Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison

Lithuanian Historical Studies

This book is worth reading, because it tells the story of the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, and it is written in a talented way. The author has gathered a great deal of information, and constructs historical images in an original manner. His language is rich and suggestive. It is no coincidence that the work has received numerous reviews and discussions. On the other hand, the content of the book is schematic, and its style eclectic. The tragedy of the Second World War is associated only with Stalin and Hitler, or more accurately, with the Soviet Union and Germany. Little room is devoted to the role of other states, processes or persons. Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daledje are mentioned only once. The concept of appeasement does not exist at all. The work is written essentially based on secondary sources. Moreover, the author's frequent statements or conclusions are not based on empiricism, they are just derived with the help of logic. Everything is nicely 'wrapped' in essayistic fiction. The whole content of Bloodlands is pierced with hatred for Stalinism and Nazism as political systems (more for the first, as it existed for a longer time). The text is often directed toward emotion for stronger impact. But the impression can be created that the equalisation of the two systems (according to the 2008 Prague Declaration) is not an end in itself for the author. At the end of the book, the statements presented would let one believe that the author knows the similarities and differences between phenomena: 'In the National Socialism vision, inequality between groups was inherent and desirable … The Soviet system, when it was expanded, brought to others the Soviet version of equality … In Stalinism mass murder could never be anything more than a successful defense of socialism ... ' (pp. 390-391); with Nazism (as opposed to Stalinism) 'ideological alignment was impossible' (p. 397). The different characteristics of Stalin and Hitler (pp. 387-389) are also discussed. Overall, it is not easy to comprehend the author's intentions. It is possible that the real intention of the book is encoded in the very title Bloodlands. In a geographical sense, the land 'extends from central Poland to western Russia, through Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic States' (p. viii). As the author explains, the area was defined in this way because in it, in the period 1933 to 1945, very many people, around 14 million, were killed. But the number of deaths itself in a certain space is barely sufficient for historical exceptionality.

Europe-asia Studies, 2004

Slavic Review, 1977

H-Net Reviews in the Humanities & Social Sciences, 2021

How does one make sense of Stalin and Stalinism? This question has been at the heart of heated debates for decades, not only within Western scholarship of Soviet history, but more importantly, within contemporary historiographical debates in Russia and other post-Soviet countries (in particular, Georgia). As editors James Ryan and Susan Grant note in the introduction of this volume, quoting from no less a figure than Nikita Khrushchev, the legacy of Stalin is "complicated" (p. 3). Moreover, as historian David Hoffmann wrote, "for students of Soviet history, no problem looms larger than that of Stalinism" (quoted, p. 7). The current volume seeks to further unpack this "Stalin enigma," challenging the commonly held assumptions and narratives about the Soviet dictator and his regime through new archival re

This is the English version of the chapter published in Russian.

Journal of Cold War Studies, 2000

The American Historical Review, 1997

Wrestling with Aspects of Interwar Stalinism, 2024

This essay addresses several issues regarding interwar Soviet history, including how western researchers label mass repression. It also discusses the fact that Leon Trotsky and Lev Sedov lied about their relations to several defendants in the August 1936 trial and how their lies challenge us to re-think certain assumptions about the trial and onset of mass repression.

Abstract The paper analyses Stalin's choices over military power and political repression as instruments for holding political power in the face of foreign and domestic threats. Since the threats were interactive, the policy combination had to be determined simultaneously. One problem was that, while military power was the more efficient instrument for countering a foreign threat, it could be adjusted less rapidly than repression.

2019

Europe-Asia Studies