Defending the Coherence of Epistemic Contextualism

Modeling and Using Context, 2005

According to the thesis of epistemological contextualism, the truth conditions of sentences of the form 'S knows that P' and 'S does not know that P' vary according to the context in which they are uttered, where this variation is due to the semantics of 'knows'. Among the linguistic data that have been offered in support of epistemological contextualism are cases that are ordinary in the sense that they involve a consideration neither of skeptical hypotheses nor of skeptical arguments. Both Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose, contextualism's two most prominent proponents, provide such cases. In a recent paper, DeRose goes so far as to claim that such cases provide the best grounds for accepting contextualism. 1 In what follows, we argue that these cases do not support contextualism. In fact, they point in the direction of epistemological invariantism-the thesis that sentences of the form 'S knows that P' and 'S does not know that P' do not vary according to the context in which they are uttered.

The contextualistic account for the semantic behaviour of the term "know" -a position labelled as "epistemic contextualism" -combined with the widely accepted idea that "know" is a factive verb seems to lead to a very unpleasant conclusion: epistemic contextualism is inconsistent. In section 1 we first examine some aspects of the epistemological meaning of the contextualist semantics of "know", then in section 2 we sketch the problem which leads to the supposed inconsistency of epistemic contextualism and in section 3 we analyse some solutions that have been proposed to solve the problem which are, in our view, unsatisfactory. In section 4 we present our attempt of solution. 32 On this point Brendel seems to agree with Baumann, see pp. 45-47. 33 Baumann (2008) pag. 583.

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2015

In epistemology, contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge claims vary with the contexts in which those claims are made. This article surveys the main arguments for contextualism, describes a variety of different approaches to developing the view, and discusses how contextualism has been used to treat the problem of radical skepticism. It then presents and responds to a range of objections to contextualism arising from aspects of the linguistic behavior of the word `know' and its cognates. Finally, several alternatives to contextualism are presented, including traditional invariantism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and relativism.

2011

Erkenntnis, 2013

This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about 'knows'. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call 'practical interests contextualism'. I also answer some questions that contextualism leaves open, particularly why the concept of knowledge is valuable, why the word 'knows' exhibits context-variability, and why this term enjoys such widespread use. Finally, I show how my contextualist framework accommodates plausible ideas from two rival views: subject-sensitive invariantism and insensitive invariantism. This provides new support for contextualism and develops this view in a way that improves our understanding of the concept of knowledge.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017

Not all philosophical theses have the charm of epistemic contextualism, which, on one hand, offers appealing solutions to classical problems such as scepticism and, on the other hand, accounts for an immense range of phenomena comprising ordinary language, practical reasoning, and almost all that can be discussed in a philosophical 'conversation'. Given the scope of the topic and its extensive literature, epistemic contextualism has become remarkably difficult to fully defend. Peter Baumann has performed this task beyond expectation. His recent book systematically argues for epistemic contextualism on linguistic evidence [ch. 1] and theoretical grounds [chs 2, 3], with its problem-solving prospects [ch. 4] and extended significance for ethics [ch. 6]. Along with current objections to contextualism [ch. 7], Baumann also examines the 'knowability problem' that arises out of intercontextual knowledge-ascriptions [ch. 5]. Although many disputes over contextualism were due to the insufficient description of the purported cases, Baumann's selected examples of knowledge-ascription and knowledge-denial seem to be sophisticated enough to resist alternative explanations. Moreover, they illustrate the parameters and the determinants of the attributor's epistemic context. In addition to the stakes of the subject, Baumann has shown that the required levels of evidence, reliability, and credence for knowledge also depend on the ascriber's purpose, intention, and the norms that govern his conversation. Instead of putting 'too much weight on the argument from cases' [32], Baumann proceeds to defend contextualism with more theoretical considerations. The first theoretical argument begins with the reliability requirement of knowledge. Via the contextsensitivity of reliability, it concludes that knowledge is also context-sensitive [ch. 2]. The context-dependency of reliability is motivated by the contextualist solution to the well-known generality problem. For any particular belief, it always seems possible to individuate the belief's cognitive method so that it is reliably acquired. Thus, one should find a principled way of individuating cognitive methods; otherwise, the reliability condition would be trivial. Mark Heller has first suggested a contextualist way out of the trouble [1995]. That is, 'reliable' is context-dependent, and whether a process is reliable is already obvious in each context. Baumann follows this idea by extending the issue to the individuation of topics. In fact, the object of one's belief can also be indeterminate, which could affect the resultant reliability even when the cognitive method is fixed. The method of 'looking around', for instance, is good for 'figuring out whether a red coffee mug is in front of me', but is inadequate for determining 'whether my favorite red coffee mug with the piece missing in the handle is in front of me' [43]. Underneath the generality problem for the method and the topic is the indeterminacy of the reference class. Here, Baumann's favoured example concerns the life expectancy of a bus driver who lives in Glasgow, smokes two packets of cigarettes a day, regularly plays golf, etc. Provided that the groups by those properties do not have the same life expectancy, there is an 'irreducible and genuine indeterminacy' about which group it is to which we should refer [51-4, 145-6].

2007

Epistemic contextualism (EC) is primarily a semantic view, viz. the view that ‘knowledge’-ascriptions can change their contents with the conversational context. To be more precise, EC is the view that the predicate ‘know’ has an unstable Kaplan character, i.e. a character that does not map all contexts on the same content. According to EC, ‘know’ is thus an indexical expression. Notwithstanding this purely linguistic characterisation of EC, contextualists have traditionally argued that their views have considerable philosophical impact, this being due to the alleged fact that their linguistic views about ‘know’ provide the resources for a resolution of sceptical puzzles. In this paper I will address an objection to EC claiming that, as a linguistic view about the term ‘know’, EC cannot be of any epistemological significance.