Parental Selecting and Autism

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2013

A preimplantation genetic test to discriminate between severe and mild autism spectrum disorder might be developed in the foreseeable future. Recently, the philosophers Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane claimed that there are strong reasons for prospective parents to make use of such a test to prevent the birth of children who are disposed to autism or Asperger's disorder. In this paper we value of mild autism for individuals who have this condition and argue that they are able to lead a life with human dignity provided autism-friendly social circumstances are present. Neither PC nor PB yields strong reasons for prospective parents to seek to prevent the birth of children who are disposed to mild autism spectrum disorder.

Bioethics, 2009

According to what we call the Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB), couples who decide to have a child have a significant moral reason to select the child who, given his or her genetic endowment, can be expected to enjoy most well-being. In the first part of this paper, we introduce PB, explain its content, grounds, and implications, and defend it against various objections. In the second part, we argue that PB is superior to competing principles of procreative selection such as that of procreative autonomy. In the third part of the paper, we consider the relation between PB and disability. We develop a revisionary account of disability, in which disability is a species of instrumental badness that is context-and person-relative. Although PB instructs us to aim to reduce disability in future children whenever possible, it does not privilege the normal. What matters is not whether future children meet certain biological or statistical norms, but what level of well-being they can be expected to have.

Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy, 2018

Imagine a world where everyone is healthy, intelligent, long living and happy. Intuitively this seems wonderful albeit unrealistic. However, recent scientific breakthroughs in genetic engineering, namely CRISPR/Cas bring the question into public discourse, how the genetic enhancement of humans should be evaluated morally. In 2001, when preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro fertilisation (IVF), enabled parents to select between multiple embryos, Julian Savulescu introduced the principle of procreative beneficence (PPB), stating that parents have the obligations to choose the child that is expected to have the best life. In this paper I argue that accepting the PPB and the consequentialist principle (CP) that two acts with the same consequences are morally on par, commits one to accepting the parental obligation of genetically enhancing one's children.

Bioethics, 2015

The article addresses the problem of disability in the context of reproductive decisions based on genetic information. It poses the question of whether selective procreation should be considered as a moral obligation of prospective parents. To answer this question, a number of different ethical approaches to the problem are presented and critically analyzed: the utilitarian; Julian Savulescu’s principle of procreative beneficence; the rights-based. The main thesis of the article is that these approaches fail to provide any appealing principles on which reproductive decisions should be based. They constitute failures of imagination which may result in counter-intuitive moral judgments about both life with disability and genetic selection. A full appreciation of the ethical significance of recognition in procreative decisions leads to a more nuanced and morally satisfying view than other leading alternatives presented in the article.

2014

To Tiny, Wietse en Yue "If I could snap my fingers and be nonautistic, I would not -because then I wouldn't be me.

Phenomenology and Mind, 2020

In this paper, I analyze the ethical implications of genetic enhancement within the specific framework of the "child's right to an open future" argument (CROF). Whilst there is a broad ethical consensus that genetic modifications for eradicating diseases or disabilities are in line with-or do not violate-CROF, there is huge disagreement about how to ethically understand genetic enhancement. Here, I analyze this disagreement and I provide a revised formulation of the argument in the specific field of genetic enhancement. First, I argue that CROF is not in contrast with every kind of enhancement. I subsequently discuss whether CROF requires some moral obligations to enhance progeny. My argument is that parents do not have the moral obligation to open as many options as possible for their children. Rather, they should provide them with a reasonable range of opportunities. Finally, I contend that the moral obligations required by CROF are directly dependent on what Allen Buchanan calls the 'dominant cooperative framework' in a given society. I conclude by claiming that, at present, parents are not morally obliged to genetically enhance their children since a non-enhanced person already might have access to a reasonable range of opportunities. However, the moral obligation to enhance progeny might arise if a structural modification of the dominant cooperative framework occurs.

2019

As the science related to genetic engineering becomes more advanced, more and more ethical questions relating to technologies such as CRISPR and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) arise. If we have the opportunity to choose the genes of our future children in order have children with our desired characteristics, should we do so? Is it okay to mess with some genes of your future child and not others? In this paper, I discuss arguments and objections associated with these questions. The aim of this paper is to show that it is ethical to alter the DNA of your future child or select a specific child only when you are attempting to improve the health of that child. Many might find the possibility of designing their own baby exciting. What could be better than creating the exact baby that you have always dreamed of? While it is easy to fantasize about the positives of genetic engineering, when we really dig deep into what such technology would mean for society, many problems emerge. How do we decide which genes are ethical to alter and which aren't? In this paper, I argue that it is unethical to alter your future child's genes or select a certain embryo unless you are doing so in order to improve the child's health. My paper is organized in the following way: In section 1, I explain current genetic technologies. In section 2, I present Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane's argument in favor of genetic enhancements. In section 3, I explain Martha Nussbaum's objective list theory of well-being. In section 4, I discuss arguments related to the differences between wanting good health for your child and wanting your child to have extraordinary abilities. In section 5, I present the Prevention of Suffering View, a view I find to be stronger than Savulescu and Kahane's view explained in section 2. In section 6, I discuss the eugenic objection. In section 7, I discuss Elizabeth Barnes' disability objection. In section 8, I discuss Michael Sandel's 'Life is a Gift' objection. In section 9, I discuss equality in relation to genetic engineering. I conclude my findings in section 10.