Art After Philosophy (1969

Philosophy, perhaps more than any other discipline, is fascinated by its own history. Introductory philosophy courses for undergraduates often focus on great works from the distant past by authors such as Plato and Descartes. Conferences, journals, and graduate seminars are devoted to the discussion of the history of philosophy. Philosophy departments normally include specialists on the history of philosophy. Philosophers conducting cutting edge research often take the trouble to situate their work with respect to long dead predecessors. In all of these respects, philosophy is vastly different from, for example, physics. Undergraduates are not taught physics by reading and discussing the works of Archimedes or Newton. (Of course, students are taught Newtonian mechanics, but they don't read and discuss the Principia in the way that philosophy students might study the Republic or the Meditations.) Conferences, journals and graduate seminars on the history of physics abound. But they are not normally considered part of the disciplinary activity of physics itself. Of course, disciplines, like academic departments, are not natural kinds and their organization is, to some extent, conventional. Disciplinary boundaries are thus contingent and reflect, at least to some degree, accidents of history. But they are not, for all that, entirely arbitrary. Disciplines tend to group together subject matters that are interestingly similar and academic departments often house teachers and researchers whose work bears tighter connection to each other's than to that of their cross-campus colleagues. It is striking that philosophy as a discipline takes ownership of the study of its history in a way that physics, for example, does not. Physicists conducting cutting edge research rarely take the trouble to situate their work with respect to their great predecessors from the distant past. They do not teach and study their works. And the physicists do not appear to be, in this regard, unusual. I have just checked the undergraduate teaching schedules for several leading departments of economics, mathematics, and psychology. 1

2000

I will not wax millenial. But we are nearing the end of a century. It is conceivable that its most important philosophical event will take place between now and December 31. But it is unlikely. So we are at a point where we can, not unreasonably, look back and assess the philosophical events of our century. Any philosophically respectable century has its moments; a point, or points, at which ways of thinking about problems, and about philosophy itself, change radically. Such a moment might fairly be called revolutionary, if one does not puff up that term unduly. Two revolutions in a century would be a lot. I will describe what I think is the crucial revolutionary moment in our century. I need to acknowledge that the view I will present is personal, or at least far from received wisdom. Some of you may find it biased. First, I do not think that the revolution means that philosophy is, or should be, at an end, that we are somehow in a period of 'post-philosophy', or that the idea of a philosophical problem is somehow passé. The revolution I am going to describe left us with some genuine, and severe, philosophical problems. At the end of my talk I will describe them, and hint, but no more, at a way with them-a way I do not know to be adequate, since it has not yet been tried fully. Second, it will occur to some of you that my revolution is suspiciously Anglophone, so, perhaps, parochial. If 'Anglophone' includes enough of Vienna and Berlin, and enough work written in German, then my revolution is, indeed, Anglophone. Given the political events of our century, it is not surprising that that should be so. In any event, such is life. If I thought the action were elsewhere, I would be there. The revolution I have in mind can be dated as occurring between 1930 and 1960 (interrupted by the war). That is a period that opened with the start of Wittgenstein's lecturing at Cambridge (roughly coincident with his new approach to philosophy), and ending with J. L. Austin's deatha period I am construing as broad enough to capture two other key revolutionary figures, Hilary Putnam and Noam Chomsky. (Stuart Hampshire, in his memoriam, said of Austin, "He could not have adopted a special tone of voice, or attitude of mind, for philosophical questions." That attitude encapsulates the revolution.) A more serious worry for me than those mentioned above is that some of my colleagues may think that the real important revolution in the twentieth century happened somewhat earlier than that. And they would be apt to mention Russell, and Wittgenstein before his change of approach, as at its centre. Now, I agree that those figures were at the centre of an important revolution. I will say a few more words about it later. But, as I see things, that was a nineteenth century revolution-indeed, that century's most important one-begun by Frege in 1879. My twentieth century revolution is, in large part, though not just, a reaction against just the features of this earlier one that most exercised Russell and early Wittgenstein. Some, of course, will find that reaction unfounded. That is a controversy into which I plan to enter in what follows.

Philosophy, 2018

In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions’. However, Stoljar's caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17thCentury. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, 2000

New Challenges to Philosophy of Science, 2013

This chapter looks for issues in scientific disciplines that have received little attention so far in the mainstream philosophy of science (e.g., design sciences, communication sciences, etc.). It addresses new topics in well-stablished disciplines, seeking novelty form different angles of the philosophical research.