Biological citizenship in the reliability democracy

Knots: An Undergraduate Journal of Disability Studies, 2019

Canadian journal of autism equity, 2021

As an Autistic student in a master's degree, I focused on the way expertise is understood. I was specifically interested in how policy decisions in education were made without Autistic involvement. I looked at the literature that was used to make these decisions and interviewed Autistic people as to their thoughts on who should be considered experts when it comes to autism. I found that policy was driven by experts who had little to no direct experience with autism or Autistics and who had no personal connections to the approaches they recommended. I argue that Autistic people must be involved in research design, execution, implementation, dissemination, and policy decisions. Résumé En tant qu'étudiant autiste en train d'effectuer une maîtrise, je me suis concentré sur notre compréhension de la notion d'expertise. Je m'intéressais plus particulièrement à la manière dont les décisions politiques en matière d'éducation étaient prises sans la participation des personnes autistes. J'ai étudié les ouvrages utilisés pour prendre ces décisions et j'ai interrogé des personnes autistes pour savoir qui, selon elles, devait être considéré comme un(e) expert(e) en matière d'autisme. J'ai découvert que les politiques étaient façonnées par des experts qui avaient peu ou pas d'expérience directe avec l'autisme et les personnes autistes, et qui n'avaient pas souvent des liens personnels avec les approches qu'ils recommandaient. Je soutiens que les personnes autistes doivent être impliquées dans la conception, l'exécution, la mise en oeuvre et la diffusion de la recherche, ainsi que dans les décisions politiques.

2022

The new approaches for disability are characterized through respect towards the beneficiary. In practice, this means empowering the person with a disability or an association that fights for the rights to make choices about their personal life. Empowering a person with disabilities, trusting their potential, and encouraging them to look with optimism towards the future are just a few of the aspects of change. Involving the person in making decisions for themselves and promoting those changes that have an impact on the quality of life also has a pragmatic side in the sense that it requires considerable expenses. Several debates for child’s rights and people’s with disabilities rights proposed the definition of “rights for a future” (Crețu, 2006). The freedom of choice does not only represent a topic from the individualized intervention plan, but additionally refers to taking responsibility, taking ownership for what the person with a disability agreed with.

The neurodiversity movement claims that there are neurological differences in the human population, and that autism is a natural variation among humans – not a disease or a disorder, just ‘a difference’. A ‘politics of neurodiversity’ is based on the claim that the ‘neurodiverse’ population constitutes a political grouping comparable with those of class, gender, sexuality or race. This paper considers the limits and possibilities of neurodiverse political activism, and concludes by calling for a politics of identity that does not depend on a politics of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Health Care Analysis

Neurodiversity has remained a controversial concept over the last decade. In its broadest sense the concept of neurodiversity regards atypical neurological development as a normal human difference. The neurodiversity claim contains at least two different aspects. The first aspect is that autism, among other neurological conditions, is first and foremost a natural variation. The other aspect is about conferring rights and in particular value to the neurodiversity condition, demanding recognition and acceptance. Autism can be seen as a natural variation on par with for example homosexuality. The broad version of the neurodiversity claim, covering low-functioning as well as high-functioning autism, is problematic. Only a narrow conception of neurodiversity, referring exclusively to high-functioning autists, is reasonable. We will discuss the effects of DSM categorization and the medical model for high functioning autists. After a discussion of autism as a culture we will analyze various possible strategies for the neurodiversity movement to claim extra resources for autists as members of an underprivileged culture without being labelled disabled or as having a disorder. We will discuss their vulnerable status as a group and what obligation that confers on the majority of neurotypicals.

2019

In this thesis, I propose a radical reframing of the analytic scientific realism debate via the phenomenological concept of the life-world. I provide motivation for examining science’s situatedness by interrogating the observable aspects of the world. In so doing, I propose to drop any notions of ecumenical truth and reality in the frame of the debate. The case study of autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) is explored to demonstrate what this suggested reframing implies for scientific practice. I offer that the best construal of the observables is the concept of the life-world (Edmund Husserl’s lebenswelt) from continental phenomenology. I perform a series of analytic tweaks on the concept and define it, for the frame of this dissertation, to be the world of immediate – yet theory-laden and prism-mediated – experience as cashed out by a subject’s perceiving capacities. The main improvement of the life-world to traditional analytic construals of the observables is that it captures extra-linguistic elements, allowing us to interrogate these crucial facets of science that are not language- and theory-based strictu sensu. Following I highlight the life-world’s pluralistic dimensions. Theoretically, I do this by defending conceptual scheme pluralism against certain tendencies in the analytic philosophy of language, and then apply this defence to life-worlds. Turning to extant cases of life-world difference, I investigate the case study of autism spectrum conditions. I argue that what this case brings to the fore is first our being compelled to recognise the autistic life-world as ‘real and true’ in the way we take the neurologically typical life-world to be and, second, that autism spectrum conditions treatment should be oriented towards this life-world, in the sense of attempting to maximize happiness and well-being in its own terms. Unfortunately, this is found to be in stark contrast with the extant ASC-related treatment situation. Finally, I claim that we should philosophically be haunted less by any claims of ecumenical Truth and Reality and related, somewhat stale metaphysical issues typically associated with the debate. Rather, it is both more philosophically interesting and humanitarianly urgent to interrogate how what a science takes to be true shapes the practice itself and how it affects human lives associated with it. Theoretically, my philosophical position abides first and foremost by life-world incorrigibility and pluralism and is thus appropriately named pluralistic incorrigible realism (PIR). ‘True’ is here taken to cash out what is incorrigible for a perceiving subject, but whatever notion of truth may arise herein is only in the form of a (subjective or intersubjective) admittance within the confines of a life-world.