The Baltic States' Military Support to Ukraine

Journal on Baltic Security, 2019

The article aims to provide an insight into academic and military studies that investigate security challenges in the Baltic region after the annexation of Crimea. To do this in a systematic way, numerous academic and military studies and analyses in this field are divided into six broad categories: literature on conventional threat scenarios in the Baltic region; studies on nuclear escalation scenarios; publications that describe Russian viewpoints in the current confrontation with the West; studies that discuss security policy and security perceptions of the Baltic countries and the national security models of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; studies on anti-access and area denial; and articles that analyse the dilemmas and challenges in association with understanding the essence of deterrence in the context of modern hybrid warfare and the build-up of a viable deterrence model in the Baltic region. In total, about 40 publications from the period between 2014 and 2019 are represented in this article. While some studies are already well known, others have undeservedly remained somewhat overlooked. This article attempts to correct this by highlighting and comparing the results of the most interesting and intriguing studies in this field. Through this, the author strived to maintain a balance between studies conducted both by military experts and by academics.

On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe, 2023

of directly striking Poland and capturing the Suwałki Corridor (Hodges et al., p. 3 and 4), in order to link up with troops deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Consequently, this could cut off the Baltic States from the other allied countries and prevent the movement of NATO personnel and equipment (Stoicescu & Praks, 2016, p. 21). Thus, the Russian Federation could easily conduct a simultaneous operation against Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which seems very feasible under the conditions of its anti-access/area-denial A2/AD capability . Indeed, V. Putin seeks to give the impression to NATO countries that defending the Baltic States is risky and costly, and that the Russian Federation can dominate them, even without waging war (Kagan, 2020). Volodymyr Zelensky's attempts to integrate Ukraine into the European Union and gain full NATO membership starting in 2019 have raised serious concerns in the Kremlin. V. Putin recognized that the implementation of the Minsk agreements would not stop Ukraine from its chosen course, which he considered a threat to the integrity of the state. In this situation, he began a dangerous game with the West using the tools of pressure and threatening aggression, which was expressed mainly in demonstrations of force along the western and southern borders with Ukraine 1 . At the same time, he made impossible demands to the West for security guarantees (Koziej, 2022) consisting of NATO's withdrawal from the territory of countries admitted to the Alliance after 1999 and demanded guarantees of non-expansion of the organization to Georgia and Ukraine. Accusing the Alliance of escalating international tensions, Russia wanted to create the impression that the West's failure to engage in dialogue on proposals to change the Euro-Atlantic security system would lead to the "preemptive" use of military force. As a result of rejecting the Kremlin's proposal, V. Putin issued an order to invade the sovereign state justifying it by the need to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. According to Russian propaganda, the attack on Ukraine is a peacekeeping mission or rescue operation, during which Russian soldiers liberate Ukrainian society from the Nazi regime (Stawarz, 2022). In reality, Russian aggression against Ukraine was an attempt to realize the Kremlin's imperialist 1 According to analysts' calculations, Russia is likely to have amassed around 130,000 troops at various locations along the border with Ukraine. This means that it is probably the largest accumulation of military forces that has taken place in Europe in the last 40 years. The Russian military on the border with Ukraine consisted of so-called battalion tactical groups, or combat formations of 600 to 1,000 soldiers, equipped with their own artillery, air defense and logistics (How, 2022).

RUSI Newsbrief, 2015

Przegląd Politologiczny, 2016

The paper explores the reasons behind and the development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and its advantages and disadvantages that have emerged in the process of its formation and implementation. The transformation of the CSDP according to the Lisbon Treaty and the prospects of its operation in Europe are highlighted. Special attention is paid to the issues of improving the CSDP in the context of new threats to regional and global security. The place and role of the Baltic states in the CSDP are analysed. The position of the Baltic states in NATO, based on greater confidence in the institutions of NATO and close cooperation with the United States is considered. The basic threats and security challenges for the Baltic states nowadays are defined, including possible aggression from Russia, which is broadcast through the mainstream media as a reaction to the idea of protecting the Russian-speaking population of the Baltic states and the establishment of "geopolitical balance through their return to the Russian sphere of influence."

