ON THE METAPHYSICS AND METHODOLOGY OF PRAGMATISM

Donald Davidson fi ts quite neatly into the resurgence of metaphysics that has been evident in Anglophone philosophy for a generation or so. At the same time, however, Davidson has been an important source-indeed, a main source-of inspiration in the development of the increasingly and self-consciously ametaphysical variety of pragmatism, associated with Richard Rorty, that has come to the fore during that same time. This makes Davidson a particularly interesting philosopher to engage with if one wants to understand the nature of the pragmatist critique of metaphysics-if there is one. I begin by expanding on the fi rst claim, that Davidson is easily absorbed by metaphysics. Next, I marshal pragmatist reservations toward metaphysics and toward the metaphysical Davidson. In the third section, I ask whether it is not possible, after all, to recover a pragmatizing reading even of this Davidson. Finally, I allow myself to wonder about the force and point of the pragmatist stance against metaphysics. Even if metaphysics remains elusive, however, there is the hope that some light will have been shed on the resources that Davidson offers pragmatists trying to affect the philosophical conversation, and also on what the metaphilosophical divergences are between a naturalistic pragmatism and contemporary analytic metaphysics.

2020

The aim of the Paper is to show the impact of the metaphysical pragmatism in the contemporary society: an analysis of Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory. Pierce in his argument presents his theory showing that action gets prior over thought. In this matter pragmatism as the doctrine that truth is a practical efficiency of an idea. This theory has made a great contribution in such a way pragmatism theory is considered as tools to solve problems and the results are considered as they are correct and real until their effects are desirable and useful, otherwise the theory is incorrect. The paper presents theoretical framework based on Peirce’s upon whom the impacts of pragmatism in the contemporary society could have taken roots from. The pragmatism approach in the contemporary society has influenced various sectors and scholars in such a way they concluded to design a system to consider the specialized subjects and also provide the required techniques to the interested individuals in the ...

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, 2015

Our goal is to examine three broadly pragmatist strategies which might be alleged to undermine realism by infecting it with unwanted subjectivism: one concerns "deflationist" views about properties, one concerns Carnap's pragmatism about ontology, and one concerns subjectivism about the notions of structure and structural similarity. In each case critics allege that the intrusion of pragmatic and/or subjective elements into our ways of thinking about the world have the unwanted result that the realists' cherished contrasts between subjective vs. objective, or what is real vs. what linguistic forms are pragmatically expedient, or what is discovered vs. what is projected, are undermined. We argue that these allegations are unfounded: the pragmatist strategies do not, in fact, threaten realism in the ways suggested. We believe in the existence of an objective, mind-independent world-much of which is the way it is regardless of human interests, goals, cognitive/perceptual capacities, and research agendas. There would have been fossils, neutrinos, and curvatures in space-time even if no one had been around to theorize about them; Kepler's laws would have accurately modeled planetary motion even if no one had realized it. To this extent we are "realists." But we also believe that our concepts of objectivity, mind-independence, and cognate notions are shot through with interests, * The authors are united on some fronts but not others; a brief genealogy of the project is thus appropriate. RK is concerned with the costs, if any, incurred by expressivist semantic strategies; in this context he has explored the details of Carnap*-an expressivist about the discourse of ontology-and various deflationary views about reference and properties. KS is interested in pragmatist critiques of metaphysics; Sider offers arguments purporting to show that interest-and goal-relativity, if postulated to belong to the semantic content of various metaphysical notions (e.g., "structure" or "similarity" or "object") has the effect of spreading to other portions of the metaphysical picture, thereby infecting our worldview with a pernicious subjectivism and undermining realism. KS rejects these arguments. The authors share a commitment to anti-representationalism and to the view that certain forms of pragmatism are consistent with a thoroughgoing realism. Responsibility for robust deflationism about properties and Carnap* is RK's; responsibility for arguments against Sider's "infection" arguments is KS's. The expressivist strategies endorsed by RK are, for the most part, rejected by KS.

Pragmatism and Objectivity, 2017

Pragmatism's appeal lies arguably in its brass-tacks approach to philosophy. The pragmatist holds that philosophical questions are elliptical for problems in experience; they are practical challenges made theoretical. The pragmatist program reorients philosophical speculation toward our lives and away from idle abstraction, integrating theory with practice. And so, at its core, pragmatism is a metaphilosophical program; it is ultimately a philosophical view about philosophy, particularly about how philosophy is properly done.

