Modals & Conditionals: Errata

Nijmegen: Radboud University Nijmegen thesis, 2008

Prologue xi 1 Note that I use the term 'modal expression' in a rather broad sense: any expression whose meaning depends on alternative states of affairs is a modal. In contrast, descriptive studies on modality, e.g. Coates (1983) and Palmer (2001), often reserve the term 'modal' for the class of such expressions that can be syntactically defined i.e. for the modal auxiliaries (these are set apart by the so-called NICE properties (Huddleston 1976)). Semi-auxiliaries like have to are then called 'semi-modals'. Arguably, my definition is too inclusive, whereas syntactic definitions are not inclusive enough, see Kiefer (1987), Narrog (2005), Zaefferer (2005) for definitional issues in the field of modality. 2 I adopt Kai von Fintel's strategy for alphabetizing last names like 'de Haan' that contain particles. That is, the article cited here will be alphabetized as 'de Haan, Ferdinand', but it will be listed under 'H'. See http://kaivonfintel.org/von/. Here the obligation is not put on the subject, but on the addressee. Apparently, the context of utterance determines who is the bearer of the obligation in (12). But if we need a pragmatic mechanism to identify the bearer for sentences like 8 The term 'root modality' seems to refer to root clauses (simple clauses that aren't contained in any other clause), but this is somewhat misleading, for root modals aren't restricted to such clauses, cf. de Haan (2005, 6). 9 This distinction between predicate and proposition operators of course corresponds to the distinction between control and raising verbs (Ross 1969, Perlmutter 1970, Jackendoff 1972, Brennan 1993). 10 To be sure, Bhatt and Wurmbrand argue that a predicate-level analysis of root modals is not only unnecessary, but also untenable. Their arguments come from case-marking in Hindi and Icelandic respectively. But as these arguments are quite intricate, I leave them out of the discussion, and refer the interested reader to the original papers instead. 11 The similarities between obligation and permission on the one hand and necessity and possibility on the other have been noted time and time again, at least since the 14 th century (Knuuttila 1981), and later by Leibniz (in Specimina juris (1667) and Elementa juris naturalis (1672), see Poser (1969)), and by von Wright, who writes that he independently made the discovery and was then prompted to write his Deontic logic (1951a), see von Wright (1999, 28). 12 Note though that these authors, as well as the authors they cite, only distinguish a subset of the modal meanings I have listed; most only distinguish epistemic and root meanings, where root modality comprises deontic and for some authors also dynamic modality. 15 Meredith & Prior (1956) seem to have been the first to employ a binary relation, and Hintikka (1957, 1961) was probably the first to explain this relation as relative possibility between conceivable states of affairs (possible worlds). Yet another pioneer of modal logic, Kanger (1957a,b), will remain famous for being the first who applied the semantics of quantified modal logic to philosophical problems such as the 'morning star paradox' (substitution of equals is not valid without restriction). See Goldblatt (2006) and Copeland (2002) for the history of relational semantics. 16 (Modal) sentential logic is commonly known as (modal) propositional logic, but I reserve the term 'proposition' strictly for the truth set or intension of formulas from the object language. See section 1.2.2 below for further explanation. 2 Material implication is sometimes attributed to Philo of Megara (4th century BC), but it was Frege who championed this semantics in modern logic. Russell happily took over this analysis and gave it its current name. For a historical overview of the battle concerning the right conditional semantics, see Kratzer (1978). 3 To be sure, the issue here is what truth value a conditional should have when its components are (true, true), (false, true), or (false, false). The argument presented here does not establish

ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, 2008

for their invaluable comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to Kotomi, Amane, and Riko Matsubara. Needless to say, the author alone is responsible for any remaining deficiencies.

1993

This paper is concemed with two different linguistic problems raised by Catalan nopm negative clauses, and will examine their representational effects. It is argued that pas can occur within the boundaries of a Tense Dependent subordinate clause if, and only if, there is a modal constituent c-commanding the NegP, and the structural requirements for the condition of logical absorption are not satisfied. The first squib deals with general restrictions on the use of no-pas in structures which contain a subordinate clause, while the second squib deals more specifically with restrictions on the use of rw-pas in expletive contexts. These restrictions are exemplified in (1) and (2). Compare on the one hand (la) with (lb), which for some speakers is absolutely ungrammatical, whereas for others it shows some degree of ill-formedness. On the other hand, compare (2a) with (2b), which cannot be used under the expletive interpretation licensed by (24. (1) a. No diu pas si vindd. not says pas whether come-3sg-FUT '(S)he doesn't say whether (s)he is going to come.' ('not' against what you appear to think, 'not' against what somebody might suppose, 'not' confirming what someone might believe, etc.) b. *I?? No diu si vindrh Pas.

of the Ninth Symposium of the Ninth Symposium on …, 2006

2005

This paper consists of two parts. The first part argues that existing accounts of anankastic conditionals make the wrong predictions in scenarios with multiple non-conflicting goals. In order to avoid the problem, I propose that anankastic conditionals are not interpreted relative to every goal, as previous accounts have it, but relative to those goals that are contextually salient. The second part of this paper is devoted to sufficiency modals, that are formed by combining anankastic conditionals with only. I claim that the analysis of von Fintel & Iatridou (2005a) isn't adequate, because it fails to predict that sufficiency modals are transitive. I present an alternative analysis that treats only as a modal operator. * This analysis of anankastic conditionals is also presented in a paper I contributed to the proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 9. Consequently, this paper partially overlaps with (Huitink 2005). 1 From the Greek ngkh which means 'necessity'. 2 This is Saebø's (2001) paradigmatic example of an anankastic conditional. It is based on Billy Strayhorn's song 'Take the A train'.

2017

The semantics of conditionals is one of the fundamental and most debated problems in philosophy: David Lewis, C. E. Alchourrón, Paul Grice, Angelika Kratzer, Allan Gibbard, David Lycan, and many others have eagerly developed highly technical, extensive analyses of conditional sentences. Conditionals are also one of the main puzzles in deontic logic: they have been for decades the objects of lively debates within the analytic tradition. With respect to standard indicative conditionals, normative conditionals present a further complication: there is an ought-element that shall be accommodated into the conditional struc- ture. The present section of our journal Analisi e Diritto contains four recent pro- posals, made by authors that, although coming from very different legal tradi- tions, share the very same analytic approach: Giovanni Battista Ratti, from the University of Genova (Italy); Jorge Rodríguez, from National University of Mar del Plata University (Argentina); Nicola Muffato, from the University of Trieste (Italy); and Hidehiko Adachi, from the University of Kanazawa (Japan). Para- graph § 1 offers a summary of these important contributions; § 2 draws out some open questions. Paragraph § 3 contains a short conclusion. The general aim of this introduction is to provide the reader with some background information.

2007

This 1969 paper presents a (modal, sentential) logic which may be thought of as a partial systematization of the semantic and deductive properties of a sentence operator which expresses certain kinds of necessity. Among the paper's innovations is its treatment of modal logic in the setting of natural deduction systems--as opposed to axiomatic systems. It also presents a linear notation for natural deduction: each two-dimensional deduction is represented by a unique one-dimensional string of characters. Thus facilitating electronic communication of natural deductions.