The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2016

This article examines the responses made by the Baltic States to the threat they face from Russian hybrid warfare. It looks first at the nature of this threat and at the many modes of warfare that are being employed by Russia, including, and in particular, information warfare. The article then goes on to examine the way in which this threat is viewed in the Baltic States and the debate over how it can best be countered. Raising defenses, though, as is made clear here, is not easy. Indeed, this article argues that the defenses that are being raised by the Baltic States will prove largely ineffective and possibly counterproductive.

BSR Policy Briefing series, 2022

Although not necessarily new, indirect and asymmetric methods of warfare have become more common in the last 30 years. This is the result of the development of new technologies and the rise of what the West calls “hybrid warfare,” with the fabrics of the nation being increasingly targeted by hostile actors to achieve the ultimate objectives of warfare in the political realm. Since the threat is multilayered and targets the nation’s very existence, war and defense should go beyond the armed forces and involve the whole of society. Therefore, the whole of society is a legitimate target and should take part in defense and war efforts. Since contemporary warfare targets a nation in its totality, defense must go beyond the traditional military realm. It must include the people, information system, culture, politics, economics, and infrastructure to increase the nation’s resilience. One fundamental factor determining a country’s resilience is the relationship between the social and the political realms. Data from the World Values Survey shows that, before the escalation of Russia’s war against Ukraine, a considerable gap existed between both realms with antagonistic characteristics. Taking the above into account, a fair question to be answered is why Russia’s war against Ukraine helped consolidate the Ukrainian nation and reduced the gap between the social and political realms resulting in greater resilience? This article uses Ukraine as a case study to draw lessons about resilience in non-kinetic/hybrid warfare to the Baltic states that might be extended to Western countries

Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2023

Historically, Estonia has suffered many years of hostilities infl icted by Russia, with Russia being a constant threat towards the nation's identity and sovereignty, including the loss of its independence and coming under and enduring belligerent Russian occupation. Recently, Moscow's policy escalated by their unilaterally using military power against Ukraine in an attempt to subordinate the nation while harbouring desires to restore their sphere of infl uence. 2022's aggression came as no surprise to Tallinn, as the nation's leadership had issued warnings about Russia's intentions, based on understanding its nature and being aware of what a so-called "Russian world" means. This article aims to focus on presenting the impact of Russian aggression against Ukraine on Estonia within three domains of understanding; those of the political, public, and military, and the author will use scientifi c methods including the collection of original data and a systematic review of existing literature and studies, along with analyses, syntheses, and elements of comparative analysis. The case study, of course, concerns Estonia. The research contends that the Russian Federation is and will continue to be considered an existential threat, one which carries out both continuous and decisive non-military and military activities against its neighbours. These activities require Estonia to improve internal security with the need of regional and international support.

Strategic Analysis, 2003

The Baltic States' search for security became a major issue after their independence in 1991. Since then these States have been trying to establish links with Europe and perceive Russia as a major threat. Their aspirations for the NATO membership are based on their security perspective. Baltic States are engaged in trying to upgrade their armed forces, solve their territorial and ethnic disputes to meet the NATO membership criteria. As regards relationship with Russia, there are problems on number of issues and they are trying to resolve them, as a normal friendly relationship between them will be beneficial for both sides.-*

2019

How Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania reacted to the recent actions of the Russian Federation.

Journal on Baltic Security

This paper aims to discuss the implications of Ukraine crisis to the U.S. foreign policy towards the Baltic States. This paper consists of several parts. To begin with, political discourse of Obama‘s and Trump‘s administrations‘ is analysed. The second part presents an analysis of practical level of U.S. relations with Baltic States during and after Ukraine crisis, focusing on three dimensions: political/diplomatic, military and economic. In the third part of this paper, implications of the Ukrainian crisis on U.S. relations with Baltic States are assessed, comparing trends in official political discourse and practical foreign policy of Baltic States prior to and after the Ukraine crisis.