The Cognitive Science of Credence (forthcoming)

One of the deepest ideological divides in contemporary epistemology concerns the relative importance of belief versus credence. Traditional epistemology, which maintains the theoretical prominence of belief, faces a serious problem if—as some Bayesian epistemologists contend—rational decision making cannot be explained without making reference to rational credence, particularly in cases with abnormal payoff structures. The principal project of this paper is to present a novel way of defusing this problem. We suggest that, in these cases, rational decision-making might draw not on credences, but, rather, other doxastic attitudes—genuine representations that differ in strength from belief. Moreover, whether to hold these different doxastic representations can often be determined on the basis of one’s beliefs. So, in practice, belief without credence might well be enough to account for rational decision-making across a wide range of cases.

Religious Studies, 2019

In this paper, I argue that faith’s going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith’s epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that the idea that faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence entails that faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational.

Philosophical Studies, 2019

In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that (i) epistemologists should pay attention to whether they are framing questions in terms of belief or in terms of credence and (ii) the success or failure of a reductionist project in the belief-credence realm has significant implications for epistemology generally.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably-p) if and only if S has a corresponding credence that p. The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p. The third is the view that, possibly, S believes that p without a modal belief that p. [Word Count: 85]

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2016

Many discussions of the “preface paradox” assume that it is more troubling for deductive constraints on rational belief if outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that this is an error: we can generate the problem without assuming such reducibility. All we need are some very weak normative assumptions about rational relationships between belief and credence. The only view that escapes my way of formulating the problem for the deductive closure constraint is in fact itself a reductive view: namely, the view that outright belief is credence 1. However, I argue that this view is unsustainable. Moreover, my version of the problem turns on no particular theory of evidence or evidential probability, and so cannot be avoided by adopting some revisionary such theory. In sum, deductive constraints are in more serious, and more general, trouble than some have thought.

Reliabilists hold that a belief is doxastically justified if and only if it is caused by a reliable process. But since such a process is one that tends to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs, reliabilism is on the face of it applicable to binary beliefs, but not to degrees of confidence or credences. For while (binary) beliefs admit of truth or falsity, the same cannot be said of credences in general. A natural question now arises: can reliability theories of justified belief be extended or modified to account for justified credence? In this paper, I address the preceding question. I begin by showing that, as it stands, reliabilism cannot account for justified credence. I then consider three ways in which the reliabilist may try to do so by extending or modifying her theory, but I argue that such attempts face certain problems. After that, I turn to a version of reliabilism that incorporates evidentialist elements and argue that it allows us to avoid the problems that the other theories face. If I am right, this gives reliabilists a reason, aside from those given recently by Comesana and Goldman, to move towards such a kind of hybrid theory.

Philosophy Compass, 2013

Beliefs come in different strengths. An agent's credence in a proposition is a measure of the strength of her belief in that proposition. Various norms for credences have been proposed. Traditionally, philosophers have tried to argue for these norms by showing that any agent who violates them will be lead by her credences to make bad decisions. In this article, we survey a new strategy for justifying these norms. The strategy begins by identifying an epistemic utility function and a decision-theoretic norm; we then show that the decision-theoretic norm applied to the epistemic utility function yields the norm for credences that we wish to justify. We survey results already obtained using this strategy, and we suggest directions for future research. Like the rest of us, Paul's beliefs come in degrees. Some are stronger than others. In particular , Paul believes that Linda is a bank teller and a political activist more strongly than he believes that she is a bank teller. That is, his credence in the former proposition is greater than his credence in the latter. Surely, Paul is irrational. But why? 1 In this survey, I describe a new strategy for answering such questions. It is a strategy that was first introduced by Jim Joyce (1998). The traditional strategy-the strategy that Joyce sought to replace or, at least, supplement is to show that such credences will lead the agent who has them to make decisions that are guaranteed to have a bad outcome. These are the well-known Dutch Book arguments. 2 For instance, Paul's credences will lead him to buy a book of bets on the two propositions concerning Linda that is guaranteed to lose him money. This, it is claimed, makes him irrational. Now, the validity of this argument has been the subject of much debate. However, even if it works, it only identifies one way in which Paul's credences are irrational: they are poor guides to action; from a pragmatic point of view, they are irrational. But, intuitively, there is something irrational about these credences from a purely epistemic point of view; they seem to exhibit a purely epistemic flaw. Even for an agent incapable of acting on her credences-and therefore incapable of making the bets that lead to the guaranteed loss-Paul's credences would be irrational. We will be concerned with identifying why that is so. That is, Joyce's strategy, which we describe here, provides a purely epistemic route to the norms that govern credences; this route does not rely on any connection between credence and action. We will begin by showing how the strategy works in the case of Paul. Then, we will show how to extend it to establish probabilism, which is the norm that Joyce considers in his original paper. Probabilism is one of the core tenets of so-called Bayesian episte-mology. Our next target is the other core tenet of that view, namely, conditionalization. We will give an argument for that norm that uses Joyce's strategy as well: it is due to Hilary Greaves and David Wallace (2006). After considering how we might strengthen these arguments by weakening the assumptions they make, we conclude by describing possible avenues for future research.

