Development of the European Union

Raşit  Ören

Development of the European Union

Raşit Ören

Abstract

This article includes the development of the European Union from its earlier beginnings in the 1950s

Key takeaways

But other states thought that Germany was a western state and also they wanted to prevent another war which is formed by Germany.
The European Coal and Steel Community was formed by that treaty.
European Atomic Energy Community and European Economic Community were separate from the European Coal and Steel Community so there were three communities about European integration in that time.
The member states signed the Single European Act which agreement made deeply changing in the Treaty of Rome.
The Federal Republic of Germany existed in the European integration but the eastern not.

This volume serves as another addition to the plethora of introductory EU textbooks currently occupying the marketplace. Like most of its competitors, this book offers chapters concerning the historical evolution of the EU, its institutional infrastructure, the nature of EU policy-making and broader political attitudes towards integration processes. The strongest part of the book is that covering the machinery of governance where students are offered a succinct overview of the key governing institutions and their respective roles. Later chapters also provide useful coverage of decision-making and legislative processes and there is also discussion of a range of individual policy areas. A glossary of terms at the end of each chapter should provide a useful introductory key to the uninitiated and there is some reference to further reading at the end of the book. The latter is, however, relatively brief and its utility is compromised by the author's reference to earlier editions of standard texts which have subsequently been published in revised editions (for example, George and Bache's volume Politics in the European Union is referred to as being 'rather dated' but in its 2001 rather than updated 2006 edition!). Although the book offers much in the way of useful detail on specific issues it is unfortunate that a source published in 2008 should refer, on its back cover, to '25 member governments' when there have been 27 since January 2007. Although the actual content of the volume does offer coverage of the post-2007 enlargement, this initial blip does engender an air of caution in the reader. There are certainly areas of the substantive content which might have benefited from reappraisal. For example, the early chapters on historical evolution are somewhat uneven; whilst some detail is provided on the origins of the integration project, its progress through the 1960s and key developments from the 1980s onwards, coverage of the 1970s is rather scant. Similarly, whilst some introductory material on integration theory is included, this remains arguably underdeveloped (for example, no effective distinction is made between Hoffman's intergovernmentalism and Moravcsik's liberal variant). The chapters making up section 5 on 'Attitudes' are arguably the weakest in structural terms. Although these seek to examine Member State attitudes towards integration processes, the opening heading 'Eligibility for Membership' suggests a discussion on enlargement. The subsequent analysis does indeed consider national attitudes but framing this within the context of successive waves of membership expansion perhaps limits the scope for cross-comparative study of attitudes. It also leads to the

Contents ix THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN UNION IS A RECURRING THEME IN THE long and often violent history of the continent. The Holy Roman Emperors, Napoleon, Hitler, and others sought, in sometimes horrifying ways, to achieve a continental unity based variously on princely alliances, ethnic cohesion, ideology, or raw power. Ever since the emergence of the modern state, in the mid-seventeenth century, philosophers and political thinkers have also imagined a united Europe triumphing over narrow national interests and allegiances. Today's European Union (EU) is singular among these competing visions. Tempering the nationalist ethos that had become the ruling principle of European political development, the countries that formed the European Communities, the basis of the EU, chose to limit (but not eliminate) their own sovereignty, the hallmark of a modern nation-state, in favor of collective peace, economic integration, and supranational governance. Their reasons for doing so were rooted in the disastrous decades of the early twentieth century. The miserable legacy of heroic European nationalism-two world wars, countless millions dead, and economic ruin-was not lost on the peoples of Europe, who were receptive to the idea of treatybased and highly institutionalized economic and political integration after World War II. European politicians wanted above all to end international strife, foster social harmony, and promote economic well-being. They sought to build a better world, free of the hatreds and rivalries that had destroyed their countries in recent years. For their generation, European integration became synonymous with peace and prosperity. Yet there was nothing inevitable about the emergence of European integration in the form with which we are now familiar. European politicians were (and still are) instinctively averse to sharing national sovereignty, despite rhetorical flourishes to the contrary. National leaders decided to share sovereignty in supranational organizations primarily because they perceived the ferment of the European movement but in the narrow confines of the French economic planning office, headed by Jean Monnet. It was an imaginative response to the challenge of rapid German economic recovery at a time of worsening East-West conflict, satisfying differing US, French, and German needs and objectives. For leading French and German politicians at

