Building markets: The political economy of technology standards
Michael Murphree2014
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Abstract
General Condition of Technology Markets in China Case Studies Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA) viii Wireless Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) 180 Intelligent Grouping and Resource Sharing (IGRS) 185 Audio-Video Standard (AVS) 190 Conclusion 196 5 CONCLUSION 198 Bringing it Together: the Cases of Japan and Korea 199
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