A case in defence of John Austin

ARE THERE A PRIORI CONCEPTS? resemblance: now we do sense the colours, but we do not sense the resemblance. But surely, speaking carefully, we do not sense 'red* and 'blue* any more than 'resemblance', (or 'qualities' any more than 'relations') : we sense something of which we might say, if we wished to talk about it, that 'this is red': and so we sense something of which we might say, if we wished to talk about it, that 'this is similar to that' or 'that this red is similar to that red'. If we insist on trying to say what we sense (which is impossible), we might try saying that 'I sense A-resembling-B': and see if that helps. 3. There are, I willingly admit, special difficulties about resemblance: but it seems to me that they are not before us for Mr. Maclagan would, as is shown by his commendation of Locke and others, x say about other 'relations', and apparently about all of them, precisely what he says about resemblance. 'Relations are not sensed'. This dogma, held by a very great number and variety of philosophers, 'synthetic*. I refer to the sentence, 'This x exists', where x is a sensum, e.g. 'This noise exists 9. In endeavouring to classify it, one party would point to the triviality of 'This noise exists 9 , and to the absurdity of 'This noise does not exist 9. They would say, therefore, that existence is 'part of the meaning of this. But another party would point out, that 'This noise might not have existed 9 makes perfectly good sense. They would say, therefore, that existence cannot be 'part of the meaning of this. Both parties, as we are now in a position to see, would be correct in their arguments, but incorrect in their conclusions. What seems to be true is that using the word 'this (not: the word 'this') gives it to be understood that the sensum referred to 'exists 9. Perhaps, historically, this fact about the sentence-trio, 'This noise exists', 'This noise does not exist 9 , and 'This noise might not have existed 9 , was pointed out before any philosopher had had time to pronounce that 'This noise exists 9

YOKESHWARI

Sképsis, 2016

Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that what Austin says about those practices is correct in relation to the appropriateness of making knowledge claims, but that the skeptic is interested in the truth of those claims. In this paper, we argue that Stroud’s defense of the alleged requirement smuggles in a commitment to a kind of internalism, which asserts that the perceptual justification available to us can be characterized independently of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. In our reading of Austin, especially of Sense & Sensibilia, he rejects that kind of internalism by an implicit commitment to what is called today a “disjunctive” view of perception. Austin says that objectivity is an aspect of knowledge, and his disjunctivism is part of an explanation of why the alleged requirement is not necessary for a knowledge claim. Since both Stroud and Austin are committed to the objectivity of knowledge, Stroud may ask which view of perceptual knowledge is correct, whether the internalist or the disjunctive. We argue that by paying closer attention to what Austin says about our practices of knowledge attribution, one can see more clearly that it is grounded not only on a conception of objectivity, but also on a conception of ourselves as information agents, a conception that is as deeply rooted as that of the objectivity of knowledge. This gives us moral and practical reasons to favor the disjunctive view of perception.

Russell, 1996

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2016

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2010

This article deals with analytical jurisprudence topics presented in John Austin’s work, his predecessors, and its influence on the contemporary theory of law. The article analyses his analytical method, understanding of what the method implies, and its application in understanding law as a social phenomenon. Not only does the article analyse the law phenomenon, but it also presents his views on similar phenomena in law, such as international and constitutional law, the phenomenon of sovereignty and a sovereign, and the principle of general utility as one of the moral principles. His theory of law was one of the most significant theoretical approaches in England of the 19th century, and also constituted the baseline for new conceptions and the basis of critical analyses of later positive law theories. Moreover, his work provides a solid ground for explanations of individual branches of law, especially criminal law. Finally, the article also presents a critical analysis of his approach, useful and important findings, and the perspectives for further development of the theory of law, especially in the domain of his analytical, empirically oriented and descriptive method.