The Science of Philosophy

Filosofiske Studier 2007

This paper argues that the so-called 6th definition of the sophist found in the outer part of Plato's "Sophist" is a methodological passage meant to point out how the sophist is to be pursued properly if he is to be distinguished from the philosopher.

This paper situates the interpretation of Plato in its 2500-year trajectory toward a significant change in the mid-twentieth century, away from the attempt to establish Plato's metaphysical doctrines to a recognition of the intrinsic value of their literary-dramatic dialogue form. I discuss the lingering presence of doctrinal interpretation in the Nietzschean-Heideggerian tradition of Plato interpretation as it manifests in Derrida's reading of Plato's Phaedrus. I then give two examples of the transformative power of attention to the literary-dramatic structure of the dialogues in the work of two quite different but mutually confirming kinds of contemporary Plato interpretation, those by Catherine H. Zuckert and William Desmond, respectively. The Plato that emerges from their work confirms the growing recognition that the tradition of Platonism does not represent the thinking embodied in Plato's dialogues.

2017

In the following lecture I will not only consider Plato’s positive statements about philosophy. Instead I choose an indirect approach by analysing the critique of his philosophy and his answer to it. This detour could turn out fertile, especially in the context of this conference. First, it could give us a better understanding of the popular picture of philosophy in its early days. Secondly, it could show us, how Plato does not want to be understood and thus contribute to avoiding common misconceptions about Plato and philosophy in general. Lastly, a closer look at Platos refutations of the critics allows a better accentuation of his concept of philosophy. I will try to show, that Plato’s concept of philosophy can best be understood as a certain perspective of thinking, opposed to everyday and sophistical thinking. This concept could be fundamental not only for the understanding of Plato but also for a systematic concept of philosophy as a certain way of thinking. The starting point of my lecture ist he so-called philopher’s critique in Republic Book VI (474b-497a). The critique contains three different challenges against philosophy in general, which ultimately aim at the philosophy of Plato. I will show how these three critiques are systematically connected and are argumentatively supported by the sophists. Plato’s defences reveal a consistent and plausible understanding of philosophy. I. Introduction p.1 a. Plato’s concept of philosophy in recent research b. Intention of the lecture II. Plato’s definition of philosophy p.3 a. Context b. Definition III. Cristiques of philosophy p.5 a. Epistemic critique p.5 i. Challenge ii. Response b. Practical critique p.6 i. Challenge ii. Response c. Moral critique p.9 i. Challenge ii. Response IV. Conclusion p.11

is is a collection of essays written by leading experts in honour of Christopher Rowe, and inspired by his groundbreaking work in the exegesis of Plato. e authors represent scholarly traditions which are very di erent in their approaches and interests, and rarely brought into dialogue with each other. is volume, by contrast, aims to explore synergies between them. Key topics include: the literary and philosophical unity of Plato’s works; the presence and role of his contemporaries in his dialogues; the function of myth (especially the Atlantis myth); Plato’s Socratic heritage, especially as played out in his discussions of psychology; his views on truth and being. Prominent among the dialogues discussed are Euthydemus, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, eaetetus, Timaeus, Sophist and Laws. George Boys-Stones is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Durham University. Dimitri El Murr is lecturer in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Junior member of the institut Universitaire de France. Christopher Gill is Professor of Ancient ought at the University of Exeter.

2016

The present chapter investigates Heidegger's early understanding of Platonic dialectic in its contrast to sophistry as this comes to expression in his Lectures on Plato's Sophist. According to Heidegger, sophistry is a possible way of being, a way we, as human beings, may relate to the 'world' and 'ourselves', through speech, through lógos. More precisely, Heidegger understands sophistry as the opposite of philosophical inquiry, as what philosophy is not. But this means, Heidegger claims, that a satisfactory account of sophistry is only possible from the perspective of philosophy, from the positive phenomenon of which sophistry is the opposite (GA 19, 352); sophistry can only be understood if one knows what its opposition, philosophy, is, and knows it from 'the inside'. According to Heidegger it is this problem that stands at the centre of Plato's dialogue the Sophist. The stated purpose of the dialogue is to make the being of sophistry apparent and this, Heidegger claims, is possible only if the attempt to do so at the same time illustrates what philosophy is, not by defining philosophy, but by being philosophical (GA 19, 12; 191; 236; 245-46). 1 In other words, only a philosophical disclosure of sophistry will

Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2016

The Platonic Art of Philosophy. Edited by George Boys-Stones, Dimitri El Murr and Christopher Gill. In: BMCR 2016

This is an uncorrected pre-publication version of one chapter of my book "Knowledge and Truth in Plato". Please use the published version for all citation purposes.

"Short or long to goblin city? The straight way's short but the long way's pretty." That's how it goes in the Cornish fairy stories, but not in Plato's fairy stories. The route to the Good for trainee philosopher kings in the ideal city will be long and does not promise to be at all pretty, though since we don't go that way we don't quite know; but the short way, and the even shorter way—the routes we are allowed to take in Plato's dialogue—are very pretty. They are vivid fairy tales decorated with pictures and diagrams, stories and entertainments, games and puzzles all the way. In this paper I take a look at what Socrates tells his listeners in the story recounted in Plato's Republic, in order to see why Socrates thinks that he and they must use icons to think with, and why he thinks that it works. I argue that his Divided Line diagram is not intended to show the worthlessness of images, but rather the value of them. It also illustrates the method that Socrates typically employs, once he has abandoned the fruitless search for definitions with which he generally starts the conversation. This method, which I call the iconic method, uses diagrams, images, pictures and stories. The Divided Line, and the surrounding text in the Republic, give us several clues as to why this richly imaginative method, which reaches no higher than the third of the four sections of the Line, still allows us to get to know the forms, even though we are taking a much shorter route than the rulers of the ideal city would need to take. But actually their longer route may also be quite pretty too.

Allgemeinen Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2019

Our contribution aims to reconstruct the normative distinction between sophistry and dialectics developed in Plato's treatment of sophistry. We begin by describing Plato's notion of sophistry as a knack for persuading that succeeds by masquerading as aiming for truth and by providing gratification for its listeners. We then argue that one can appreciate the stringency of Plato's arguments by using this definition of sophistry as an interpretive guide to the dialogues Protagoras and Gorgias. In unison these dialogues provide a well-structured argument against the usefulness of the mastery of sophistry, despite its effectiveness in attaining power within the Athenian democratic institutions. Plato's fundamental critique of sophistry is different from the specific misleading prejudices against sophistry also found in his writings which historical research has undermined. Therefore, the critique is of continued relevance not only for understanding Plato's philosophical agenda but also for the interpretation of 'the sophists'. We end by suggesting how Plato's normative distinction between sophistry and dialectics is also of relevance for our contemporary conception of democratic discursive culture and its legitimacy.