Violation of utility theory in unique and repeated gambles

2000

Ž. Ž. Miyamoto's 1988, 1992 generic utility theory GUT subsumes a broad class of bilinear utility models. Ž. Chechile and Cooke 1997 tested the GUT class of models and found model failure due to the systematic variation of a parameter that should be a positive constant across a range of contexts. In the current study, an improved experimental design is employed to evaluate utility theory. The current study provides further evidence against the GUT class of models for mixed gambles. Moreover, evidence is also provided to demonstrate individual behavior that is incompatible with a coherent bilinear utility theory of choice behavior in the context of mixed gambles with gains and losses.

British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 2007

Experimental evidence indicates that decision makers who reject a single play of a gamble may accept repeated plays of that gamble. The rationality of this pattern of preference has been investigated beginning with Samuelson's colleague (SC) who gained notoriety in a well-known paper. SC's pattern of preference is commonly viewed as a behavioural anomaly. Researchers from branches of psychology and economics have analysed the choice and, despite much debate, there remains considerable confusion. An axiomatic analysis of SC's choice has been used to motivate experimental studies in several disciplines. This paper identifies the axiomatic violation as that of an assumed rather than a normative condition. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, SC's choice is consistent with expected utility theory.

Economic Theory, 2008

We specialize our results on entropy-modified representations of eventbased gambles to representations of probability-based gambles by assuming an implicit event structure underlying the probabilities, and adding assumptions linking the qualitative properties of the former and the latter. Under segregation and under duplex decomposition, we obtain numerical representations consisting of a linear weighted utility term plus a term corresponding to information-theoretical entropies. These representations accommodate the Allais paradox and most of the data due to Birnbaum and associates. A representation of mixed event-and probability-based gambles accommodates the Ellsberg paradox. We suggest possible extensions to handle the data not accommodated.

2002

1995

The dominance principle states that one should prefer the option with consequences that are at least as good as those of other options for any state of the world. When applied to judged prices of gambles, the dominance principle requires that increasing one or more outcomes of a gamble should increase the judged price of the gamble, with everything else held constant. Previous research has uncovered systematic violations of the dominance principle: people assign higher prices to a gamble with a large probability of winning an amount, Y, otherwise zero, than they do to a superior gamble with the same chance of winning Y, otherwise winning a small amount, X! These violations can be explained by a configural-weight theory in which two-outcome gambles are represented with two sets of decision weights; one set for outcomes having values of zero and another set for lower-valued outcomes that have nonzero values. The present paper investigates whether dominance violations are limited to two-outcome gambles. Results show that people violate the dominance principle with three-outcome gambles even with financial incentives. Furthermore, results could be predicted from the configural-weight theory. The data do not support the view that configural weighting is caused by a shift in strategy that would apply only to two-outcome gambles.

2009

Experimental work on preferences over risk has typically considered choices over a small number of discrete options, some of which involve no risk. Such experiments often demonstrate contradictions of standard expected utility theory. We reconsider this literature with a new preference elicitation device that allows a continuous choice space over only risky options. Our analysis assumes only that preferences depend on the probability p and prize x; U = u(p; x): We then allow subjects to choose p and x continuously on a linear budget constraint, r 1 p + r 2 x = m, so that all prospects with a nonzero expected value are risky. We test …ve of the most importantly debated questions about risk preferences: rationality, prospect theory asymmetry, the independence axiom, probability weighting, and constant relative risk aversion. Overall, we …nd that the expected utility model does unexpectedly well.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

This paper presents a model for the \gambling e®ect," i.e., the e®ect that risky gambles are evaluated di®erently than riskless outcomes due to an intrinsic utility (or disutility) of gambling. The model turns out to violate stochastic dominance and therefore its primary applications will be descriptive. It sheds new light on empirical observations of risk attitudes and provides new insights into the distinction between risky and riskless utility.

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2009

Experimental Economics, 2014

Experiments on choice under risk typically involve multiple decisions by individual subjects. The choice of mechanism for selecting decision(s) for payoff is an essential design feature that is often driven by appeal to the isolation hypothesis or the independence axiom. We report two experiments with 710 subjects. Experiment 1 provides the first simple test of the isolation hypothesis. Experiment 2 is a crossed design with six payoff mechanisms and five lottery pairs that can elicit four paradoxes for the independence axiom and dual independence axiom. The crossed design discriminates between: (a) behavioral deviations from postulated properties of payoff mechanisms; and (b) behavioral deviations from theoretical implications of alternative decision theories. Experiment 2 provides tests of the isolation hypothesis and four paradoxes. It also provides data for tests for portfolio effect, wealth effect, reduction, adding up, and cross-task contamination. Data from Experiment 2 suggest that a new mechanism introduced herein may be less biased than random selection of one decision for payoff.