Direct Consequentialism, Unlimited
Philip N Pettit2025, The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics
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Abstract
Consequentialism, as I take it here, offers a theory that ranks any items in a set of mutually exhaustive, jointly exclusive possibilities from a neutral perspective.
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The Definition of Consequentialism: A Survey
Utilitas , 2022
There are different meanings associated with consequentialism and teleology. This causes confusion, and sometimes results in discussions based on misunderstandings rather than on substantial disagreements. To clarify this, we created a survey on the definitions of 'consequentialism' and 'teleology', which we sent to specialists in consequentialism. We broke down the different meanings of consequentialism and teleology into four component parts: Outcome-Dependence, Value-Dependence, Maximization, and Agent-Neutrality. Combining these components in different ways we distinguished six definitions, all of which are represented in the philosophical literature. We asked the respondents which definition is best for consequentialism and for teleology. The most popular definition of consequentialism was the one which accepted value-dependence, but not maximization and agent-neutrality. We therefore recommend the use of this meaning to avoid misunderstandings. The results for teleology were more problematic, with several respondents claiming they never use the term, or indicating that it is confusing.
Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism
Ratio, 2012
This article introduces and explores a distinction between multidimensional and one-dimensional consequentialist moral theories. One-dimensional consequentialists believe that an act's deontic status depends on just one aspect of the act, such as the sum total of wellbeing it produces, or the sum total of priority-or equalityadjusted wellbeing. Multi-dimensional consequentialists believe that an act's deontic status depends on more than one aspect. They may, for instance, believe that the sum total of wellbeing produced by an act and the degree to which the wellbeing is equally distributed in the population affect the act's deontic status independently of each other. These two aspects cannot be reduced into any single (composite) aspect. Wellbeing and equality are two separate considerations that cannot be merged into some novel entity that accurately reflects both intuitions. On the multi-dimensional view I defend, such clashes between separate aspects are irresolvable and are best accounted for by claiming that moral rightness and wrongness are non-binary concepts. Some acts are, literally speaking, a little bit right (because they maximise wellbeing) and a little bit wrong (because they do not maximise equality). 1 1 I would like to thank Joel Katzav, Rosemary Lowry, Nicolas Espinoza and the participants of the Eindhoven Ethics Workshops for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Reflections on consequentialism
Theoria, 2008
there is no separate entry for "consequentialism"; the reader is referred to "utilitarianism", and this is in turn explained as "the moral theory that an action is morally right if and only if it produces at least as much good (utility) for all people affected by the action as any alternative action the person could do instead". 2 This is a sufficient starting point for my purposes in this paper. It indicates, for example, that the kind of theory I have in mind is "act consequentialism", rather than "rule consequentialism". A well-known consequentialist theory would be the hedonistic utilitarianism described in the first two chapters of G.E. Moore's Ethics; another example would be Moore's own nonhedonistic "ideal" utilitarianism proposed in the same book. 3 Moore takes (hedonistic) utilitarianism to contain the "principle" that "a voluntary action is right, whenever and only when the agent could not, even if he had chosen, have done any other action instead, which would have caused more pleasure than the one he did do". 4 Notice, however, that, for Moore, utilitarianism does not only say "that the producing of a maximum of pleasure is a characteristic, which did and will belong, as a matter of fact, to all right voluntary actions (actual or possible)", it also says that "it is because they possess this characteristic that such actions are right". 5 I follow Moore here. I take consequentialism to be an explanatory theory of moral rightness; it is neither a statement of a mere correlation between rightness and a certain empirical and/or evaluative property, nor a decision procedure to be followed in actual situations of choice. The distinction between theories of rightness and practical decision procedures is probably quite old. It appears to go back at least to Henry Sidgwick. 6 It is quite clearly
Consequences of Consequentialism
Mind, 1993
