The subject of ideals

Jefferson Journal of Psychiatry, 1988

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 1997

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2000

SEE, 2018

Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this is the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other arguments—such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc.—are also often cited. In this essay, I will argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible ontology.

Ethics, 2009

The paper clarifies the basic conceptual framework of the ideal/nonideal theory of justice distinction. It juxtaposes two alternative conceptions of a complementary understanding of the relation between ideal and nonideal theory. The first is John Rawls's "double-level" conception that employs two distinct normative yardsticks on the level of ideal and nonideal theory. The second type is a "single-level" conception that operates with only one evaluative standard that is grounded on the level of ideal theory and translates into distinct action-guiding norms on the level of both ideal and nonideal theory. The paper points out that while -as G.A. Cohen puts it -"fact-sensitive" theorists will not necessarily be disinclined to endorse a double-level conception of a complementary relation between ideal and nonideal theory, "fact-insensitive" theorists will. Hence the endorsement of either a single-level or double-level conception hinges upon one's view on the significance of facts in grounding principles of justice.

The author of this paper starts by sketching a general framework for Peirce's ethical theory: first, he discusses very briefly Peirce's phenomenological categories; then, he outlines some implications of these categories for Peirce's concept of personal identity. In the rest of the paper he discusses successively within this framework Peirce's views on the status of ethics, ideals, concrete reason-ableness, evolutionary love, and the relation between the individual and the cosmos. He then argues that these notions, taken together , culminate in a non-subjective ethical theory that indicates what is a good life. The central argument that he develops is that we, according to Peirce, can only become authentic persons through a process of giving a general form to our interactions with our social and natural environment, i.e., a form that is constituted by virtue of the belief in and embodiment of common ideals, which are no less real than concrete, physical events.

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2006

The article argues that the structure of self-realisation is bipolar, and that genuine self-realisation should be conceptualised as a phenomenon of connectedness manifesting itself simultaneously in both a horizontal and a vertical dimension. As a relation between individual selfassertion and self-exposition on the one hand and ideals and values in relation to individually transcending horizons of meaning on the other hand, genuine self-realisation develops through different self-organisational levels, with the relational character of the self being transformed in ways corresponding to the level of its self-organisation. Framing The Question of Self-Realisation The Historical Root Like so many psychological-existential topics, the question of how we shall understand the relation between the right of the individual to act out and realise his individual lust, desire and needs versus his duty to realise higher moral ideals in his way of living dates back in history. Looking at specific moments in history, we will find, that it was discussed by the Greeks in the conflict between the Sophist's hedonistic philosophy and the "universal ideal of excellence" promoted by Socrates; that it was core-positioned in the dispute between Nietzsche's philosophy of volition and Christian moral teaching; and that in the early years of psychology, it became a nodal point in the conflict between Freud's id and superego, between homo natura and homo socius. Although Freud did not as such deem morality unnecessary, (but rather saw it as a necessary evil), he was in line with the Sophist's and