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Feeling Power is a bold and provocative book whose breadth of inquiry is stunning. Author Megan Boler sets out to rescue emotions from their devalued and obscure political status by showing that they are both a site of social control and also a site for political resistance. She situates her inquiry within the context of education, convinced that classrooms, especially within higher education, constitute signifi cant locations of social and political struggle.
The Journal of Popular Culture, 2020
Vas Stanescu asserts that those working for nonhuman animal rights or liberation have failed to create revolutionary change because they have not been able to integrate such values into mainstream culture. While not a direct answer to Stanescu's call, Thinking Veganism in Literature and Culture: Toward a Vegan Theory responds to this shortcoming in particularly creative ways. Ten chapters divided into four categories ("Politics," "Visual Culture," "Literature," and "Definitions") create a wide scope. The editors see their volume as a third installment of vegan studies books following Laura Wright's monograph The Vegan Studies Project and Castricano and Simonsen's collection Critical Perspectives on Veganism. While Wright examines cultural discourses that shape perceptions of vegan identity and practice post-9/11 in the United States, Castricano and Simonsen critically assess current vegan praxis relative to its radical origins as it gains popularity. Thinking Veganism develops vegan studies by problematizing any absolute definition of the word "vegan." The editors seek a veganism that is both a method of social critique and an object of analysis. They situate veganism within a complex of ethics and contradictions in acting on those ethics. After the introduction, the first chapter, by Laura Wright, analyzes animal consumption discourse surrounding 2016 US presidential campaigns. Wright finds animal consumption portrayed as patriotic and the feasibility of a vegetarian like Ben Carson being elected president questioned. Thus, vegetarianism is indeed viewed
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Employing a qualitative method adapted from phenomenological psychology, the paper presents a socio-psychological portrait of a vegetarian. Descriptives are a product of the author’s reflection on (dialogue with) empirical findings and published personal accounts, interviews, and case studies. The paper provides evidence for the hypothesis that vegetarianism is a way of being. This way of experiencing and living in the world is associated with particular forms of relationship to self, to other animals and nature, and to other people. The achievement of this way of being, particularly in the interpersonal sphere, comprises an initial, a transitional, and a crystallizing phase of development. The paper frames contrasts between vegetarianism and carnism through the phenomena of the presence of an absence and the absent referent, respectively.
Vegetarianism is becoming increasingly common in the Western world, yet little has been written on how the practice is discursively constructed. This represents a gap in the systematic understanding of the motivations, ideas and issues of the vegetarian community, especially because vegetarian discourse both seeks to explain the deviant practice to meat-eaters and simultaneously rationalize the practice to vegetarians. By focusing on how the three main motivations behind vegetarianism - animal welfare, health and the environment - are presented, this essay explores the discursive construction of vegetarianism from a social problems perspective. It reveals that although vegetarians have succeeded in making meat eating a social problem, the majority of the vegetarian arguments do not in fact support or necessitate an all-out ban on animal products. Instead, they provide a useful explanation for the now growing flexitarian movement, and the rise in ethical, health-oriented and ecologically conscious consumers.
2019
This thesis starts from the proposition that the ethical meat discourse that is, the discourse recognizing that factory farming is unacceptable while maintaining that it is possible to produce meat in an acceptable way-has not been thoroughly analyzed. Indeed, both the partisans of this idea and the animal rights literature provide oversimplified analyses of this relatively new phenomenon. Considering I like to think that this thesis is original, not based on its content, but for the fact that from the start, it has been a personal project more than a professional one. Considering this distinctive characteristic, I did not have the all-important motivating factor of needing a piece of paper with "Ph.D." written on it to become a professor or a researcher. Looking back, this was both a blessing and a curse. A blessing since because I did not need to write this thesis, I had to find good reasons to want to do it. All along, the most important reasons were a fascinating subject and a strong desire to do my part to help the animals. The fact that I was lucky enough to get scholarships from both the governments of Quebec and of Ontario also made this much easier. This situation was also a curse because in hard times, I could not tell myself that I "needed" this piece of paper for a clear and distinct objective. For these moments, I was very lucky to be surrounded by supportive and caring people. The first person to thank is without hesitation Matthew without whom this thesis would certainly not exist. If I remember correctly, he is the one that initially asked me why I was doing a Ph.D. and accepted without questions my naive answer that it was "for fun." Despite this, he gave more time than I would have ever hoped and somehow found a way to push me intellectually to do more without discouraging me. I remember, when he announced to me that he was moving to Manchester, telling some friends that if for some reason he could no longer be my supervisor, that I would quit. I meant it because I could not imagine a better supervisor. I am proud of having the chance to work with him and will forever be grateful for his work, support, and inestimable help. CHAPTER ONE: Introduction Factory farming 1 is an abomination. There is no gentle way to put it. It is not just vegans-people who reject all forms of animal 2 exploitation-that say so. Even people that still support certain