Security dilemmas and the end of the Cold War

Winston Churchill famously remarked in an October 1939 radio address that Russia is -a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.‖ In the decades after the Second World War, as the Grand Alliance gave way to bitter Cold War, the source of Soviet conduct-be it national security interests, Stalin's dysfunctional personality, or Marxist-Leninis ideology-was the subject of rancorous debate among historians in determining the origins of East-West confrontation.

An overview of the myriad circumstances that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the de facto victory of democracy over communism in the geopolitical arena.

Diplomatic History, 1997

The facts. .. are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean.. .. What the historian catches will depend partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use.-E. H. Carr  It goes without saying that a decade of glasnost has been a boon to scholarship on Soviet politics and history, including diplomatic history. Although archival revelations have not, to date, supported any radically new interpretations of Soviet foreign policy, they have served to clarify important issues and strengthen one or another long-standing argument on the causes or consequences of the Cold War.  Moreover, new documentary sources have contributed much to works that shed valuable light on precisely how the "Kremlin's Cold War" was waged.  But the archival windfall brings potential pitfalls. And, as Carr's dictum serves to remind us, one of these is overreliance on the new sources, a temptation to view Politburo, Central Committee, or Foreign Ministry records as definitive in and of themselves. The temptation is understandable given that they offer access to what seems most important: the inner councils of a highly centralized, dictatorial system. But herein a danger lies, for so centralized and dictatorial was the Soviet system-fully autocratic under Josef Stalin-that the decision-making locus was not the Central Committee or Politburo, but Stalin's own mind. Also complicating the historian's task were Stalin's aversion to records of his deliberations and his pains to deflect responsibility and depict authority as lying elsewhere.  Thus, the "black box" of early Cold War decision

International Journal, 1994

To a very large extent the current policies developed for dealing with the strife between Russia and the West echo the policy and ideological stresses of the Cold War. There is an underlying theme of anti-communism in dealing with Russia which colours the strategy. For most scholars, academics and analysts the term Cold War is viewed as a general rubric for the competition between the U.S. and its allies in the West against the Soviet Union and its allies around the world. The Cold War has been described as a game of tactics and coercion conducted by nation states under the umbrella of Mutual Assured Destruction where nuclear attacks were the ultimate weapons. This interaction by sovereign states may, indeed, be the vital component of the Cold War struggle but it was not really the arena in which most the Cold War interactions took place. The Cold War was rarely conducted on a battlefield with soldiers (except for Korea); the real Cold War battlefield was in the factories, ports, schools, universities and cultural centres across the world where the covert forces of the U.S. and the Soviets were pitted against each other; occasionally with deadly consequences. It involved the most important elements of our societies: political parties; labour unions; national unions of students; organisations of cultural freedom; organised criminal structures; and organised religious groups. These were the battlefields of the real Cold War and the loci of competition and coercion by the KGB, the GRU, the CIA, MI6, the BND, the Stasi and many others. Without understanding the crucial dimensions of these conflicts any real understanding of the term 'Cold War' is woefully deficient. The modern development of social media and the internet has added the capability of the competitors to lie, exaggerate and confuse.

This article tackles two of the major questions in later twentiethcentury international history, the origins and the end of the Cold War. Historians traditionally assumed that Moscow was determined from the outset to Sovietise Eastern Europe, once liberated from Nazism, and that this made the later confrontation with the Western powers inevitable. It will be shown here that the idea to install Moscow-friendly regimes in a Europe destroyed by war had been formulated by Kremlin officials already a decade earlier. The article also argues that the Western alliance became comfortable with the status quo it had previously denounced, and that it was reluctant to upset the East-West equilibrium of later years. In the aftermath of 1989, several Western politicians have claimed the laurels of victory over Communism, but it was the Soviet bloc countries who liberated themselves, despite pleas of officials in London, Washington, Paris, and Bonn to slow down or even suspend their reforms.