Preface and acknowledgements Unlike Italy, which was a founder member of the European Economic Community (now the European Union), Portugal, Spain and Greece were latecomers to the process of European political and economic union. This book, written by historians and political scientists, seeks to review the processes involved in the approximation of these countries to European unification and the impact that this has had within these southern European societies from 1945 until their final accession in the 1980s. The first part of the book contains studies of the relationships between the four southern European countries with the institutions of the then EEC. António Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira provide an analysis of the Portuguese case, which was marked by the move from the authoritarian regime's resistance to decolonisation to a pro-European stance following the country's complex transition to democracy. In Chapter 2, Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares and Antonio Moreno Juste look at the Spanish example, another that is characterised by the persistance of authoritarianism as a hindrance to establishing a relationship with the EEC, as well as by the development of closer economic relations during the 1960s. Antonio Varsori looks at the Italian case in Chapter 3. Italy was clearly different from the other southern European states, to the extent that it participated in all of the xii major decisions and debates leading up to the Treaty of Rome. In Chapter 4, Susannah Verney examines the factors that led Greece to decide on association with the European Community, thus marking a new direction in postWar Greek policy. The second part of the book examines the economic, political and public opinion dimensions of the European unification process and its impact upon southern Europe. In Chapter 5, Alfred Tovias surveys the links between the economic changes in southern Europe and the role played by the EEC in these transformations. In Chapter 6, Geoffrey Pridham analysis the various links between democratisation, the consolidation of democracy and European integration. The prospect of accession to the European Union was an important factor in the consolidation of democracy in Portugal, Spain and Greece, an aspect that was originally underestimated in studies of democratisation. Finally, in Chapter 7, José Magone reviews the evolution of southern European public opinion regarding European unification. In his conclusion, Leonardo Morlino provides an analytical framework for understanding the Europeanisation of southern Europe. *** This book is the result of a research project on "Portugal and the unification of Europe", which was funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology and led by the editors of this book. The project involved two conferences on this theme, the first of which was held in the spring of 1997 at the Luso-American Development Foundation in Lisbon, and the second at the Arrábida Summer University during the summer of 1998. The chapters that are published here include revised and updated versions of some of the papers presented at these two conferences. Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union xiii Some of the participants at these conferences could not, for various reasons, provide copies of their papers for publication in this volume. Amongst those are Nikiforos Diamandouros, who was a lively presence at both conferences, and who has in the meantime been appointed Ombudsman of Greece. The editors would like to express their gratitude to the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology, without whose financial support this project would not have been possible. We would also like to thank the European Studies Institute of the Portuguese Catholic University under whose auspices this project took place. A debt of gratitude is also due to the Luso-American Development Foundation and the Arrábida Summer University for their support in providing facilities for the realisation of the two conferences. We would also like to thank those who participated as discussants at the conferences and those who took part in the project meetings. In particular, we would like to mention

This contribution to a series on the 'state of the art' in various fields of political study has dual aims. On the one hand it invites its contributors to survey European Union Studies-and not, as the editors insist, of 'integration' or 'European Area' studiesas they are today, so as to help postgraduates and teachers worried by the expanding scope and complexity of the field. Save in one chapter it does not do this by statistical assessment of publications and structures devoted to the Union, rather it works by analysing the intellectual content of some of the field's specific political aspects. On the other hand, to justify the concern for 'advances', it looks more normatively for new contributions suggesting where the field might, or should, go. In practice, this attracts less attention than the first aim, although Warleigh makes a strong case for mixing theories, an idea echoed by other chapters. Half the chapters are devoted to specific theories presently used in EU studies, the traditional run through from functionalism to inter-governmentalism being wisely discarded. Of the rest most is given over to dimensions of EU activities such as enlargement, foreign policy, political economy and identity and the ways these might be theorized. Europeanization, being both a process and a possible research agenda, sits between the two. There are also chapters on historical and grand theoretical approaches together with a rounding off piece by Wessels. As is often the case, the contributors adopt a variety of strategies. Some, like Scully and Warleigh, keep helpfully close to what the editors wanted, setting out the theories, showing where they have been applied to the EU and considering future developments. Others concentrate more on the theories themselves, sometimes defensively so. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier do a great job in creating a structure for theorizing enlargement-something which was virtually ignored not so long agowhile Laffan and Gillespie bring out the importance of identity questions. Overall, although Jupille argues that while it is coming back in, 'grand theory' is much less present than tactical insights, many of which will help academics in the field. Most of the contributors do well in unbundling, classifying and developing their topic. This makes it a very useful tool box for academic studies of the EU and will no doubt be cited in many PhD theses. And the lenses offered here may well affect the way future research is carried out. However, the book offers less the snapshot desired by the editors and more a kaleidoscopic view. The optimum mix, if it exists, is not easy to grasp. Researchers will have to make choices and decide which approach, or mixture, they wish to adopt. And, as the contributions often hint, these approaches can still be in conflict and are not as open as the editors might wish.