This work first appeared as Sidney Hook's dissertation, afterward quickly published by Open Court in 1927, the same year Hook began his long career at New York University. Heretofore difficult to find, it now appears as a handsome and timely reprint, carrying John Dewey's original "Introductory Word," and providing opportunity to look back at the pragmatist tradition and the controversial role of metaphysics in it.

Philosophy in Review, 2000

This book is an introduction to pragmatism, but also an explication of Rescher's own version of a realistic pragmatic philosophy. Rescher's realistic pragmatism is designed to dispel a number of traditional objections that figure prominently in the history of pragmatism from Peirce to the present day. Rescher contrasts a pragmatism of the 'left'-associated with James, Schiller, Dewey, Rorty-with a pragmatism of the 'right'-represented by Peirce and himself. Rescher carefully lays out a methodological version of pragmatism that is marked by metaphysical realism, objectivity, rationality, a hard-nosed theory of truth, but tempered with methodological flexibility and a healthy epistemological fallibilism. Rescher's distinction between truthconditions and use-conditions in his discussion of language and logic presents an intriguing strategy for cleaning up a pragmatist theory of truth and meaning. Rescher applies equal attention to presenting a pragmatic moral theory that is objective, principled, rational, sensible, capable of accommodating the highest human values, while shunning the conventional, pluralistic, crass-materialistic, anything-goes socio-cultural relativism traditionally associated with pragmatists of the left. All in all, Rescher forcefully addresses well-known criticisms leveled against earlier forms of pragmatism, presenting an alternative view that fares well as a response to recalcitrant problems of modernist philosophy without succumbing to tenuous laxities of post-modernism. This book is to be recommended for its effective portrayal of a hardnosed objectivist, realist pragmatism. Unfortunately the book will disappoint readers familiar with classical pragmatist texts.

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 2015

The aim of this paper is to argue that Richard Rorty’s claim that pragmatism is opposed to all varieties of metaphysics is fundamentally mistaken. After detailing pragmatist reasons for thinking Rorty’s proposal is justified, I argue that there are more compelling pragmatist reasons to think Rorty’s metaphilosophical interpretation of pragmatism is rather problematic: firstly, Rorty has a narrow understanding of ‘metaphysics’ and he does not take into account Peirce’s argument that it is impossible to eliminate metaphysical concepts from ordinary language and our scientific practices; secondly, Rorty’s Sellarsian philosophical anthropology and his proto-Brandomian theory of the constitution of norms are in fact instances of metaphysical positions. I conclude the paper by claiming that given pragmatism is in fact supportive of a specific variety of metaphysics, the relationship between idealism and pragmatism ought to be seen as involving more convergence rather than great contestation.

This paper appears here by special permission from George Leaman at the Philosophy Documentation Center.The issue of this paper is the extent to which historicism excludes metaphysics in the contemporary revival of American philosophical pragmatism. Minimalist metaphysical assumptions are implied in philosophical neo-pragmatism, and so the author develops the dialectical position of religious neo-pragmatism, which is the unity of what is true in both theological and philosophical neo-pragmatism.

Praxis, 2010

2021

This unique introduction fully engages and clearly explains pragmatism, an approach to knowledge and philosophy that rejects outmoded conceptions of objectivity while avoiding relativism and subjectivism. It follows pragmatism's focus on the process of inquiry rather than on abstract justifications meant to appease the skeptic. According to pragmatists, getting to know the world is a creative human enterprise, wherein we fashion our concepts in terms of how they affect us practically, including in future inquiry. This book fully illuminates that enterprise and the resulting radical rethinking of basic philosophical conceptions like truth, reality, and reason. Author Cornelis de Waal helps the reader recognize, understand, and assess classical and current pragmatist contributions-from Charles S. Peirce to Cornel West-evaluate existing views from a pragmatist angle, formulate pragmatist critiques, and develop a pragmatist viewpoint on a specific issue. The book discusses: • Classical pragmatists, including Peirce, James, Dewey, and Addams; • Contemporary figures, including Rorty, Putnam, Haack, and West; • Connections with other twentieth-century approaches, including phenomenology, critical theory, and logical positivism; • Peirce's pragmatic maxim and its relation to James's Will to Believe; • Applications to philosophy of law, feminism, and issues of race and racism.