Meta-regresses and the limits of persuasive argumentation

Argumentation, 2012

ABSTRACT I argue that argumentation is not to be identified with (attempted) rational persuasion, because although rational persuasion appears to consist of arguments, some uses of arguments are not attempts at rational persuasion. However, the use of arguments in argumentative communication to try to persuade is one kind of attempt at rational persuasion. What makes it rational is that its informing ideal is to persuade on the basis of adequate grounds, grounds that make it reasonable and rational to accept the claim at issue.

Argumentation, 2024

That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S doubts that a source O is reliable and believes that information i is delivered by O, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of i. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation.

2020

This paper studies the relation between persuasive argumentation and the speaker’s epistemic attitude. Dung-style abstract argumentation and dynamic epistemic logic provide the necessary tools to characterize the notion of persuasion. Within abstract argumentation, persuasive argumentation has been previously studied from a gametheoretic perspective. These approaches are blind to the fact that, in reallife situations, the epistemic attitude of the speaker determines which set of arguments will be disclosed by her in the context of a persuasive dialogue. This work is a first step to fill this gap. For this purpose we extend one of the logics of Schwarzentruber et al. with dynamic operators, designed to capture communicative phenomena. A complete axiomatization for the new logic via reduction axioms is provided. Within the new framework, a distinction between actual persuasion and persuasion from the speaker’s perspective is made. Finally, we explore the relationship between the two n...

Metaphilosophy, 2017

This article presents a critical analysis of the main modern approaches to the problem of meta-argumentation and suggests a method for developing a general conception of meta-argumentation. A set of theoretical-methodological difficulties (aporias) along this path is revealed. Overcoming these aporias would constitute the main steps toward developing the body of a theory of meta-argumentation.

Topoi, 2019

ABTRACT: Robert Fogelin argued that the efficacy of our acts of reasons-giving depends on the normalcy of our discourse-to the extent that discourse is not normal disagreements occurring in it are deep; and to the extent that disagreements are deep, they are not susceptible to rational resolution. Against this, Maurice Finocchiaro argues that meta-argumentation can contribute to the rational resolution of disagreements having depth. Drawing upon a competency view of reasons-giving, this article conducts an inventory and audit of meta-argumentation's resolution resources for disagreements having depth. It concludes that, because Finocchiaro mischaracterizes the relationship between meta-argumentation and normalcy in the underlying discourse, he systematically overstates the rational resolution value of meta-argumentation. To the extent that meta-argumentation can contribute to the rational resolution of disagreements, those disagreements are normal, not deep. According to the competency view, the only way to resolve depth in disagreement is to first re-establish its normalcy.

2016

Critical thinking is a fundamental skill for youth learners as the future generation of a nation. It is significantly important for them to be able to use the language to convey voices and ideas. The objective of this study was to assess the quality of arguments made by debaters in English Debating Society (EDS) of State University of Semarang based on the concept of rational persuasiveness. There were two basic data involved in this study. The first data is the audio of the EDS preparatory rehearsal for the Indonesian Varsities English Debate (IVED) 2011 and the second is the transcript of the speeches in the rehearsal. After the process of transcription was carried out, it was followed by the argument reconstruction, code creation, argument classification, and finally the outline of a basic procedure for the assessment of arguments represented in standard form. Some recommendations are given to the readers to improve the quality of their arguments. For educational purpose, debate ...

2017

1 This distinctive feature is at the same time an important cognitive capacity and a powerful social phenomenon. It has attracted attention and careful analysis since the dawn of civilization, being intimately related to the origin of any form of social organization, from political debates to law, and of structured thinking, from philosophy to science and arts. As a cognitive capacity, argumentation is important for handling conflicting beliefs, assumptions, viewpoints, opinions, goals, and many other kinds of mental attitudes. When we are faced with a situation where we find that our information is incomplete or inconsistent, we often resort to the use of arguments in favor and against a given position in order to make sense of the situation. When we interact with other people we often exchange arguments in a cooperative or competitive fashion to reach a final agreement or to defend and promote an individual position. Articles

Informal Logic, 2008

Much psychological research on argumentation focuses on persuasion and pragmatics. However, one strand investigates how average people understand the nature of knowledge and knowing, and how these epistemological orientations underlie skilled argumentation. The research reviewed addresses the question whether the normative emphasis of the philosophical epistemological approach to argumentation matches psychological findings. The empirical research reviewed concerns the relationship between personal epistemological understanding and three aspects of argument: argument construction, identification of informal reasoning fallacies, and orientation toward explanation or evidence. Findings suggest that people develop an epistemological approach toward argumentation in which beliefs about knowledge justification requirements are related with skilled argumentation. Résumé: Plusieurs recherches en psychologie sur l'argumentation concentrent sur la persuasion et la pragmatique. Toutefois celles-ci cherchent à savoir comment des personnes moyennes comprennent la nature des connaissances, et comment cette compréhension épistémologique sous-tend les habiletés argumentatives. La recherche examinée tente de déterminer si l'accent normatif de l'approche de l'épistémologique correspond aux découvertes en psychologie. La recherche examinée s'intéresse au rapport entre la compréhension personnelle épistémologique et trois aspects d'un argument : sa construction, l'identification des sophismes non-formels, et l'orientation vers l'explication ou l'appui. Les résultats suggèrent qu'on développe une approche épistémologique envers l'argumentation dans laquelle les croyances sur les exigences de la justification des connaissances se relient avec les habiletés argumentatives.

Argumentation Theory provides a very powerful set of principles, ideas and models. Yet, in this paper we will show that its fundamental principles unsatisfactorily explain real-world human argumentation and should be adapted. We will present an extensive empirical study on the incompatibility of abstract argumentation and human argumentative behavior, followed by practical expansion of existing models.