Academia.eduAcademia.edu

Irrealidad y ontología parmenídea

It is argued in this paper that there are fundamental negative facts. This violates what would seem reasonable for a Parmenidean ontology according to which there is nothing other than what there is, or at least that privations and absences are admissible as long as they are grounded on ‘positive’ facts. Fundamental negative facts seem to be required, in the first place, as truthmakers of some negative and general truths. It is argued here, however, that the problem is not restricted to a narrow class of propositions, but is ubiquitous and affects all finite beings. The point is that any finite being must possess determinate properties such as physical magnitudes or quantities. The fact that something possesses a determinate property of this kind requires, at least as a partial ground, a negative fact. Finitude seems to require fundamental negativity.