Derrida's Deconstruction of the Subject: Writing, Self and Other

Derrida will argue that the reversal of the cogito and rethinking subjectivity in terms of embodiment and corporeality is a non-philsophy and anti-metaphysics that repeats metaphysics by negating and reversing it. Derrida's notion of truth is quasi-transcendental rather than anti-metaphysical like Merleau-Ponty's, which locates truth in the difference or differance between transcendental and empirical. Rather than privilege idealism or empiricism as both camps have done, Derrida posits the quasi-transcendental, differance, or the mediation between transcendental and empirical as the space of truth. Differance enables the thinking of both transcendental and empirical, and thus a thinking of the conditionality of structurality as differance is the true resolution to the impasse between idealism and post-metaphysics, or philosophy and non-philosophy.

In this paper I have examined Derrida's reception in the phenomenological field. I examined common miscontruals of Derrida as an empiricist and nihilist, and allegations that his post-phenomenology is a destruction of phenomenology. Contrary to these charges, I have argued that Derrida's post-phenomenology is a meta-phenomenology in its account for the conditions of possibility for transcendental-empirical distinction through his notions of differance and trace, as well as the quasi-transcendental. The quasi-transcendental is the interval between the transcendental and empirical which enables the thinking of both. Iterability and repetition name the conditions of possibility of ideality rather than being any simple destructive negation of it. The transcendental is only enabled by its signature, or difference from the origin in order to be communicated through space and time. It is the written mark, the quasi-transcendental, that which is neither transcendental nor empirical, which makes possible the distinction between the transcendental and empirical at the same time it makes impossible a sphere of purely expressive signs without the distinction. In this paper I review Derrida's reception in the field of phenomenology. This section differs from the review I gave earlier of phenomenologists in that it is a review of contemporary phenomenologists who have, unlike those covered previously, read Derrida, but read him erroneously, as I judge from my understanding of Derrida. I seek to address these misconceptions in this paper. Where contemporary phenomenologists describe Derrida's work as a disruption and interruption of phenomenology in critiquing the metaphysics of presence, I proceed to argue that characterizations of Derrida as a destructive critic of phenomenology are mistaken, and show how Derrida rather accounts for the conditions that make phenomenology possible with his notions of differance, iterability and the quasi-transcendental. Derrida is not to be mistaken for as a nihilist or an empiricist, rather he argues that phenomenology has to account for the conditions that make it possible. These conditions are differance, iterability, and the quasi-transcendental, that which is neither transcendental nor empirical, but the paradoxical space between that determines and enables us to think both transcendental and empirical. Derrida thus performs meta-phenomenology rather than a destruction of phenomenology as his critics

Minerva-An Internet Journal of Philosophy, 2001

Derrida has been rather frequently acclaimed for his conception of alterity, which we are told is irrecuperable and beyond the dialectic. However, this essay will argue that his attempts to instantiate an ethics of responsibility to the "otherness of the other" are more problematic than is commonly assumed. Much of Derrida's work on alterity palpably bears a tension between his emphasis upon an absolute and irrecuperable notion of alterity that is always deferred and always 'to come', and his simultaneous insistence that the other is somehow always already within the self. These two aspects of his treatment of alterity do not necessarily contradict one another, but they represent an important tension between a Levinasian inclined account of alterity (the other is that which can never be known), and a more traditionally phenomenological conception of alterity (i.e. the imperialism of the same, in which the other is always partially domesticated by the self's horizons of significance).

In this paper I have examined Derrida's reception in the phenomenological field. I examined common miscontruals of Derrida as an empiricist and nihilist, and allegations that his post-phenomenology is a destruction of phenomenology. Contrary to these charges, I have argued that Derrida's post-phenomenology is a meta-phenomenology in its account for the conditions of possibility for transcendental-empirical distinction through his notions of differance and trace, as well as the quasi-transcendental. The quasi-transcendental is the interval between the transcendental and empirical which enables the thinking of both. Iterability and repetition name the conditions of possibility of ideality rather than being any simple destructive negation of it. The transcendental is only enabled by its signature, or difference from the origin in order to be communicated through space and time. It is the written mark, the quasi-transcendental, that which is neither transcendental nor empirical, which makes possible the distinction between the transcendental and empirical at the same time it makes impossible a sphere of purely expressive signs without the distinction. The written mark functions as if it was transcendental, but without it no distinction between the transcendental or empirical would be able to take place, and were the distinction impossible no transcendental or pure expressive realm would take place either. Hence the phenomenological project becomes possible through this paradoxical relation of the quasi-transcendental, relating the transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity in non-identity. It is thus made more powerful through an acknowledgement of the quasi-transcendental as its condition of possibility. In this paper I review Derrida's reception in the field of phenomenology. This section differs from the review I gave earlier of phenomenologists in that it is a review of contemporary phenomenologists who have, unlike those covered previously, read Derrida, but read him erroneously, as I judge from my understanding of Derrida. I seek to address these misconceptions in this paper. Where contemporary phenomenologists describe Derrida's work as a disruption and interruption of phenomenology in critiquing the metaphysics of presence, I proceed to argue that characterizations of Derrida as a destructive critic of phenomenology are mistaken, and show how Derrida rather accounts for the conditions that make phenomenology possible with his notions of differance, iterability and the quasi-transcendental. Derrida is not to be mistaken for as a nihilist or an empiricist, rather he argues that phenomenology has to account for the conditions that make it possible. These conditions are differance, iterability, and the quasi-transcendental, that which is neither transcendental nor empirical, but the paradoxical space between that determine and enables us to think both transcendental and empirical. Derrida thus performs meta-phenomenology rather than a

Angelaki-journal of The Theoretical Humanities, 2001

2014

The term "deconstruction" decisively enters philosophical discourse in 1967, with the publication of three books by Jacques Derrida: Writing and Difference, Of Grammatology, and Voice and Phenomenon. Indeed, "deconstruction" is virtually synonymous with Derrida's name. Nevertheless, the event of Derridean deconstruction developed out of the phenomenological tradition. On the one hand, as is often noted, Derrida appropriated the term from Heidegger's idea, in Being and Time, of a "destruction" of the history of Western ontology (Heidegger 2010, 19-25 [ §6]), that is, a dismantling of the historical concepts of being in order to lay bare the fundamental experience from which these concepts originated (PSY2, 2). On the other, and less often noted, Derrida took constant inspiration from Husserl's idea of the epoché (Husserl 2012, 59-60 [ §32]), that is, from the universal suspension of the belief in a world having existence independent from experience (see, e.g., SM, 59). Both Heidegger's historical destruction and Husserl's universal suspension amounted to critical practices in regard to accepted beliefs and sedimented concepts. Likewise, Derridean deconstruction criticizes structures, concepts, and beliefs that seem selfevident. In this regard, deconstructive critique is classical (or traditional, Kantian), aiming to demonstrate the limited validity of concepts and beliefs, even their falsity, aiming, in other words, to dispel the illusions they have generated. In general, deconstructive critique targets the illusion of presence, that is, the idea that being is simply present and available before our eyes. For Derrida, the idea of presence implies selfgivenness, simplicity, purity, identity, and stasis. Therefore, deconstruction aims to demonstrate that presence is never given as such, never simple, never pure, never self-identical, and never static; it is always given as something other, complex, impure, differentiated, and generated.

Essays in Philosophy, 2004

the quint : an interdisciplinary quarterly from the north 3 the quint volume six issue one an interdisciplinary quarterly from the north advisory board We cannot be held responsible for unsolicited material cover photo: Sue Matheson A quarterly journal, the quint is housed in and