Quem é o sujeito dos direitos humanos?
Andréia Fressatti Cardoso2021
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Abstract
The aim of this dissertation is to present the recent theoretical debate on the subject of human rights, from the theoretical perspective of three authors: Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Rancière. The contemporary debate about who is the subject of human rights tends to retake the category of the "right to have rights", both to attribute the need for a foundation for such rights as to question the need for a foundation, or for a subject who is prior to the demand of rights on the public scene. Rancière (2004) takes up this category, implying that it creates an ontological trap in which only those who already have citizenship rights are entitled, an idea that would be continued by Agamben. With this text, Rancière enters into this contemporary debate, raising some questions about the reading and categorical development of Arendt and Agamben, as well as proposing a different conception of the ownership of rights. In order to analyze how this insertion occurs, we developed two hypotheses: there is a distinctive element in Rancière's political thought, and Rancière's formulation seems to allow greater agency potential to the subject of rights. Therefore, we performed a structural analysis of the authors' arguments separately, followed by a moderate hermeneutic analysis, establishing comparisons and contrasts. We conclude that Agamben presents some elements of Arendt's continuity, but his specific theoretical developments lead him in a direction that cannot be attributed to her. However, Rancière's proposal to rethink human rights and its distinct subject is independent of his interpretation of Arendt and Agamben. Moreover, the way he conceives his categories allows greater agency to the subject of rights, broadening his possibilities of experiences in the world.
