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Watson’s 1913 “behaviorist manifesto” had little effect in the years immediately following its publication. The inconspicuous but indefatigable rise of behaviorism was more of a barbarian invasion than a revolution, and the manifesto played the role of crystallizing sentiment and unifying diverse and tentative efforts under one flag. It also provided traditional psychology, the “low road,” with a favorite punching bag to spar with for mainstream favoritism, a situation which has not changed now a century later. Watson’s views often are misrepresented as naïve and simplistic and as a mere extrapolation of findings based on crude experiments with animals. But it was the objective methods of animal research, not the specific findings, that he sought to apply to human research. Critics and followers alike have often minimized his struggle as Watson tried to provide a psychology that could really account for complex human behavior. In this respect, one hundred years after the publication of the manifesto, behaviorism has yet to fulfill Watson’s promises for a genuinely scientific understanding of our complex subject matter.
Interamerican Journal of Psychology, 2016
propósito tanto de humanizar su perfil así como desmitificar su figura para estar en mejor posición para entender el carácter original y contestatario de sus aportes. Se reseñan además las características más importantes de sus contribuciones para la evolución científica de la psicología (Kantor, 2005). Finalmente, se retoma la crítica del objeto de estudio propuesto por Watson, a la luz de la metateoría de Kantor (1959), Kantor (2005), Kantor y Smith (1975) y Kantor (1971a, 1971b), proporcionando dos ejemplos reconceptualizados con la teoría de campo: el experimento de Watson y Rayner (1920b) sobre el pequeño Alberto y uno del posmoderno mundo de la comunicación electrónica.
Despite the attention given John B. Watson during the century since he introduced behaviorism, there remain questions about what he really contributed. He is still appropriately criticized for his arrogant selfpromotion and especially for his perceived emphasis on a simple S-R reflexology. However, we argue that the former was necessary at the time and that criticism of Watson on the second count only diverts attention from the genuine contributions that he did make. In support of these contentions we examine several aspects of his contributions that warrant clarification, namely, his promotion of applied comparative psychology, his views on the nature of mind, his originality, criticism from and respect afforded by contemporaries, his relation to recent interest in "the embodiment of mind," his treatment of thinking, and his appreciation of Freud's work. We organize our discussion around specific chapters of the two editions of Behaviorism, but in support of our arguments we include publications of Watson that are less well known. Those works develop some important points that are only briefly treated in both editions of Behaviorism.
Analysis of the origins of behaviorism and the contribution of John B. Watson
In this paper I discuss (1) the nontechnical nature of the term "behavior"; (2) the need to revisit the Aristotelian concept of soul as the prime naturalistic subject matter of psychology; (3) the incompleteness of meaning when behavior is identified with movements or actions; (4) the implication of behavior in episodic and dispositional words and statements including mental terms; (5) that mental concepts are not learned by inner or outer ostension to physical properties of the speaker or of others; and (6) the concept of behavior involves a two-fold abstraction, involving speaking with terms about doing and saying, on the one hand, and speaking about those terms with which we speak, on the other.
WHAT THIS PAPER IS ABOUT This paper is about a number of connected issues: • Mentalism and why and how we are a mentalistic species. • Why there are two, equally important, stories about human behaviour, the mentalistic and scientific, whose differences need to be clearly understood. • Why the mentalistic story of human behaviour is flawed starting place for a scientific study of ourselves, though absolutely necessary for everyday life. That necessity and utility has seduced many psychologists erroneously to start their would-be science with mentalistic concepts. • And yet, in the manner of those practicing biomimetics, how scientists can learn from evolved mentalism, and in particular the pervasiveness of the mentalistic understanding people at the level of motivations (feelings, intentions, etc.), and work on the heuristic expectation that patterns in behaviour will be found, not at the behavioural level, but at the level of motivation albeit inferred from the observed behaviour.
Grand Canyon University, 2022
Behaviorism originated some time ago and was mostly pioneered by a single man who established behaviorism as a distinct area of psychology. Ledoux (2012) provided a detailed examination of Behaviorism during the previous century and how it developed into a distinct field distinct from psychology. As Moore (2011) stated, behaviorism was founded by John B. Watson in 1913 in response to Watson's dissatisfaction with the way in which psychology was headed. Watson founded behaviorism to transform psychology into a more experimental research-based science. Moore (2011) also discussed how Skinner contributed to the creation of psychology by expanding on Watson's Classical Conditioning and coining the term Operant Conditioning. Clark (2004) examined the scientific origins of classical conditioning. As Moore (2011), Clark (2004), and Ledoux (2012) highlighted, behaviorism originated as a field of study that appeared in the 1950s with an emphasis on accomplishment. The three earlier researchers defined behavior as the result of a potentially important event in an individual's past or a stimulus in the environment; this might include the individual's present motivational state, controlling stimuli, and penalties and rewards.