Philosophical Issues, 2022

Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief-credence connection. Even on the anti-reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief-credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how independent are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational person, how closely connected are belief and credence?) I argue that those committed to minimal normative independence should accept more radical normative independence, and that cases of descriptive independence support belief-credence dualism. This suggests that belief and credence are more independent than one might think.

Philosophers' Imprint, 2015

Probabilism is the thesis that an agent is rational only if her credences are probabilistic. This paper will be concerned with what we might call the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism (Rosenkrantz, 1981; Joyce, 1998, 2009). In this paper, I wish to identify and explore a lacuna in this argument that arises for those who take there to be (at least) two sorts of doxastic states: beliefs and credences.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012

This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is for her credence in this proposition to be above a certain threshold, a threshold that varies depending on pragmatic factors. We show that while this account of belief can provide an elegant explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, it is not alone in doing so, for an alternative account of belief, which we call the reasoning disposition account, can do so as well. And the latter account, we argue, is far more plausible than pragmatic credal reductivism, since it accords far better with a number of claims about belief that are very hard to deny. Recently, a quandary has arisen in the literature on pragmatic encroachment. On the one hand, it has been forcefully argued that there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, or in other words that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors such as the costs of acting as if it were true that p when it is not true. And it has been argued that the best way to explain pragmatic encroachment on knowledge is by assuming that pragmatic factors affect justified belief. On the other hand, it is widely held that there is no pragmatic encroachment on justified degrees of belief, or levels of confidence, as the latter, it is maintained, should be strictly apportioned to the evidence. 2 But this creates a problem. How can pragmatic factors affect whether we are justified in believing a proposition (as opposed to disbelieving it or withholding judgment concerning it) without affecting the degree of belief or level of confidence that we are justified in

I give original arguments for the thesis that one believes a proposition only if one's credence in it is 1, as well as respond to several objections to that thesis. Belief implies having a credence of 1 because of the connections between assertoric representation, possibility, and probability.

A central question in epistemology is: which beliefs are rational? However, I intend to argue that the notion of rationality is, in fact, a conflation of two quite different notions: the notion of what we ought to believe and the notion of what the evidence supports. I also think that many of the problems that epistemologists face can be solved by distinguishing these two notions. I will say more about these notions later in the paper, but for now, the crucial point to note is that what beliefs we ought to have depends, in part, on our cognitive capacities, whereas what beliefs the evidence supports does not. In this paper, I will focus on how this distinction can be used to address some puzzling issues that arise with regard to the question of how precise our doxastic attitudes should be.

Synthese, 2017

In this paper, I present and defend a novel account of doubt. In §1, I make some preliminary observations about the nature of doubt. In §2, I introduce a new puzzle about the relationship between three psychological states: doubt, belief, and confidence. I present this puzzle because my account of doubt emerges as a possible solution to it. Lastly, in §3, I elaborate on and defend my account of doubt. Roughly, one has doubt if and only if one believes one might be wrong; I argue that this is superior to the account that says that one has doubt if and only if one has less than the highest degree of confidence. [Word Count: 115

Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 2020

The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our understanding of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world.

2011

This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is for her credence in this proposition to be above a certain threshold, a threshold that varies depending on pragmatic factors. We show that while this account of belief can provide an elegant explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, it is not alone in doing so, for an alternative account of belief, which we call the reasoning disposition account, can do so as well. And the latter account, we argue, is far more plausible than pragmatic credal reductivism, since it accords f...