This study sets out to explain why historically, continental and southern Europe has been significantly more favourable to post-1945 European integration than the north. I argue that this is an important problem for two reasons. First, the fact that there are more and less Europeanist member states has been and remains the most basic political constraint on European integration. Second, I believe that by exploring this issue, I am able to present an innovative, comparative-historical analysis that not only advances our theoretical understanding of European integration, but also sheds new light on the evolution of nationalism and the nation-state. In line with broad trends in political and social theory over the last twenty to thirty years, notably social constructivism, in the introductory discussion in Part 1 I assume that a search for the sources of Europeanism – territorial and other – requires an appropriate consideration of the role of ideas. I argue that the attitudes of individuals and collectivities to political issues like European integration reflect their ideological preferences as well as their material interests, both of which are in turn products of, and may be modified by, learning. Key concepts in the study are thus ‘interest,’ ‘ideology,’ and ‘learning.’ I assume that territorial-historical background fundamentally structures how agents are influenced by these variables. Inspired by the Norwegian comparativist Stein Rokkan, I interpret European integration as a case of polity-building comparable to other instances of state- and nation-building in history. This approach suggests that integration is a fundamentally political process with the issue of sovereignty at its core. Hence, regionally differentiated patterns of attitudes to European union may reflect territorially distinct, historically evolved ideas of sovereignty. On this assumption, I construct a 2x2 table defining four basic ideas of soverereignty – polity-ideas, or normative ideas about a legitimate political order – that structures the study’s comparative-historical analysis: universalist-descending; particularist-descending; particularist-ascending; and universalist-ascending. I argue that each polity-idea is associated with a particular discourse, ideology, and even an ontological and epistemological paradigm. The main controversy in the post-1945 European debate has been between what I term the national-liberal and the Christian-democratic paradigms of integration. The former is basically particularist and intergovernmentalist and is based in northern, Lutheran or Anglican Europe. The second is inspired by Christian universalism, favours a federal or unitary Europe, and has its mainstay in continental and southern, Catholic Europe. In Part 2, I examine existing integration and international relations as well as general political science theory in order to identify theoretically possible sources of Europeanist attitudes. This discussion concludes with a working hypothesis based on Rokkan’s notion of the European city-belt. Could, as Rokkan himself explicitly suggested, the city-belt, stretching roughly from Central Italy to the North Sea and representing the historical core territory of the Catholic church and the Holy Roman Empire, be the home base or ‘primary territory’ of a European ‘nation’? Could it in this sense play a similar historical polity-building role as that assigned by Karl W. Deutsch to the Île de France as the hub of the French nation-state, to Leon-Castille in Spain, Savoy-Piemonte in Italy, Prussia in Germany, England in Britain etc.? If so, it is indeed worthwhile comparing contemporary European union-building to historical nation-building, Europeanism (pro-union ideology) to nationalism and Europeanness (European identity) to national identity. While conceding that his perspective is indeed valuable and relevant, the historical discussion in Part 3 criticises Rokkan’s notion of the city-belt for national-liberal reductionism. The Rokkanian-Deutschian thesis neglects the ancient and medieval tradition for unity and universalism espoused by the Roman Church and the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empire and underrates the continued influence of these institutions even after the Peace of Westphalia. Moreover, the thesis is too structuralist, implying that the European Union emerged more or less by default. Like intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist integration theory, it underestimates the role of ideologically aware and reasoning human agency. Hence it is argued that Rome, represented by the Roman Church as well as by successive Roman empires, is a more important territorial and historical source of Europeanism than city-studded Central Europe. Part 3 narrates how the ascendancy of particularist (or nationalist), discourse resulted from the fragmentation of unitary medieval Christendom into a modern Europe dominated by autonomous states. State-builders propagated the notion of territorial sovereignty, which eventually turned into the hegemonial, particularist-ascending idea of national sovereignty. Here France and the Protestant states of north-western Europe were the pioneers, their kings’ control of national churches being an important factor. Anglican and Lutheran Protestantism was particularly conducive to particularism, which notably in the German context turned exclusivist and eventually racist. The particularist paradigm survived two World Wars in its more benign North Atlantic, liberal form. I submit that this paradigm has been a major source of British and Scandinavian ideological reluctance to post-war European integration. But the Holy See as well as the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empires continued to represent a strong counterweight to particularist discourse even after the Reformation and the religious wars. The Papacy criticised nationalism as a political religion, and came to terms with the modern, secular nation-state and national mass politics only with difficulty. Still, in the late nineteenth century Catholic parties were allowed to emerge and enabled Catholics to participate in secular, national politics. But they continued to look beyond the nation-state. The final Part 4 of the study narrates how transnationally networked, Christian democratic parties of Western Continental Europe jointly formulated a Europeanist-ascending programme for European union after World War II. The European Union was launched on its supranational path when these parties, led mainly by statesmen from Carolingian-Lotharingian Europe, dominated the governments of the six founding states from about 1945 to 1965. Their discourse in this regard was heavily informed by ideology rooted in the universalist European legacy, whose mainstay remains Catholic, continental and southern Europe.

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