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2003
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
Articles: [“Abrial, Jean Marie Charles (1879-1962),” 1:4-5; “Auboyneau, Philippe Marie Joseph Raymond (1899-1961),” 1:64-65; “Auphan, Paul Gabriel (1894-1982),” 1:65-66; “Bloch, Claude Charles (1878-1967),” 1:118-119; “Christie, Ralph Waldo (1893-1987),” 1:176-177; “Conolly, Richard Lansing (1892-1962),” 1:183-184; “Cunningham, Sir John Henry Dacres (1885-1962),” 1:215-216; “Fechteler, William Morrow (1896-1967),” 1:266-268; “Fegen, Edward Stephen Fogarty (1891-1940),” 1:267-268; “Giffen, Robert Carlisle ‘Ike’ (1886-1962),” 1:307; “Godfrey, John Henry (1888-1971),” 1:312-314; (with Spencer C. Tucker) “Godfroy, René Émile (1885-1981), 1:314-315; “Great Britain, Women’s Royal Naval Service,” 1:322-323; “Harwood, Sir Henry (1888-1950),” 1:341-342; “Hewitt, Henry Kent (1887-1972),” 1:347-348; “Holland, Lancelot Ernest (1887-1941),” 1:350; “Ingersoll, Royal Eason (1883-1976),” 1:379-380; “Ingram, Jonas Howard (1886-1952),” 1:380-381; “Keyes, Roger John Brownlow (1872-1945),” 1:415-416; (with Spencer C. Tucker) “King, Ernest Joseph (1878-1956),” 1:420-421; “Kirk, Alan Goodrich (1888-1963),” 1:423-424; “Knox, William Franklin ‘Frank’ (1874-1944),” 1:424-425; (with Spencer C. Tucker) “Laborde, Jean Joseph, Comte de (1878-1977),” 1:441-442; “McGrigor, Sir Rhoderick Robert (1893-1959),” 2:488; “McMorris, Charles Horatio ‘Soc’ (1890-1954),” 2:489; “Noble, Sir Percy Lockhart Harnam (1880-1955),” 2:564-565; “Reeves, Joseph Mason (1872-1948),” 2:624-625; “Sherman, Forrest Percival (1896-1951),” 2:660-661; “Stark, Harold Raynsford ‘Betty’ (1880-1972),” 2:709-711; “Wilkinson, Theodore Stark ‘Ping’ (1888-1946),” 2:801-802] The war at sea was a key aspect of World War II, one that is too-often under-studied. This comprehensive encyclopedia shares current understandings of the struggle to control the seas during that conflict—and it opens our eyes to the reasons sea power continues to be of critical importance today. Scholarly treatment of World War II is constantly changing as new materials inform new interpretations. At the same time, current military operations lead to reevaluation of the tactics and technologies of the past. Marshalling the latest information and insights into this epic conflict, World War II at Sea: An Encyclopedia will enable students and other interested readers to explore specific naval engagements, while also charting the transformation of naval history through innovations in ordnance. In treating the naval aspects of World War II, this two-volume ready reference enhances the understanding of a part of the war that is often overshadowed by the fighting on land and in the air. The encyclopedia focuses on the events, individuals, organizations, and ideas that shaped the world's navies during World War II, as well as the resultant battles that changed naval history. It also covers the numerous innovations that occurred during the conflict and shows how strategies evolved and were executed. Features •More than 450 A–Z entries •A comprehensive chronology •Numerous illustrations of individuals, weapons, and battles •Maps •A glossary of naval terms •A comprehensive bibliography, plus cross-references and suggestions for further reading at the end of each entry Highlights •Overviews the history of the navies of World War II in an instructive introductory essay •Shares biographies of the leading personalities of the war •Discusses naval strategy during the war, explaining the naval technology of the period in layman's terms •Provides comprehensive treatment of battles and information on principle campaigns
2021
This work is the second and last sequel to Major Naval Operations, published by the Naval War College Press in 2008 as Newport Paper 32. The first sequel, Major Fleet-versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945, was published (as Historical Monograph 22) by the Naval War College Press / Government Printing Office in 2014; a second edition came out in 2016. The focus of that volume was on the description and analysis of three major fleet-versus-fleet operations. In contrast, this work, Major Naval Operations in European Waters, 1939–1945 (twenty-seventh in the Naval War College Press’s Historical Monograph series), looks at three different types of major naval/joint operations: an attack on enemy maritime trade, the defense and protection of friendly maritime trade, and a major amphibious/anti-amphibious operation. The principal purpose is to impress on commanders and their staffs the critical importance of studying the theory and practice of major naval/joint operations. A...
Naval warfare is defined as the tactics of military operations conducted on, over, or under the seas, oceans, or any other major water bodies such as rivers or lakes. It is waged against other seagoing vessels or targets on land or in the air. Even if one agrees with the techno-centric view that modern naval history begins at the point when steam power becomes the principle propulsive mechanism for combat, in the late 1840s, the major naval engagements of the twentieth century best demonstrated, indeed rapidly accelerated, the unprecedented development of technology, the evolution of tactics, and the fighting skills of personnel – altering the relationship between them. However, outside the idealised theoretical conditions of the academy, the environment remained an un-mastered obstacle to all these imperfect factors, but especially technology, throughout the century. The maritime environment constitutes atmospheric conditions such as cloud, fog, wind, precipitation, humidity, temperature, sunlight, and night time, on the one hand, and aspects of the water, namely area, temperature, state, tides, landforms (sandbanks and reefs), on the other. It was a hindrance or an aid to naval forces, as it reduced the fighting capabilities of personnel and caused fatal accidents, enabled concealment and evasion of platforms, and fundamentally altered the nature, and forced the delay, postponement, and abandonment of certain naval engagements altogether. The study focuses on the two world wars and the Falklands conflict of 1982, only briefly including the Korean War, fought in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Ocean. Finally, for convenience purposes the essay prioritises the navies of the UK and US over others.