Behaviorism has made a powerful impact upon modern psychology. Examining the history and current applications of behaviorism offers an opportunity to seek an understanding of behaviorism by exploring behaviorist theory, behaviorism’s “premiere theorists” – Ivan Pavlov, John B. Watson, and B. F. Skinner – and their influence on the development of the behavioral, cognitive, and cognitive/behavior therapies and learning theories used in contemporary psychology. Although behaviorism, in its purest form, did not survive in America, it was, nevertheless, successful in paving the way for potential-based learning, online education, and distance learning.
Perspectives on Behavior Science, 2020
is a significant figure in the history of psychology. Although some scholars contest the thesis that he was the creator of the behaviorist movement, he was undoubtedly a great popularizer of behaviorism, and many of the psychologists who proposed new varieties of behaviorism admit that they were directly influenced by him. Most psychologists, and probably all behavior analysts, read and heard about Watson at some point in their apprenticeship. Nevertheless, Watson's works are usually misunderstood, mainly because most of his publications are unknown to the majority of psychologists and historians of psychology. The publication of a more complete and precise bibliography may help to solve this problem. This article presents an updated bibliography of John B. Watson's published works; it contains 209 entries, including 50 new ones compared with the last, and at that point the most developed, bibliography available. The bibliography we present here is offered to assist researchers, historians, and other scholars in taking a broader view of Watson's behaviorism and its impact on academic and lay audiences. Keywords John B. Watson. bibliography. classical behaviorism John B. Watson (1878-1958) was one of the best-known psychologists of the early 20 th century and one of the most influential psychologists of his generation (Buckley, 1989). During the 1990s, he was ranked among the 10 most notable psychologists by historians of psychology and chairpersons of psychology departments in American universities (Korn, Davis, & Davis, 1991). In the 2000s, he was ranked 17 th among the 99 most eminent psychologists of the 20 th century (
This paper discusses the introduction of behaviorism as a major contribution to the world of psychology by comparing and contrasting the contributions and perspectives of three of psychology’s “premiere figures” - Ivan Pavlov, John Watson, and B. F. Skinner
The Behavior Analyst, 1996
Revista Colombiana De Psicologia, 2013
Behaviorism has argued that behavior is the Psyche and the subject matter of psychology. Although, some scientists had done empirical work with objective methods before 1913, the year in which John B. Watson published his manifesto, he was the first one to attempt a systematization of behavior as the Psyche, that is, as psychology's subject matter. In this text, I outline Watson's notion of behavior to compare it with two other forms of behaviorism: Skinner's radical behaviorism and molar behaviorism. The purpose of the paper is to illustrate how the concept of behavior has been and is changing.
The Psychological Record, 2011
Early forms of psychology assumed that mental life was the appropriate subject matter for psychology, and introspection was an appropriate method to engage that subject matter. In 1913, John B. Watson proposed an alternative: classical S–R behaviorism. According to Watson, behavior was a subject matter in its own right, to be studied by the observational methods common to all sciences. Unfortunately, by around 1930, Watson’s behaviorism had proved inadequate. Many researchers and theorists then adopted a view in which various organismic entities were inferred to mediate the relation between S and R: mediational S–O–R neobehaviorism. This general view has remained influential, although the details of the various versions have differed over the years. The behavior analysis of B. F. Skinner took an entirely different approach. Particularly important was the study of verbal behavior. Although behaviorism is often conventionally defined as an approach that seeks to explain behavior without directly appealing to mental or cognitive processes, this definition needs considerable clarification, especially as it pertains to Skinner’s behavior analysis and his view of behaviorism as a philosophy of science.
In this text, we will reflect on psychology as a scientific discipline focused on mind and behavior, which initially diverged from philosophy and medicine and has made a long process of recognition as an autonomous science. Since the 19th century, Wilhelm Wundt and Edward Titchener, William James, and John Dewey, to the famous Thorndike as the leading pioneers. Thorndike discovered a premise so influential in psychology and applicable to so many human behaviors: a stimulus tends to produce a specific response over time if a given organism is rewarded for that response. Introducing Psychology as a science at the service of humanity in the 21st century is one of the goals of this text. It will reflect on the importance of constructivist paradigms and narratives and the perception of psychotherapeutic reality as a multiverse perspective.
