A Realist Theory of Science

2002

My model-theoretic realist account of science places linguistic systems and the corresponding non-linguistic structures at different stages of the scientific process. It is shown that science and its progress cannot be analysed in terms of only one of these strata. Philosophy of science literature offers mainly two approaches to the structure of scientific knowledge analysed in terms of theories and their models, the "statement" and the "non-statement" approaches. In opposition to the statement approach's belief that scientific knowledge is embodied in theories (formulated in some (first-order) symbolic language) with direct interpretative links-via so-called "bridge principles"-to reality, the defenders of the non-statement approach believe in an analysis where the language in which the theory is formulated plays a much smaller role than the (mathematical) structures which satisfy that theory. The model-theoretic realism expounded here retains the notion of a scientific theory as a (deductively closed) set of sentences, while simultaneously emphasising the interpretative role of the conceptual (i.a. mathematical) models of these theories. My criticism against the non-statement approach is based on the fact that merely "giving" the theory "in terms of' its mathematical structures leaves out any real interpretation of the nature and role of general terms in science. Against the statement approach's "direct" linking of general theoretical terms to reality, my approach interpolates models between theories and (aspects of) reality in the interpretative chain. The links between the general terms of scientific theories and their interpretations in the various models of the theory regulate the whole referential process. The terms of a theory are "general" in the sense that they are the result of certain abstractive conceptualisations of the object of scientific investigation and subsequent linguistic formulations of these conceptualisations. Their (particular) meanings can be "given back" only by interpreting them in the limited context of the various conceptual models of their theory and, finally, by finding an isomorphic relation between some substructure of the conceptual model in question and some empirical conceptualisation (model) of relevant experimental data. In this sense the notion of scientific "truth" becomes inextricably linked with that of articulated reference, as it-given its model-dependent nature-should be.

2007

Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Debates between realists and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science. Anjan Chakravartty traces the contemporary evolution of realism by examining the most promising strategies adopted by its proponents in response to the forceful challenges of antirealist sceptics, resulting in a positive proposal for scientific realism today. He examines the core principles of the realist position, and sheds light on topics including the varieties of metaphysical commitment required, and the nature of the conflict between realism and its empiricist rivals. By illuminating the connections between realist interpretations of scientific knowledge and the metaphysical foundations supporting them, his book offers a compelling vision of how realism can provide an internally consistent and coherent account of...

This essay will set out the importance of realism to the scientific endeavour; the anti-realist doubts, the realist response and the anti-realist response. It will then look at the common anti-realist positions of instrumentalism and constructive empiricism and discuss a possible third way presented by Fine (1984) the natural ontological attitude (NOA). Finally I will sum up the arguments and proposals as to the future of science with the conclusion that in the light of all the evidence against realism, it is becoming decreasingly tenable. Nevertheless the anti-realist solutions whilst avoiding the main problems of realism may take us too far away from the noble endeavour of science, which is the search for truth of reality.

Constructive realism in the conception of models-based scienti c theory" initially tackled the concept of scienti c theory and models in the new situation of contemporary philosophy of science, which can be characterised by the focus shi ing away from the theory because it has been recognised as an unjusti ably narrow orientation on theoretical physics only, at the same time neglecting the research of a more general issue of "how science actually works". As a result of our research, we suggest a solution to the problem via developing a version of model-based constructive realism we call practical realism which exhibits clear advantages over other constructivist approaches, especially over constructive empiricism and "radical" social constructivism. For the di erent members of our research group, the speci c research areas have been diverse extending from physics (two theoretical physicists have been participating in our team) and chemistry to social researches and humanities.

Springer eBooks, 2014

Synthese, 2022

According to realists, theories are successful because they are true, but according to selectionists, theories are successful because they have gone through a rigorous selection process. Wray claims that the realist and selectionist explanations are rivals to each other. Lee objects that they are instead complementary to each other. In my view, Lee's objection presupposes that the realist explanation is true, and thus it begs the question against selectionists. By contrast, the selectionist explanation invokes a scientific theory, and thus it is not clear whether it is a realist explanation or an antirealist explanation. Finally, the six new arguments for scientific realism in the literature truly complement the no-miracles argument.

2014

Philosophy is the basis of all sciences, the foundation of knowledge that provides ultimate answers beyond the limits of science. Although scorned and spurned by science purists(which is partially justified by its modern errant versions), metaphysics and logic, especially, form a common ground of agreement and the tools for truth validation that is so obviously missing in theoretical analysis. We will propose a set of premises for use as a common world-view and then apply them to current science beliefs in order to demonstrate some common fallacies that commonly occur in establishment public beliefs and rational thinking. The intent is to build a solid common ground of tools and axioms based on philosophical realism and the scientific method for knowledge development by researchers. Modern Modern types of philosophy seen in science today include: Scientism-the world can be completely explained by science. Materialism-only matter exists; there is no other immaterial world. Naturalism-only nature exist; denies a spiritual world. Scientific modernism-a blend of materialism and humanism Humanism-one quote captures the humanistic view …. man is the measure of all things. Agnosticism-believes there is truth, but no human way to find it. Nihilism-there is no truth, and no sense in trying to find it. Atheism-there are three types of atheist. Theoretical: believes there is no God, but lives as though there were. Practical: believes there is a God, but lives as though there were not. True: believes there is no God, and lives as though there were not.

Inferences from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories remain central to the most influential arguments for scientific realism. Challenges to such inferences, however, based on radical discontinuities within the history of science, have motivated a distinctive style of revision to the original argument. Conceding the historical claim, selective realists argue that accompanying even the most revolutionary change is the retention of significant parts of replaced theories, and that a realist attitude towards the systematically retained constituents of our scientific theories can still be defended. Selective realists thereby hope to secure the argument from success against apparent historical counterexamples. Independently of that objective, historical considerations have inspired a further argument for selective realism, where evidence for the retention of parts of theories is itself offered as justification for adopting a realist attitude towards them. Given the nature of these arguments from success and from retention, a reasonable expectation is that they would complement and reinforce one another, but although several theses purport to provide such a synthesis the results are often unconvincing. In this paper I reconsider the realist's favoured type of scientific success, novel success, offer a revised interpretation of the concept, and argue that a significant consequence of reconfiguring the realist's argument from success accordingly is a greater potential for its unification with the argument from retention. 1 Musgrave (1988) argues that 'careful realists', at least since Whewell, have always intended the verification of novel predictions in discussions of scientific success. Worrall (1989b), , and Psillos (1999) each argue the importance of peculiarly novel success; many recent antirealist arguments also now pay particular attention to such results. 2 The most famous example of the antirealist challenge from the history of science is . Many interpret Laudan as defending a (pessimistic meta-) induction that implies our own theories are destined for replacement by new theories, radically incongruent with our own. Others (for example argue convincingly that Laudan should instead be understood as merely providing examples that at least appear to undermine the credibility of the realist's inference from success to approximate truth. On either interpretation historical considerations present the realist with a significant challenge.