The Mariner's Mirror, 2017
This article represents a work in progress for a war gaming journal. it deals with the naval aspect of the " coming invasion " or " next war " craze of the two world war preludes of the 20 th century. it contains various drafts and notes from open sources. As such it is a rough draft.
Journal of Strategic Security, 2021
Review Essay of "On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare. Edited by Timothy Heck and B.A. Friedman. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020."
International review of the Red Cross, 2016
a retired British naval commander. He chaired the Editorial Board of the UK's official Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004) and co-authored its chapter on 'Maritime Warfare'. He had previously written the Royal Navy's maritime strategic doctrine (British Maritime Doctrine, 1999).
The Mariner's Mirror, 2014
The Journal of Military History, 2003
2003
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
Legacies of the First World War. Building for Total War 1914 -1918, 2018
Archaeological summary of the First World War at Sea
History: Reviews of New Books, 2020
This is the text of a conference held in Cascais, Portugal, the 8 April 2016. The paper deals mainly with the impact of the naval warfare on the Italian economy, using it as reference point for general trends that affected other Entente and neutral powers. The paper is a starting point for future analysis that I am going to conduct on this subject.
2000
is is the first study to show how the Royal Navy’s ideas about the meaning and application of seapower shaped its policies in the interwar period. Drawing on a wide range of unpublished sources, the author challenges the accepted view that the intellectual shortcomings of Britain’s naval leaders resulted in poor strategic planning and an inability to meet the challenges of the Second World War. This book provides the first comprehensive survey of the navy’s strategies for dealing with possible wars with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and even the United States. It argues that the “Singapore Strategy” has been widely misunderstood, that there was in fact more than one strategy developed for war with Japan, that the navy’s war plans placed greater emphasis on maritime economic pressure than decisive sea battles, and that the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on the interwar navy has been greatly exaggerated. The author also reveals how the “One Power Standard” did not fundamentally affect the outcome of the navy’s ongoing struggle with the Treasury for funds, how the service’s interest in “showing the flag” abroad was linked to its concerns over the health of the naval armaments industry at home, and how the navy reluctantly employed propaganda between the wars to revive its popularity with the British public. The book argues that naval leaders possessed a more sophisticated and flexible understanding of the strengths and limitations of sea power than previous studies have recognized, and that Britain’s strategic position during the 1930s would have been stronger if their advice had been followed. The author concludes that the navy’s efforts to shape British grand strategy were largely unsuccessful, however, because civilian decision-makers often had different views about the role of sea power in the modern world.
International Journal of Maritime History, 2012
From the late 1880s to 1914, the Royal Navy was confronted by the prospect of major war with one or more continental great powers. From 1914 to 1918, Britain fought Germany and Austria-Hungary as part of a great power coalition. During this conflict, British sea power played an essentially supporting role to the titanic and protracted struggle on land between armies. This, together with the Royal Navy's failure to fight and win a decisive fleet action and initially unsatisfactory response to the German submarine campaign, which very nearly brought about defeat, resulted in perceptions that the Admiralty had failed to develop an effective naval strategy in the quarter century prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, and that this was the product of faulty planning organization and poor planning. Grimes challenges this assessment by examining four things: the development of Admiralty strategic planning instruments, the nature and development of the Admiralty's strategic planning process, the strategic plans produced by that process, and the application ofprewar planning to the prosecution ofthe First World War. Grimes maintains that the expansion and improvement ofthe Naval Intelligence Department constituted a sound basis for strategic planning that was augmented by the work of ad hoc committees and planning groups. Strategic conclusions drawn from historical scholarship, which were largely the result ofthe efforts ofJohn Knox Laughton and his associates, informed the deliberations ofthe Admiralty's various planning bodies, were tested by fleet manoeuvres, and influenced the direction ofwarship procurement. By 1914, the plans generated by the planning process embodied two lines of major action in the event of war: distant rather than close blockade, and offensive combined operations against the enemy coast. During the First World War, the implementation of the distant blockade was ultimately effective and the preoccupation of the Royal Navy's leadership with offensive combined operations throughout the war are to be taken as proof"that there was an underlying validity to the offensive planning trend begun at the height ofthe Dual Alliance [Franco-Russian] rivalry." [224] In a sentence, the thesis ofGrimes' monograph is that the First World War demonstrated "that for thirty years the Royal Navy's planning was legitimate, progressive, innovative, and constantly attuned to the efficient projection of sea power to defend Britain's interests." [234; see also 2] The author's arguments are remarkably at odds with reasonable conclusions that can be drawn from his own presentation of the evidence. A great deal of space is devoted to the description of various schemes to project major British naval forces into German coastal waters to bombard fortifications or to cover the landing of British troops. But Grimes also provides ample testimony of strong and well-informed opposition by senior officers to such actions as reckless or otherwise ill-advised.
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