The Soviet and Post-soviet Review, 1995

Between the "discovery" of the Cold War in 1946 and its "dissolution" in 1989, the world for scholars, citizens and policymakers was simple. There was an assumed and apparently undeniable dichotomy between "them" and "us"; the "evil empire" and "the City on the Hill"; a "Free World" and a "Communist" one that yvas in the "Soviet bloc" behind a virtually impregnable "Iron Curtain"; and pure democracy and capitalism yersus Communism. if effect, the assumptions that justified and kept the Cold War "heated" created a Cold War or, at least, 'Iron Curtain" from west to east in scholarship and in virtually every other area. To the extent the differences between the Soviet Union, its purported "satellites" in Eastern Eu

History of Classical Scholarship, 2019

For the last fifty years the Respublica Litterarum in classical scholarship has been dominated by the divisions brought about by the Cold War. As this traumatic period begins to fade I have tried to recall the attempts of one classical scholar to bridge this gap between east and west. Let us not forget the past in building a new future.

Journal of Cold War Studies, 2013

Why would the Soviet government consider the Marshall Plan more threatening than the Truman Doctrine? How could Yugoslavia move from being a stalwart of socialism in Europe to a renegade pariah, expelled from the Soviet sphere of inºuence a few months after states in Western Europe signed the Brussels defense pact? Why would Yugoslavia be welcomed back into the socialist family, with profuse acknowledgments of previous mistakes, when the country's defense contribution was much less needed? Why would the USSR allow its most important alliance with China to falter? Why would Iosif Stalin completely neglect the de-colonizing world as a potential ally in the global power competition? Why did the USSR start an offensive global power strategy in the Third World only after de-Stalinization? Ted Hopf answers these puzzles by suggesting that instead of realist theories of international relations (IR) or personality-centered diplomatic history, a constructivist take provides a more promising path. Developing his earlier approach to "societal constructivism," Hopf argues that Soviet identity discourses at home explain relations abroad. For each of these puzzles, he shows that Soviet external policy was driven by a particular way the Soviet Union came to understand itself. Once an identity "discourse of difference" was empowered, relations with Yugoslavia, the Eastern bloc, China, and the Third World were redeªned. Covering 1945-1958, the book is the ªrst of a planned trilogy that will cover Soviet foreign policy through the end of the Cold War. In today's environment of overwhelming academic output, Hopf stands out as a scholar whose research one is always inspired to read and reºect upon. This book is no exception. It is a must-read for its combination of IR theory and history, precisely because history is not used simply for quick theoretical points. Instead, Hopf devises a theoretical framework for understanding the history of Soviet foreign policy. In return, his meticulous historical analysis feeds back to IR theory, especially constructivist foreign policy analysis (FPA)-in content and methodology. His contribution to FPA lies precisely in his careful distinction between his approach and what FPA has come to mean. Whereas FPA has become centered on the analysis of individual decisions, thereby harnessing a multitude of factors from stan

The Encyclopedia of the Cold War: A Political, Social, and Military History. 5 vols.

Editor (with Spencer Tucker et al.), author of 66 short articles, editor/compiler of Vol. 5 (Documents Volume). Association of Educational Publishers, Distinguished Achievement Award for Social Studies Instruction (Reference Category), June 2008. A comprehensive five-volume reference on the defining conflict of the second half of the 20th century, covering all aspects of the Cold War as it influenced events around the world. • 1,299 entries covering all facets of the Cold War from its origins to its aftermath, including all political, diplomatic, military, social, economic, and cultural aspects of the conflict • Over 200 internationally recognized contributors from around the world, many writing about events and issues from the perspective of their country of origin • Over 175 original documents―a collection that draws heavily on recently opened files from archives in China, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union • More than 470 powerful images and illustrations plus 47 maps detailing specific military conflicts and movements of various groups • Indexes that are both alphabetically and categorically organized, covering people, places, events, weapons systems, and more

