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This is the essay that I wrote for my Introduction to Ethics course in my first year of university. The introduction reads as follows: John Stuart Mill famously summarised utilitarianism as “the greatest good for the greatest number.” The theory identifies human happiness as the goal of any action and aims to provide a moral metric that quantifies outcomes on a scale of utility. In this essay, I will formalise and explain positive act utilitarianism, as made by Bentham. Secondly, I will analyse prominent objections pertaining to justice, workability and demandingness. These sections conclude that utilitarianism contravenes justice at great cost to minority interests, is practically unworkable and requires supererogation. Rule utilitarianism is then evaluated as a possible solution to the aforementioned concerns. Ultimately, I will conclude that rule utilitarianism does not escape the refutations of act utilitarianism because it either dissolves into act, or is forced to abandon the principle of utility altogether. This essay will be divided into five distinct sections: 1. The Utilitarian Argument 2. Justice and Minority Rights 3. Workability 4. Demandingness 5. Rule Utilitarianism: a possible solution?
2019
Far removed from the stereotype of cold, logical thinking that pervades support for John Stuart Mill's Utilitarian model, this reviewer finds only self-contradictions in Mill's logic, a thoughtless support for the instant gratification of a mob mentality, and a complete failure in application when applied to real world scenarios.
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1985
2008
In his metaethics and philosophy of language, Jeremy Bentham was strongly influenced by John Locke's empiricist framework. In his works on logic and mind (but also in his ethical writings), John Stuart Mill displayed a blend of empiricism and common sense philosophy, which he inherited from his father James. In addition to this, both Bentham and Mill viewed ethics and politics as empirical disciplines, based on human experience, and modeled after empirical, inexact disciplines, such as medicine. Despite his intuitionist leanings, even Henry Sidgwick presented his moral epistemology as a correction of an originally empiricist framework. Moreover, in Sidgwick's argument for utilitarianism, a lot of room is left to the power that a utilitarian ethical theory has in accounting for our common moral experience, embodied in our common sense moral judgements. Even through the twentieth century, utilitarianism has kept its connection with human experience, if only because of its frequent and numerous incursions in detailed applicative problems. Possibly, utilitarian ethical thinkers were the first to realize a turn to applied ethical theory. Paradoxically, the often repeated and most well-known objection to utilitarianism, namely its alleged counter-intuitiveness, concerns the relationship between utilitarian ethics and experience. This aspect of utilitarian moral theories was placed at the center of the three-day Conference "Utilitarianism: An Ethic of Experience?" (held at the University of Rome, June 12-14, 2007), where the papers published here were originally presented and discussed. From the many presentations, discussions, and informal talks that happened in those three days in Rome, it turned out that the question mark at the end of the conference title, originally indicating the ironic, yet provocative and wary spirit the organizers had toward the subject, could be removed safely. Experience is at the centre of utilitarianism, both in its historical and contemporary versions. Experience, however, is only a common point of departure, and it is not able to settle the various puzzles that scholars interested in utilitarianism must face. It is also for this reason that the title of the present collection was changed to a more neutral one, aiming to show the two directions assumed by the contemporary scholarship: an increasing penetration into the historical texts of eighteenth and nineteenth century utilitarians and a more detailed refinement of utilitarian ethical theories to respond classical and new objections and problems.
Gale Researcher Philosophy Series 1 and 2 (Internet Library Reference Database, 2017
John Stuart Mill’s theory of utilitarianism is a classical formulation, built on the foundation of the work of Jeremy Bentham. Mill’s theory departs from predecessors particularly insofar as he develops a qualitative distinction between higher and lower pleasures, a move seen by some to be Mill’s genius, and by others to lead to confusions. This article explains the classical theory, along with the higher/lower pleasure distinction, and goes on to consider various criticisms of utilitarianism as a way of further explaining the key points in the theory.
Millʹs famous essay ʺUtilitarianismʺ to begin with an almost is true of the hedonism of Bentham. First and most important, it is Millʹs unwillingness to accept the Benthamʹs view holding that all pleasures are qualitatively on a par. On the contrary, Mill argues, we must differentiate between ʹhigher and lowerʹ pleasure. Utilitarianism, the ethical doctrine that the good of any action is tested by its contribution to the results, especially human happiness. It should be focused on what brings happiness to the greatest number. It tries to prove rational and scientific foundation for morality. Rational based on calculation, and scientific is based on observation. Bentham thinks an action is right if it produces the greatest amount of pleasure rather than pain. Mill thinks an action, if only it conforms to generally accepted rules, creates most pleasure for most people. Bentham considers quantitative pleasure, and Mill considers qualitative pleasure, not just quantitative pleasure.
Journal of Value Inquiry, 1986
In contemporary moral philosophy, there is considerable confusion not only about what John Stuart Mill meant by the Principle of Utiiity but also about the position which the Principle occupies in his moral philosophy. Many interpreters regard Mill as an act utilitarian whose Principle of Utility was identical with a qualitatively hedonisticl version of the first principle of act utilitarianism which affirms that we are morally obligated to perform that relevant individual act which is most likely to have the best consequences for all persons or sentient beings affected by the act.2 Others regard him as a quaiitativeiy hedonistic rule utilitarian and take his Principle of Utility to say that we are morally obligated to perform that relevant act which falls under a general rule, universal obedience to which would have the best consequences for all persons or sentient beings affected.3 As a qualitative hedonist, Mill equated intrinsically good consequences with happiness, defined as "an existence exempt as far as possibie from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality."4 We are thus repeatedly informed that Mill's ultimate moral principle, the Principle of Utility itself, is that we are morally bound both to maximize happiness and minimize unhappiness either through each individual act that we perform or through the societal adoption and enforcement of general rules or behavior which would maximize happiness and minimize unhappiness for the greatest possible numbers if everyone acted on the rules. I hope to show that Mill offers us a third form of utilitarianism which I shall call minimizing utilitarianism.
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