And, although his reductions appear to move well beyond those implemented under START I, they are no more "sweeping" than reductions that have been considered for the past 10 years under START II and a potential START III Treaty. The President did not propose any new monitoring measures, but the United States and Russia are likely to continue to implement the monitoring regime from START I to improve transparency with future reductions. Finally, the President and his advisers have highlighted the fact that these measures will provide the United States with the flexibility to reduce or restore its forces quickly. Russia, on the other hand, may feel threatened by the U.S. ability to reverse its weapons reductions. And, without precise definitions of those weapons that will be eliminated, disputes and suspicion could arise in the future.

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