forms of animal exploitation are quick to recognize this reality. For example, author Jonathan Safran Foer writes: "More than any set of practices, factory farming is a mind-set: reduce production costs to the absolute minimum and systematically ignore or 'externalize' such costs as environmental degradation, human disease, and animal suffering. For thousands of years, farmers took their cues from natural processes. Factory farming considers nature an obstacle to be overcome." (2010, 34) In the same vein author and food activist Michael Pollan notes that "More than any other institution, the American industrial animal farm offers a nightmarish glimpse of what capitalism can look like in the absence of moral or regulatory constraint." (2002b) Considering the general disgust provoked by images and graphic descriptions of the horrors happening day and night in these factories, it is not surprising that the animal rights movement 3 has been using this reality as its main argument against 1 David Fraser presents factory farming in technical terms: "Until about 1950, farm animals in industrialized countries were raised by fairly traditional methods that relied on labour for routine tasks such as feeding and removal of manure and that generally involved keeping animals outdoors, at least part of the time, After the Second World War, there emerged a new generation of 'confinement' systems that generally kept animals in specialized indoor environments and used hardware and automation instead of labour for many routine tasks." (2005, 2) 2 The word "animal" will be used to describe "nonhuman sentient beings", except when it is important to highlight the fact that humans are also animals. For these specific cases, the expression "nonhuman animal" will be used. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka clearly explain that "sentience" is the characteristic that "has a distinct moral significance because it enables a subjective experience of the world." (2011, 24) 3 In the literature and in the media, a wide variety of expressions are used to describe what is commonly understood as the "animal rights movement." For example, the expressions "animal liberation movement," "animal protection movement," and "animal advocacy movement" are often used in contradictory ways. Indeed, since there are intense debates within/between these
A small but vocal group of feminists—including Carol J. Adams, Josephine Donovan, Greta Gaard, Lori Gruen, and others—have passionately argued that nonhuman animals are oppressed, and the appropriate feminist response includes the adoption of ethical vegetarianism (if at all possible). Though most feminists continue to exclude nonhuman animals from their praxis, remarkably few have responded to these arguments. One exception is Kathryn Paxton George. Her recent publication—Animal, Vegetable, or Woman? A Feminist Critique of Ethical Vegetarianism (AVW 2000)—is the culmination of more than a decade’s work and encompasses standard and original arguments against the feminist-vegetarian connection. In this thesis, I sketch the arguments offered in favour of the feminist-vegetarian connection and defend ethical vegetarianism against all of the central challenges that George raises. As she claims to offer A Feminist Critique of Ethical Vegetarianism, I set an evaluation of her key arguments within a feminist framework. First then, I review shared precepts of feminism, with a focus on ecofeminism, as it is in this terrain that the feminist-vegetarian connection is most often discussed and defended. Second, I outline George’s arguments against ethical vegetarianism and present the “quasi-ethical” diet she advocates in its stead (feminist aesthetic semi-vegetarianism). Third, I demonstrate that none of her key arguments succeeds. Among other flaws, she equivocates between dietary and ethical vegetarianism, improperly applies the principle of nonarbitrariness, relies heavily on problematic hypotheses, makes false and un-feminist assumptions, and begs the question against central issues of the feminist-vegetarian debate. Fourth, I demonstrate that support can be found throughout George’s book for two inconsistent applications of her preferred dietary proscriptions. I examine each of these and find both to be problematic. On the first count, abidance by George’s “quasi-ethical” theory would require us (Westerners) to live a lifestyle that is nearly reducible to the vegan ideal that she takes great pain to disparage. On the second count, she needlessly condones actions that she takes to be “morally wrong in any case,” while simultaneously encouraging people to protest against them. I conclude that, as each of the key arguments that George offers fails, the cumulative weight of her critique of ethical vegetarianism is nil. She does not prove that feminists cannot consistently or should not ethically advocate vegetarianism. Moreover, an analysis of what is required for opponents of the feminist-vegetarian connection to offer a persuasive defense of their position reveals that their prospects are bleak, if not utterly hopeless.
Veg(etari)an Arguments in Culture, History, and Practice, 2021
2020
In everyday situations, the experience of being a vegetarian or a vegan occurs within a process of conflict and practices of negotiation involving decisions, refusals, consumption acts, and proximity and distance between people in their relationships, mainly including the family. Many dilemmas result from the inconsistency between theory and difficult practices to be obeyed. To understand how this phenomenon, the chapter uses the interviews with vegetarians considering different alimentary restrictions and data obtained from observation in virtual groups of vegan activists. We have conducted the research between 2015 and 2017 as part of a larger project entitled: The Social Place of Animals in Contemporaneity.
This paper discusses Peter Singer's strict ethical vegetarianism. I argue that utilitarianism does not provide sufficient grounds for vegetarianism to be presented as an ethical obligation. I argue that the boycott style of vegetarianism advocated by Singer is not an effective means of reducing the suffering experienced by animals and, finally, demonstrate that the proper application of the principle of utility to our dietary choices requires the consumption of both ethically sourced meats and roadkill.
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