The consequentialism I defend is defined by the following principle: (C) It is right for S to do A (S ought to do A or S should do A) iff no total state of affairs that would be a consequence of 5 's doing any alternative to A would be better than the total state of affairs that would be a consequence of S's doing A. The view to be considered is no novelty. Moore (1903,1912, 1922), for example, made significant contributions to understanding this doctrine. 1 The goal of this paper is to make precise a version of the view and to absolve it of alleged difficulties. Consequentialism's basic idea is that the ethical status of an act depends on the value of its consequences. The concept of an act's consequences is central to the theory. This paper will argue that the best understanding of the concept of consequence or outcome leads to a theory resistant to counterexamples and difficulties commonly posed for consequentialism. The notion of causal consequence, for example, proves too restricted for these purposes, at least on the most common understanding of that notion (and this is not the place for its reconsideration). If Slim, by leaving a room, makes Tubbs the thinnest person in that room, that is not, on many views, a causal consequence of Slim's leaving Tubbs alone in the room. But it is a consequence of Slim's act. It may be relevant to the ethical status of Slim's leaving the room. The word "outcome" may have a clearer connotation (but "Outcomism" is unattractive). We are familiar with a broader notion of consequence or outcome. It is an out-_ come of X's hitting Y that Y is hit (by X). It is a consequence of her writing 'c' followed by 'a' followed by 't' that she wrote 'cat'. As a result of my having been born on the 8th of March, I was born a Pisces. I unlocked the door because I turned the key. By giving birth, his sister brought about his becoming an uncle. 2 I can exploit this notion of consequence in understanding (C). The first characteristic to note about this kind of consequentialism is that it will allow a wide range of states of affairs to count as consequences. Indeed any state
Insane Consequentialism: A Pragmatic Objection to Direct Consequentialism
Utilitas, 2018
I argue that direct consequentialism is not rationally believable. I focus on duties of love. Those feelings are so fundamental to us that believing consequentialism creates insanity. For it entails negative judgements not just about our loyal acts, but also about our deepest feelings. If direct consequentialism is true we should be able to believe it and stay sane. But we cannot, so it is not true.
What is Consequentialism? A Reply to Howard-Snyder
Utilitas, 2001
If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X, then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. This principle is plausible but mysterious, so it needs to be explained. It can be explained by necessary enabler consequentialism, but not by other consequentialisms or any deontological moral theory. Or so I argue. Frances Howard-Snyder objects that this argument fails to establish consequentialism as understood by ‘most philosophers’, because it fails to establish agent-neutrality. I respond by distinguishing consequentialism, which need not be agent-neutral, from utilitarianism, which claims agent-neutrality. Howard-Snyder also presents a schema for a non-consequentialist theory that is supposed to explain moral substitutability. I respond that her explanation cannot be completed without introducing incoherence into deontological moral theories.
Toward a more adequate consequentialism
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2018
Philip Pettit has been one of the pioneering figures in the contemporary development of consequentialism toward an approach to ethical theory more adequate to our understanding of ourselves and of our lives together. He has shown how consequentialism has resources for contending with many of the most serious criticisms that have been levelled against it. Two fundamental elements of this development make an appearance in ‘Three Mistakes’. The first element is broadening the base of intrinsic goods in terms of which consequentialism makes its fundamental evaluations of acts and outcomes. At the outset of ‘Three Mistakes’, Pettit urges that consequentialists should go beyond the hedonic concerns of Benthamite utilitarianism to include among fundamental intrinsic goods friendship, promise-keeping, truth-telling, and the kind of respect for others shown when we impose upon ourselves limits on how we are willing to treat them. So sensible is this recommendation, that pluralism about intri...
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On the Alleged Incoherence of Consequentialism
New Scholasticism, 1988
have advanced versions of an argument which, they believe, shows that consequentialism is incoherent. 1 It is incoherent, they contend, because it cannot account for the possibility of making wrong choices. Let us call this argument, for convenience, ACI (argument that consequentialism is incoherent). Finnis and Grisez prefer to talk about proportionalism rather than consequentialism, but this is a terminological matter and makes little deference to the issue. Proportionalism is described by Finnis as the view that one should "[compare] the benefits and harms proposed by alternative possible choices (whether the choice be of commitment to rules or ways of life, or of a one-off action), and make that choice which promises to yield a better proportion of benefit to harm than any available alternative choice." 2 He states the ACI as follows: [On] the proportionalist explanations of 'right' and 'wrong', wrong choice would be not merely wrong but unintelligible and, as a choice, impossible. One can choose only what appears to one to be good; but if, as proportionalists claim, (i) 'wrong' entails 'yielding (or promising) less good,' and (ii) there are choices which can be identified as yielding or promising less good than some
Consequentialism and Metaphysical Indeterminacy
Contemporary consequentialism depends on the ordering of the values of alternative states of affairs through the betterness relation. In this paper I will show how open future versions of metaphysical indeterminacy make those evaluations very difficult by making the world incomplete in two different ways: both the values of states of affairs and the probability of states of affairs obtaining are usually indeterminate. This drastically limits the scope of things to which the betterness relation applies, and thereby limits consequentialism.
Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism and Degrees of Rightness (with Vuko Andric)
Philosophical Studies, 2016
In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multi-dimensional consequentialism’. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are irreducible moral aspects that jointly determine the deontic status of an act. In defending his particular version of multi-dimensional consequentialism, Peterson advocates the thesis – he calls it DEGREE – that if two or more moral aspects clash, the act under consideration is right to some non-extreme degree. This goes against the orthodoxy according to which – Peterson calls this RESOLUTION – each act is always either entirely right or entirely wrong. The argument against RESOLUTION appeals to the existence of so-called deontic leaps: the idea is that endorsing RESOLUTION would not give each relevant moral aspect its due in the final analysis. Our paper argues that, contrary to Peterson, (1) all moral aspects remain visible in what can properly be called the final analysis of a moral theory that involves RESOLUTION; (2) moral aspects do not have to remain visible in judgements of all-things-considered rightness or wrongness, respectively; (3) introduction of what Peterson calls verdictive reasons does not change the overall picture in favour of DEGREE. We conclude that multi-dimensional consequentialists should accept RESOLUTION rather than DEGREE.
Consequentializing Moral Theories
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2007
Beyond Consequentialism
Beyond Consequentialism, 2009
The focus of this book is consequentialism, the moral theory upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The theory can with some plausibility claim a status as the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy; moreover, its pervasive deployment in spheres such as economics, public policy, and jurisprudence is one of the striking developments of the last 150 years. It is the thesis of this book that debates concerning the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism, an unresolved tension between the theory and many of its most fundamental presuppositions. An appreciation of the nature of this tension grounds the articulation of a fundamental challenge to the theory from within. This challenge is developed and sharpened through the first 4 chapters of the book. Development of this challenge to consequentialism in turn reveals that the apparent force of the challenge of consequentialism is largely illusory. Chapter 5 demonstrates that many traditional rationales offered in its support draw upon systematic misappropriations of intuitions linking rightness of actions and goodness of actions, treating them as intuitions concerning rightness of actions and goodness of overall states of affairs. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that one remaining rationale, a rationale grounded in the appeal to the impartiality of morality, does not provide support for the theory; indeed, that attempts to respond to the tension within consequentialism suggest a fundamental role for an alternative to the consequentialist’s impersonal conception of impartiality, an interpersonal rather than an impersonal conception of equal concern. Unlike the consequentialist’s impersonal conception, such interpersonal impartiality can allow for the ordinary moral convictions that actions that do not promote about the best overall state of affairs are often morally permitted, and sometimes morally required.
Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances
Synthese, 2020
I claim that objective consequentialism (OC) faces a problem stemming from the existence in some situations of a plurality of chances relevant to the outcomes of an agent's acts. I suggest that this phenomenon bears structural resemblance to the well-known Reference Class problem. I outline a few ways in which one could attempt to deal with the issue, suggesting that it is the higher-level chance that should be employed by OC.
Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews , 2020
In this fine collection, Christian Seidel has brought together innovative new work on consequentialism, with a special focus on the theoretical strategy of "consequentializing" agent-centered (deontological) moral theories. It is an excellent resource for anyone seeking to better understand and evaluate the conceptual foundations of consequentialism.
Consequentialism and Decision Procedures
2005
Consequentialism is often charged with being self-defeating, for if a person attempts to apply it, she may quite predictably produce worse outcomes than if she applied some other moral theory. Many consequentialists have replied that this criticism rests on a false assumption, confusing consequentialism's criterion of the rightness of an act with its position on decision procedures.
Consequentializing and its consequences
Philosophical Studies, 2016
Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that we can and should "consequentialize" non-consequentialist moral theories, putting them into a consequentialist framework. I argue that these philosophers, often treated as a group, in fact offer three separate arguments, two of which are incompatible. I show that none represent significant threats to a committed non-consequentialist, and that the literature has suffered due to a failure to distinguish these arguments. I conclude by showing that the failure of the consequentializers' arguments has implications for disciplines, such as economics, logic, decision theory, and linguistics, which sometimes use a consequentialist structure to represent non-consequentialist ethical theories.
Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism
2006
Abstract: Maximizing act consequentialism holds that actions are morally permissible if and only if they maximize the value of consequences—if and only if, that is, no alternative action in the given choice situation has more valuable consequences. It is subject to two main objections. One is that it fails to recognize that morality imposes certain constraints on how we may promote value. Maximizing act consequentialism fails to recognize, I shall argue, that the ends do not always justify the means.
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