Attempts to assassinate Michael Collins

Journal of social philosophy, 2000

Who fears to speak of Easter Week That week of famed renown When the boys in green went out to fight The forces of the Crown-Dublin Ballad, origins unknown 1 In the fall of 1920, General Headquarters staff of the IRA realized that a new danger was facing them in their struggle for political independence from Britain. The British had begun to augment intelligence operations by organizing a special unit known as the Cairo Gang, whose mission was to execute the political leadership of Sinn Fein, including Michael Collins. 2 By October 1920 this unit had taken residence in Dublin and begun its nocturnal operations. In civilian clothes members of the Cairo Gang raided private homes and hotel rooms. Among those selected for execution were Dr. Fogarty, the Catholic Bishop of Killaloe (he wisely went away after the plot was described to him), the Lord Mayor of Limerick (murdered in his home), a former Lord Mayor of Limerick, Alderman George Clancy, John Lynch, a Kilmallock businessman (shot dead in his bed at 2 A.M.), and Arthur Griffith, then Acting President of Sinn Fein, among others. As a result of fortuitous circumstances, Michael Collins was able to piece together information on the main figures in the plot to break Sinn Fein. His strategy to paralyze British operations during this critical period in Irish independence was simple and successful: identify the members of this unit and other high-ranking British personnel, gather irrefutable evidence, and then assassinate them. Subsequently, names and addresses of thirty-five British Secret Service officers were secured and presented to Michael Collins by his staff. Detailed reports were prepared on each of them. Fifteen were rejected on grounds of insufficient evidence. The remaining twenty were chosen for assassination. On the morning of November 21, known as Bloody Sunday, Collins's squad of assassins-called the Apostles (young men, mostly from rural areas-along with members of the Volunteers and the Dublin Brigade, mobilized in different parts of Dublin. At exactly 9:00 A.M. the shooting began. Lieutenant Aimes and Captain Bennett were shot dead. So, too, were Captain Bagalley, Captain Fitzgerald, Captain Newbury, and Lieutenant McLean. In all, nineteen agents and members of the Cairo Gang were assassinated on that day. By 9:30 A.M. the killing was over and the mission complete. Collins was sufficiently confident in the success of this mission to say,

No Times Four , 2020

This paper deals with four common explanations for the killing of Michael Collins at Beal na Blath and shows why none of these four are accurate.

Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2022

On the assassination attempt on novelist Salman Rushdie on Friday, August 12, 2022 at the Chautauqua Institution, New York.

This article seeks to draw together two major themes in studies of political violence, namely, decapitation and factionalism, using exam- ples from the Irish republican paramilitary groups that emerged during the period of conflict in Northern Ireland commonly known as the Troubles. I seek to complement the extensive literature across these areas by offering analysis of the behaviour of Irish republican paramilitary groups during internecine feuds that took place between the 1969 split in the Irish Republican Army and the 1992 Provisional Irish Republican Army action against the Irish People’s Liberation Organisation. By comparing three inter-group feuds, this study will demonstrate the prevalence of decapitation attacks in the aftermath of factional splits and the serious consequences that they have for groups which suffer a decapitation attack.

The author of “The Assassination of Michael Collins: What Happened at Béal na mBláth?” takes issue with two previous Irish Story articles on Ireland's most controversial “cold case”: the 1922 assassination of newly-independent Ireland's Commander-in-Chief. The two articles in question are: "Evasive Manoeuvres: An Examination of Florence O’Donoghue’s Account of the Death of Michael Collins" by Daniel Murray www.theirishstory.com/2013/06/10/evasive-manoeuvres-an-examination-of-florence-odonoghues-account-of-the-death-of-michael-collins/#.VGSntY-P8xA and "Deceptive Manoeuvres: Daniel Murray, Florence O’Donoghue and the Death of Michael Collins" by Denis Lenihan www.theirishstory.com/2014/02/25/deceptive-manoeuvres-daniel-murray-florence-odonoghue-and-the-death-of-michael-collins/#.U0dDHs938Yw

Cathal Goulding was a soldier, prisoner, IRA leader and left wing revolutionary figure, at a time of great ideological uncertainty in Ireland. His role in Irish history, particularly republican history, has become complicated and divisive, given the marriage of truth, lies, propaganda and spin that continue to surround his life. As someone who has spent five years researching his life, and interviewed family members, comrades and opponents, it is clear the realities of his life contradict a great deal of the existing information, particularly when agendas and political positioning are removed from the dynamics. His former comrades have been eager to highlight his achievements, journey toward peace and reconciliatory relationships with Loyalist gunmen. His enemies, particularly those who supported the Provisional IRA, have been quick to marginalise and dismiss his successes, eagerly portraying his republican career negatively. Many respected academic historians, such as Brian Hanley, have broken ground on Gouldings movement, or the 'Officials' as it was widely known, and challenged the validity of many agenda driven arguments. Given the central role, which Goulding played, and the affect his agenda had on people, these contradictory interpretations present many opportunities, when viewed from an academic historian's perspective. In order to understand the origins of this divide, and reveal some of the truths that have been forgotten, marginalised or ignored by people seeking to rewrite history and elevate political positions to unsustainable heights, it is crucial to look at Gouldings life, particularly his time as Chief of Staff, when the movement struggled to resolve ideological positions and slowly journeyed toward schism.

by Margaret Urwin and Niall Meehan On 1 December 1972 at 7.58 and 8.15pm, as the Irish Times reported, ‘Two [car] bombs in Dublin city centre killed two [CIE workers], injured 127 other people, and dramatically changed the course of the Dáil crisis over the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill’. The legislation permitted a court to accept as proof of IRA membership the uncontested word of a garda chief superintendent. The bombs were the second in a series of three in Dublin between November and January. They prevented a general election by collapsing Fine Gael opposition to the controversial measure. British involvement was suspected by then Taoiseach Jack Lynch. However, his government ensured that an MI6 agent John Wyman and Patrick Crinnion, Wyman’s mole in garda HQ, arrested nearly three weeks later, were freed prematurely. A ‘third man’, whose role was hidden, led gardaí to Wyman. Gardaí told the Taoiseach about him. The Department of Justice, under then minister Desmond O’Malley, must also have known. Judge Henry Barron’s 2004 report on the 1972-73 bombings, that considered the Wyman-Crinnion scandal, ignored his existence. The Irish Press reported initially the arrest of two British agents, in addition to a garda member ‘employed in a clerical capacity at garda headquarters’ (Crinnion’s position). After that, this second British agent was forgotten. The third man was 31-year-old Englishman Alexander Forsey (reported as ‘Fursey’). Gardaí initially thought him ‘sympathetic to the IRA’. On 15 December 1972 he appeared in court, charged with possession of explosive safety fuse, 710 rounds of .22 and eight rounds of .303 ammunition. Under interrogation, Forsey told gardaí that he was in contact with a fellow Englishman, John Wyman.