Inductive Scepticism Revisited

2003

The Philosophical Quarterly, 1992

2 DAVID PAPINEAU true beliefs. So Williams argues that the desire for true beliefs itself generates the desire that our beliefs should issue from processes that generally produce truths. And then, finding it independently plausible that beliefs produced by such processes should ...

The meaning of life is the attainment of knowledge regarding what is true and what is false. One of the longest surviving obstacles to the discovery of knowledge is an ideology that is known as scepticism. This ideology masquerades itself under the cover of various perspectives that pretend to have nothing to do with scepticism but really affirm its' existence after the masks of these perspectives are uncovered. Before we can uncover the existence of various forms of scepticism and refute scepticism as a false ideology, we need to have a clear grasp of the meaning of this ideology. A Google search comes up with the following definition of scepticism. Scepticism: In philosophy, this is the theory that certain knowledge is impossible.1 Anyone who is committed to a true search for the nature of reality would ask the question of how it is possible for certain forms of knowledge to be unattainable. Questions naturally arise regarding the boundaries of human knowledge and the kind of evidence that could be used to prove that certain forms of knowledge are impossible to attain. Another question arises. Who are the sceptics? In this modern era, very few people who secretly adhere to scepticism are willing to accept the label of being a sceptic. As a result of this denial, they do not actively campaign against the forms of knowledge that they reject. I have a strategy for three hidden forms of this ideology to be uncovered in three separate sections and then refuted. Firstly, this strategy involves a clear knowledge of self identification regarding the human condition. As modern scepticism is a denial of the existence of certain forms of knowledge, it eventually involves a refusal to admit to the existence of certain factors that are necessary for us to obtain self identification in regard to the concept of essence which will be explained later on. The concept of essence will be used as a factor that is essential in exposing and refuting scepticism. Secondly, I will explain the three classical laws of thought and demonstrate how a clear knowledge of them is an effective means of exposing the absurdities of scepticism. In parts two and three of this argument, I will show how an awareness of both secular and theological approaches to scepticism is beneficial to our understanding of how scepticism can be defeated. Before we can make a valid challenge to the strength of scepticism as an ideology, we need an historical example of what it is. In my opinion, the scepticism that was espoused by David Hume regarding the theory of induction provides us with an example of how strong scepticism can be as an argument. I will briefly explain what inductive reasoning is first, and then give an explanation of Hume's sceptical position on it, soon afterwards. Induction is a form of reasoning which advocates the view that we can draw a conclusion regarding an

Philosophical Studies, 2009

The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.

Philosophies, 2024

When an empirical prediction E of hypothesis H is observed to be true, such observation is said to confirm, i.e., support (although not prove) the truth of the hypothesis. But why? What justifies the claim that such evidence supports the hypothesis? The widely accepted answer is that it is justified by induction. More specifically, it is commonly held that the following argument: (1) If H then E; (2) E; (3) Therefore, (probably) H—here referred to as ‘hypothetico-deductive con-firmation argument’—is inductively strong. Yet this argument looks nothing like an inductive generalisation, i.e., it doesn’t seem inductive in the term's traditional, enumerative sense. If anything, it has the form of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. This paper aims to solve this puzzle. True, in recent decades, ‘in-duction’ has been sometimes used more broadly to encompass any non-deductive, i.e., ampliative, argument. Applying Bayesian confirmation theory has famously demonstrated that hypothetico-deductive confirmation is indeed inductive in this broader, ampliative sense. Nonetheless, it will be argued here that, despite appearance, hypothetico-deductive confirmation can also be recast as a strong enumerative induction. Hence, by being enumeratively inductive, the scientific method of hypothetico-deductive confirmation is justified through this traditional, more restrictive type of induction rather than merely by ampliative induction.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1989

Journal of Philosophy, 2007

Virtually every epistemological theory that is currently a live option is committed to two theses: fallibilism and attributabilism. A new argument for skepticism is advanced, which is grounded in the incompatibility of these two theses. It is then argued that the main responses to traditional skepticism—epistemic externalism, contextualism, and Moorean common sense—are ineffective with respect to this new type of skepticism.

2016

1992

An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an objective world beyond our subjective experiences. I argue that there is there is a fatal flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "external world." Therefore, no such justification is necessary. The feature of skepticism which I believe renders it vulnerable is the assumption that each of us has a right to be certain of his own existence as a subject of conscious experience even in the face of comprehensive doubt about our empirical beliefs.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 373-375, 1994

In "The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism" I argue that traditional global epistemological skepticism is incoherent because it mistakenly assumes that we can question our knowledge of the external world without undermining our self-knowledge. The rationale behind my argument is the idea that, since we are substantial agents who exist and act "in the world" among other material beings, the view that our knowledge of our own existence and nature is or can be exclusively subjective is misguided. In a critical response to my essay, Anthony Brueckner claims that my reasoning fails to discredit the idea that one can adopt both "the Cartesian conception of self-knowledge as involving an inference to the existence of a mental substance" and "the Cartesian skeptical view concerning knowledge of the external world. Brueckner believes that my argument is of the "transcendental" variety, and I suspect he also believes that any reasoning of that kind is fatally flawed. In this discussion I explain why my argument escapes Brueckner's objection.