The Behavior Analyst
Evolutionary theory, comparative psychology, British empiricism, the reflexwe learn in graduate school that all of these had something to do with the origins ofexperimental psychology in general and behaviorism in particular. Somehow Watson got tired of introspection and of inferring mental events in animals and so founded behaviorism with his manifesto of 1913. But is this so, and how did it happen? This book tells the story. It covers a relatively brief period of about 60 or 70 years from the impact ofDarwin's Origin ofthe Species in the 1860's to the establishment of behaviorism in the 1920's, just before Skinner came on the scene. The tale is told with thoroughness, care, good humor, and-best of all-with understanding, because the author is no outsider, no professional philosopher or historian, who might tell it with scorn and the misapprehension that behaviorism is dead, but an experimenter who did his graduate work at Harvard during the 1960's when, under Herrnstein, and with Skinner still present, quantitative studies of behavior and the development of modern behaviorism were in full swing. To anyone interested in behaviorism, pro or con, this book should be required reading. I found it entertaining and provocative from beginning to end. It was many years in the making. I know, be
2005
The central idea in behaviorism can be stated simply: A science of behavior is possible. Behaviorists have diverse views about what this proposition means, and particularly about what science is and what behavior is, but every behaviorist agrees that there can be a science of behavior. Many behaviorists add that the science of behavior should be psychology. This causes contention because many psychologists reject the idea that psychology is a science at all, and others who regard it as a science consider its subject matter something other than behavior. Most behaviorists have come to call the science of behavior behavior analysis. The debate continues as to whether behavior analysis is a part of psychology, the same as psychology, or independent of psychology, but professional organizations, such as the Association for Behavior Analysis, and journals, such as The Behavior Analyst, Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, and Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, give the field an identity. Since behaviorism is a set of ideas about this science called behavior analysis, not the science itself, properly speaking behaviorism is not science, but philosophy of science. As philosophy about behavior, however, it touches topics near and dear to us: why we do what we do, and what we should and should not do. Behaviorism offers an alternative view that often runs counter to traditional thinking about action, because traditional views have been unscientific. We shall see in later chapters that it sometimes takes us in directions radically different from conventional thinking. This chapter covers some of the history of behaviorism and one of its most immediate implications, determinism. Keyterms Anthropomorphism Behavior analysis Caloric Comparative psychology Continuity of species Determinism Folk psychology Introspect Just-noticeable difference Libertarian free will Methodological behaviorism Objective psychology Phlogiston Psyche Radical behaviorism Reaction time Standard narrative Vis viva
1999
W. O'Donohue and R.F. Kitchener, Introduction: The Behaviorisms. E.K. Morris and J.T. Todd, Watsonian Behaviorism. L.J. Hays and D.W. Fredericks, Interbehaviorism and Interbehavioral Psychology. N.K. Innis, Edward C. Tolman's Purposive Behaviorism. M.E. Rashotte and A. Amsel, Clark L. Hull's Behaviorism. J. Ringen, Radical Behaviorism: B.F. Skinner's Philosophy of Science. S.W. Bijou, Empirical Behaviorism. H. Rachlin, Teleological Behaviorism. J.E.R. Staddon, Theoretical Behaviorism. W. Timberlake, Biological Behaviorism. E.V. Gifford and S.C. Hayes, Functional Contextualism: A Pragmatic Philosophy for Behavioral Science. D. Bloor, Wittgenstein's Behaviorism. U.T. Place, Ryle's Behaviorism. R.F. Kitchener, Logical Behaviorism. R.E. Gibson, Quine's Behaviorism. Subject Index.
American Psychologist, 1992
A substantial portion ofB. F. Skinner's scholarship was devoted to developing methods and terms for a scientific study of behavior. Three concepts central to scientific accounts-cause, explanation, and theory-are examined to illustrate the distinction between mechanistic and relational frameworks and radical behaviorism's relationship to those frameworks. Informed by a scientific tradition that explicitly rejects mechanistic interpretations, radical behaviorism provides a distinctive stance in contemporary psychology. The present analysis suggests that radical behaviorism makes closer contact with the "new world view" advocated by physicists and philosophers of science than does much of contemporary psychology.
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