Handout on Austin's How to Do Things with Words
Nilanjan Bhowmick
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Abstract
This handout covers the entire book of Austin and brings out the arguments given. Indeed, in some sense the book should have been arranged differently than the way it was arranged later. The way Austin's book came out tends to blunt the force of some of what he was trying to establish.
Key takeaways
- St. Stephen's College, University of Delhi, 2013-14 Philosophy, 3 rd year B A Hons Philosophy of Language/Instructor: Nilanjan Bhowmick 2 A.1 There must be a convention regarding the utterance of the performative.
- 1) Austin says that if X says "I state that John is running" then this is a performative for in stating you are doing something.
- That is the object version of Perlocution; the sequel version is brought out clearly when there is no illocutionary formula.
- But this formula applies to locution as well as to cases where no illocution is involved at all: 1) In saying "Iced ink" I was uttering the noises "I stink" 2) In saying X you were making a mistake or failing to observe a distinction or breaking the law or running a risk or forgetting.
- 2) Tempt is a verb which can be used in both senses of either locution or Perlocution.
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