Articles: [“Churchill, Winston (1874-1965), 31-34; (with Christopher John Bright), “Committee on the Present Danger,” 39-40; “Cuban Missile Crisis,” 48-52; “Dulles, John Foster (1888-1959),” 56-59; “Eisenhower, Dwight David (1890-1969),” 61-64; “Kennan, George Frost (1904-2005),” 99-101; “Kissinger, Henry Alfred (1923-),” 107-108; “Nixon, Richard Milhous (1913-1994),” 151-153; “Reagan, Ronald Wilson (1911-2004),” 184-187; “United Nations,” 222-228.] The impact of the Cold War is still being felt around the world today. This insightful single-volume reference captures the events and personalities of the era, while also inspiring critical thinking about this still-controversial period. Cold War: The Essential Reference Guide is intended to introduce students to the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States that dominated international affairs in the second half of the 20th century. A comprehensive overview essay, plus separate essays on the causes and consequences of the conflict, will provide readers with the necessary context to understand the many facets of this complex era. The guide's expert contributors cover all of the influential people and pivotal events of the period, encompassing the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, Southeast Asia, China, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa from political, military, and cultural perspectives. Reference entries offer valuable insight into the leaders and conflicts that defined the Cold War, while other essays promote critical thinking about controversial and significant Cold War topics, including whether Ronald Reagan was responsible for ending the Cold War, the impact of Sputnik on the Cold War, and the significance of the Prague Spring. Features •Several analytical essays by prominent historians, plus 85 additional A–Z reference entries about conflicts, incidents, leaders, and issues •35 examples of relevant primary source documents, including speeches, treaties, policy statements, and letters, such as the Marshall Plan and Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech •A detailed chronology of important events that occurred before, during, and after the Cold War •Numerous maps and images of key leaders and events •A comprehensive bibliography of print resources Highlights •Provides readers with a look inside the Cold War, pinpointing the main causes and consequences of this long-running conflict •Analyzes controversial Cold War topics that still generate widespread debate today to inspire critical thinking among readers •Supplements entries with a broad overview to help readers grasp the far-reaching implications of this worldwide conflict •Discusses key leaders and events in a scholarly, yet accessible manner

The American Historical Review, 2011

Why would the Soviet government consider the Marshall Plan more threatening than the Truman Doctrine? How could Yugoslavia move from being a stalwart of socialism in Europe to a renegade pariah, expelled from the Soviet sphere of inºuence a few months after states in Western Europe signed the Brussels defense pact? Why would Yugoslavia be welcomed back into the socialist family, with profuse acknowledgments of previous mistakes, when the country's defense contribution was much less needed? Why would the USSR allow its most important alliance with China to falter? Why would Iosif Stalin completely neglect the de-colonizing world as a potential ally in the global power competition? Why did the USSR start an offensive global power strategy in the Third World only after de-Stalinization? Ted Hopf answers these puzzles by suggesting that instead of realist theories of international relations (IR) or personality-centered diplomatic history, a constructivist take provides a more promising path. Developing his earlier approach to "societal constructivism," Hopf argues that Soviet identity discourses at home explain relations abroad. For each of these puzzles, he shows that Soviet external policy was driven by a particular way the Soviet Union came to understand itself. Once an identity "discourse of difference" was empowered, relations with Yugoslavia, the Eastern bloc, China, and the Third World were redeªned. Covering 1945-1958, the book is the ªrst of a planned trilogy that will cover Soviet foreign policy through the end of the Cold War. In today's environment of overwhelming academic output, Hopf stands out as a scholar whose research one is always inspired to read and reºect upon. This book is no exception. It is a must-read for its combination of IR theory and history, precisely because history is not used simply for quick theoretical points. Instead, Hopf devises a theoretical framework for understanding the history of Soviet foreign policy. In return, his meticulous historical analysis feeds back to IR theory, especially constructivist foreign policy analysis (FPA)-in content and methodology. His contribution to FPA lies precisely in his careful distinction between his approach and what FPA has come to mean. Whereas FPA has become centered on the analysis of individual decisions, thereby harnessing a multitude of factors from stan