The Liberalism of Love

Nussbaum engages core questions about the relationship between political stability and moral psychology (or, the emotions). Rawls considers these questions in the final section of TJ (entitled "Ends"), but never revisited them in the light of his later ideas of political liberalism. Nussbaum thus proposes a theory of political love (and its affiliated emotions) that addresses these questions in a manner consistent with the spirit of political liberalism, and so in a way that Rawls himself might have wanted. Before directly engaging some of Nussbaum's ideas, I provide a brief overview of the philosophical context for her book and of its content.

Hybris, 2017

Emotions have a problematic status in modern philosophy. Given the strongly rationalistic character of modernity, the affective aspects of human cognition-sentiments, feelings, passions and emotions-have often been treated with suspicion. This scepticism has been particularly vivid in the history of liberalism-the approach in socio-political philosophy most intimately connected with the modern idea of dignity based on equal rationality of human beings. From this perspective, emotions seem to be more in place in totalitarian regimes, which exercise control over citizens by tapping into the irrational forces lurking in their minds, rather than in the societies devoted to mutual respect and transparency [Nussbaum 2013, 2]. Yet, one the most influential versions of contemporary liberalism alerts us to the relevance of emotions to liberal objectives. In A Theory of Justice John Rawls provides his conception of justice as fairness with extensive psychological underpinnings. Drafting a three-stage account of moral development, Rawls explains how citizens of a well-ordered society acquire the sense of justice, the crucial element of this process being the cultivation of proper moral sentiments [Rawls 1971, 1999, 405-425]. Such emotional support, Rawls argues, is necessary if a conception of justice is to remain stable over generations. We need to demonstrate that citizens are indeed able to be motivated by the

Phenomenology and Mind, 2012

2020

For both John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum, the concept of love plays a significant role in moral psychology. Rawls views the sense of justice as grounded in parental love, and continuous with love of mankind. Nussbaum’s recent defence of patriotism revives the emotio n of love as essential for political contexts. I argue that love ought to play a substantial part in the shaping of global politics, and that a moral psychology of love based merely on a combination of Rawls’s and Nussbaum’s accounts fails to produce an ad equate ground for conceptualizing moral motivation with respect to addressing transnational concerns of justice. I contend that by critically synthesizing Rawls’s and Nussbaum’s conceptions of love and moral psychology with resources from Kant’s ethics, it is possible to develop a more attractive, and potentially politically effective, conception of love of human beings in the framework of political liberalism.

[This essay first appeared on the LA Progressive website on June 20, 2024.] Liberalism and Progressivism overlap and have some similarities, but their histories are different, and they have different nuances. Love, however, is not usually associated with either term. But agape love--sort of a love of people in general--should be linked with each concept. Martha Nussbaum in her "Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice" (2013) suggested this, and more recently so too has Australian philosopher Alexandre Lefebvre.

Love has been theorized as a way to rebuild fractured communities, and a potential way to overcome differences on the political Left. However, might it be dangerous to invest so much potential in the power of love? In this paper, I reflect upon Michael Hardt's work on the necessity of love for politics. Hardt emphasizes the radical and transformative potential of love, seeing it as a collective and generative force. Yet, I argue that Hardt's reading of love, tied to a Spinozist theorization of joy, provides a limited understanding of the affective dimensions of love. Instead, I propose that we need to think about the ambivalence and incoherence of love: how love can be both joyful and painful, enduring and transient, expansive and territorial, revolutionary and conservative. That is, to consider how love, even in its seemingly most benevolent and unconditional form, can still be a source of exclusion, violence, and domination. Ultimately, I seek to challenge this fantasy of coherence and togetherness, asking if there is still space for aspects of politics that are not joyful, that do not feel like love, that anger us, disappoint us, and that make us desire distance rather than togetherness.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2014

On the whole, "Political Emotions" is a remarkably successful book that combines several areas of philosophical research in which the author’s proficiency is well known. It shows how problems that lie on the more intimate side of ethics, pertaining for instance to friendship and family life, have relevance for social justice and public culture; along the way, it also incorporates insightful readings of literary texts. Nussbaum’s book therefore ought to introduce readers of her work in one area (such as social philosophy) to aspects of her work in another (such as the philosophy of mind, or literary criticism). It explores the nature of human emotions, as they form early in life and develop in the context of personal relationships, in order to clarify some of the conditions of possibility for a just liberal democracy. "Political Emotions" asks: which emotions are essential for such a society to flourish, and which are apt to undermine its values and goals? In order to offer an account that can answer this question, Nussbaum draws upon her influential cognitive theory of emotion and, in the process, reformulates it in subtle yet significant ways.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2013

Political Theory , 2006

Psychology in Society, 2017

With the "affective turn" in social studies, the discussion of the role of emotions in social and political life is increasingly becoming a valid topic of inquiry. However, it is the "negative" emotions, like fear, anger, shame, that tend to dominate the discussions, with less attention being given to discussions of hope, compassion, and love. Srecko Horvat's The radicality of loveis an attempt to correct this bias. His text makes a case for the social importance of love in the reinvention of revolutionary politics. He does this through a discussion of some of the revolutions of the twentieth century, as well as some of the (revolutionary) social movements of the twenty first century.