What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far

2014

There are several ways to incorporate evolutionary concepts into economic thinking. This article reviews the most important transfers of this kind into evolutionary economics. It broadly differentiates between approaches that draw on an analogy construction to the biological sphere, those that make metaphorical use of Darwinian ideas, and avenues that are based on the fact that other forms of – cultural – evolution rest upon foundations laid before by natural selection. It is shown that an evolutionary approach within economics informed by insights from cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and anthropology contributes to more realistic models of human behavior in economic

Journal of economic theory, 1992

Journal of Economic Literature, 1998

2007

Two questions central to the foundations of game theory are (Samuelson 2002): (i) Why equilibrium? Should we expect Nash equilibrium play (players choosing best response strategies to the choices of others)? (ii) If so, which equilibrium? Which of the many Nash equilibria that arise in most games should we expect? To address the rst question the classical game theory approach employs assumptions that agents are rational and they all have common knowledge of such rationality and beliefs. For a variety of reasons there has been wide dissatisfaction with such an approach. One major concern has to do with the plausibility and necessity of rationality and the common knowledge of rationality and beliefs. Are players fully rational, having unbounded computing ability and never making mistakes? Clearly, they are not. Moreover, the assumption of common (knowledge of) beliefs begs another question as to how players come to have common (knowledge of) beliefs. As we shall see in later discussi...

Econometrica, 1991

Economics and Business Review

The article presents the current state of evolutionary economics against the backdrop of changes related to the potential use of the achievements of other social sciences, in particular psychology, as well as dynamically developing neuroscience. The article suggests a synthesis of evolutionary and behavioural economics concepts as a logical consequence of evolutionary cooperation processes in social sciences. Interdisciplinary initiatives create new perspectives on generation synergy effects for all participants. Contemporary evolutionary economists present the nature of ongoing innovation-driven economic change as a long evolutionary process. The main creator of the econosphere as a global system is a man–entrepreneur who is also the result of evolutionary processes. For this reason evolutionary economics should take into account the results of behavioural economics’ research based on modern psychology and neuroscience. The cornerstone of evolutionary and behavioural economics synt...

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1994

This paper presents the basic ideas and methodologies of a set of contemporary contributions which are grouped under the general heading of "evolutionary economics". Some achievements-especially with regard to the analysis of technological change and economic dynamics -are illustrated, some unresolved issues are discussed and a few promising topics of research are flagged. contributed to equilibrium theories: for example one often cites Alfred Marshall on "the Mecca of economics [lying] in economic biology rather than economic mechanics" (Marshall 1948, p. xiv); and also the "as...if" argument by Milton Friedman (1953) can be considered the most rudimentary use of an evolutionary point of view in order to justify the assumptions of equilibrium and rationality. In addition, of course scholars like Veblen, von Hayek and, even more so, Schumpeter, have anticipated many of the ideas that contemporary evolutionary economists are struggling with. 2 However, the wave of current evolutionary theorizing is probably fostered by several convergent factors. There is certainly a growing recognition of the difficulties that equilibrium theories which presume perfectly rational agents face in interpreting wide arrays of economic phenomena -ranging from the generation of technological change all the way to the diversity of long-term patterns of growth. But, of course, we know from the history of science that anomalies and falsifications alone are not sufficient to spur alternative theories. In addition, a rich empirical literature, concerning the nature of the processes of innovation and the institutions supporting them, to a good extent inspired by evolutionary ideas, has shown that an evolutionary theoretical perspective can provide useful heuristics for applied research. Not only that: the empirical work has suggested fruitful inductive generalizations and taxonomies from which evolutionary theories can draw behavioral assumptions and "stylized facts. ''3 Finally, the development of quite general formal machineries able to account for the properties of dynamical systems displaying various forms of non-linearities increasingly allows rigorous analytical treatments of evolutionary processes. 4 This, together with the possibility of computer implementations of formal gedankenexperiment concerning diverse "artificial economies" (Lane 1993a, b), holds the promise of establishing also formally sound bases for evolutionary analyses of economic change.

Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 2016

This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version may differ from the original in pagination and typographic details.

The Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2003

The American Mathematical Monthly, 2012

An economist and a biologist walk into a bar. No joke here-the two have lots to talk about. In fact, there's an entire journal devoted to Economics and Human Biology, and, of course, biotechnology is big business. As the conversation deepens, more commonalities emerge. Both fields share an avid interest in evolutionary processes, and the phrase "survival of the fittest," first coined by the philosopher-economist Herbert Spencer to describe Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection, has also been used (some would say abused) to justify an unregulated competitive marketplace.

Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 2004

The Economic Journal, 1996

Evolutionary Game Theory - V. Zeigler-Hill, T. K. Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences, 2019

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2010

The renaissance in evolutionary economics in the past two decades has brought with it a great deal of theoretical development and interdisciplinary import. Much of this has been useful, but not all of it has been commensurate. In this paper, we make the case for the limits to theoretical developments that lack clearly specified ontological commitments by attempting an inductive synthesis of the ontological content of empirical generalizations in evolutionary economics. We call this 'evolutionary realism' and present it in three axioms -(1) all existences are bimodal matter-energy actualizations of ideas, (2) all existences associate, and (3) all existences are processes. We conclude with discussion of the sort of analytical framework that we might consistently build on these axioms; a three-level analytical structure of micro, meso and macro domains.

The Journal of Socio-Economics, 2004

Economists have long followed developments in the 'hard' sciences with an eye toward applying those developments to their own discipline. Hypothesis testing of positive statements, the use of mathematics as the formal language of economic theory, and the use of experiments are all examples of methods economists have borrowed from other disciplines. Economics as an Evolutionary Science is another attempt to improve the field of economics by borrowing the methodology of the natural sciences. Gandolfi, Gandolfi and Barash (GGB) try to incorporate what E.O. Wilson calls consilience (Wilson, 1998) into economics. Wilson argues that the natural sciences have advanced further than the social sciences because all the areas of the natural sciences overlap in a logically and empirically consistent manner. For example, chemists do not posit theories that violate the agreed upon laws of physics; instead chemists build upon those laws when extending their own field. This cross-relatedness and consistency has not been tried in the social sciences, argues Wilson, to the detriment of those who study it. GGB take up the gauntlet thrown down by Wilson, and attempt to link theory from the relatively hard science of biology to economics. In a bold and thought-provoking work, the authors try to make evolution the basis of economic analysis. Many economists have recognized the similarities between economic and evolutionary theory; in addition to making plain those similarities, this book moves further, and attempts to integrate evolution more fully into economics. The authors follow some lines of thought from both evolutionary theory and economic theory to their logical conclusions. Building on Stigler and Becker's (1977) idea that all consumers have the same utility function, the