The New Nomos of Europe

Polish Review of International and European Law, 2018

According to I. Pernice, the European Union has to be distinguished from an international organization for four reasons at least.First, there is no international organization where citizens have their own political representation and participate in the decision-making process. Second, direct legal action against individuals by directly applicable legislation does not happen. Third, the question of protection of fundamental rights against such ‘international’ power is not an issue. Last but not least, ‘no international organization provides for legal remedies of individuals against measures of that organization since there is no action having direct effect to the individual’. Therefore the author believes that the EU is an organization of citizens albeit having an appearance of an organization between states.Nevertheless one needs to remember that the European Union was founded as an intergovernmental organization by the European states on the principles of international law. That is...

GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

2015

The contemporary Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) functions as a uniquely authoritative transnational court. The doctrines established in its case law ensure the effective enforcement of European legislation when compared to standard international organisations. It is undoubtedly the European legal order that has led to the most prevalent definition of the European Union (EU) as a ‘sui generis’ polity in European studies. The Court has provided a voice for a wide variety of national and transnational actors in the integration process through the development of an extensive system of legal recourse. The Court has also engaged in an on-going dialogue with national courts firstly to differentiate and distinguish the European legal order from national legal orders, and secondly to ensure the adaptation of national legal orders to European principles and doctrines. The position of the ECJ in the EU has become so entrenched and central that its supporters—and some sympathetic academic observers—claim that it is a European Supreme Court and that it has built a constitutional, proto-federal legal order. Despite this prominence, historians have tended to underplay the legal and judicial dimensions of European integration. Leaving law for jurists and social scientists, historians have been merely content to explore the political and social-economic facets of the integration process. As a result, the EU’s legal history remains unexplored. Although existing integration historiography offers a rich collection of empirical narratives with important insights into the complex history of post-war Europe, ignoring the legal dimension of the story seriously weakens our understanding of the overall European phenomenon. Important historical actors such as the first president of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, who was also a prominent professor of law, perceived the integration process as fundamentally legal in nature. Certainly, European law is finely woven into almost all aspects of integration whether those are questions of a broad institutional nature or specific public policies. Moreover, the development of the European legal system seemingly constitutes one of the most important and clearest examples of institutional self-empowerment and the promotion of the federalist ideology by the European institutions in the overall integration process.

Eunomia Rivista Semestrale Di Storia E Politica Internazionali, 2012

After a quick look at some of the new provisions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the article aims to bring to light some of the legal and ideological implications related to the decision of erasing all references to the term "Community" from the Lisbon Treaty. Starting from an etymological analysis of the term "Community", the research explores how the decision to give such a name to the first successful experiments of European integration in 1951 and in 1957 was, on the one hand, a cultural legacy of the Thirties and Forties and, on the other hand, necessary in order to achieve some political goals. In line with this, it will be possible to understand how the term «Community», quite unusual in the context of international organizations, allowed for more opportunities than the term "Union", which seems, prima facie, to embody the old federalist dream of the United States of Europe.

International law is a European tradition. Nevertheless, like many other European traditions, it imagines itself as universal. Throughout its history, it has been associated with projects such as Christianity, secular statehood, enlightenment, 'civilization', free trade and human rights. International law's association with particular ideas or preferences does not, however, even slightly undermine it. There are no authentic universals that one could know independently of their particular manifestations. The key question is a political one: Are there good reasons for extending the scope of such ideas or preferences? Answering this question may not have been assisted by the turning of some of them into kitsch. But is that the condition of their universality?

2008