Arbiter Framework and the Adaptive Strike Chain

At the dawn of the 21st century, “cyber” seems to have become the common prefix of every human activity expressing the tendency of people towards networking. Cyber world emerges in parallel with the real one and its dynamic is so intense that many pundits consider it to be the fifth dimension in addition to land, sea, air and space. In the so called Information era, cyberspace consisting of various networks (financial, political, social) brings closer anyone willing to take part in them regardless of their nationality, mother tongue, religious belief or race. They seem to be supranational and many analysts describe networks as virtual societies that exist even though they cannot be defined using real life terms such as land or frontiers. Every human activity ranging from finance to social interactions finds a new way to be expressed within cyberspace and so does war. In Information era, the unregulated and chaotic structure of cyberspace alters decisively the nature of war. In the digital – virtual battlefield the “fog of war” seems to reach unprecedented levels, for any actor ranging from sovereign states to non state actors, criminal organisations, hacktivists or patriotic hackers can take advantage of the anonymity of cyberspace and cause harm. This paper intends to focus on the sociopolitical aspect of cyber in order to explain why cyber attacks are likely to meet the political objectives of war. Cyber is not considered to be just a technological breakthrough. Instead, it is viewed as the next evolutionary step in world politics which offers a new cognitive means of the real life world.

SYNERGY, 2019

In 2016, the United States Army initiated the development of the “multi-domain battle” (MBD) concept. While critics and cynics have argued that it is a desperate attempt by the U.S. Army to find relevance for itself in the battlespaces of the Information Age, it has now been progressively adopted by almost all arms of the U.S. military establishment. While this battle concept was offered as a “difficult to fracture” concept and signaled the gradual demise of the AirLand and AirSea battle concepts, it is, in conceptual terms, not difficult to understand. As has been reported elsewhere, the basic idea is to "synchronize crossdomain fires and manoeuvre in all the domains to achieve physical, temporal and positional advantages.” This requires “mov[ing] beyond the mere synchronization of joint capabilities to the complete integration of capabilities”, which will allow, for example, “anti-air capabilities…coming from a … submarine or anti-ship cruise missiles…coming from an Army unit on the ground.” Leaving aside the critical and cynical points of view, the rationale offered is that “[p]otential adversaries are closing the technology gap with the United States and developing strategies to keep U.S. forces at bay.” Further, it has been assessed that “separatist forces [are] able to gain air superiority via the land, without even an air force….[they are] able to take down large land forces with a combination of electronic warfare, cyber, autonomous systems, drones, et cetera – not with a close-in battle.” These developments suggest that the key element underwriting the development and adoption of the MDB concept is the conceptualization and design of weapon-systems and capabilities that are unrestricted by the limitations of domains here understood as land, air, sea, and outer space. While this is not a “new” idea per se, the novelty of this development should not be lost on us which, counterintuitively, lies not simply in the projected cross-domain capabilities that are being expounded; rather, the novelty – indeed the uniqueness – lies in the nature of the battlespace that is being presumed that requires such cross-domain capabilities. In this short essay, I engage with this theme thereby attempting to draw attention to the transformation that is taking place in how we conceptualize the emergent battlespace and some of the implications of the same. I conclude with some observations on how this impacts the Indian strategic-military architecture and will recommend some ways by which it may adjust to these changing realities.

Wilton Park Conference Reports, 2019

The human race has a propensity for conflict; on land, at sea, in the air and to some extent in outer space. Has cyberspace become the latest ‘battlespace’; a recognisable domain of military activity in which the organised armed forces of states should have specific roles and responsibilities? ‘Military operations in cyberspace’, a conference held at Wilton Park in early September 2018, set out to answer these questions from a variety of perspectives – operational, political, legal, moral, strategic and technical. Rather than follow a standard, thematic agenda, Military operations was structured sequentially. The conference began by asking why and how cyberspace might indeed be understood as a battlespace. Discussion then addressed in turn the more or less discrete phases of a notional conflict in cyberspace: the prevention of conflict (including deterrence); the means available for conflict in cyberspace (e.g. cyber weapons and dual- use platforms); the justification for military operations (e.g. threats, the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities); the conduct of operations (in two parts – the tactical/operational and the higher level strategic); the management of conflict (e.g. conflict mediation and de-escalation); legal and ethical constraints on military operations in cyberspace; and the conclusion of military operations (including the notions of victory, defeat and loss). The conference finished with a discussion of plausible futures for military operations in cyberspace. The conference highlighted above all that the national security communities and militaries of technologically advanced democracies are struggling to understand the character and Page 1 of 14 implications of all of these phases of potential conflict in cyberspace. The concluding section of this report is almost entirely devoted to raising a series of intricate and urgent questions that need further reflection. One certainty though is that militaries cannot effectively undertake this reflection on their own and that it must be conducted as part of a comprehensive, integrated civil-military approach to conflict in cyberspace.

As the DoD strives for greater digital capabilities, it becomes exponentially more effective on the battlefield and yet more vulnerable to pre-emptive attacks – both virtual and physical – on the digital networks and technologies that enable the U.S. military’s modern lethality. Further, as systems and tactics shift from digitally enhanced to digitally dependent, the United States may inadvertently place itself in a position to either take a debilitating first strike from adversaries or else strike first in order to preserve the digital capabilities necessary for modern warfare. This paradox of digital capability and vulnerability leads to an important consideration for U.S. policymakers: Do we go all in on digital warfare and accept the vulnerabilities in order to build the most capable military possible? Or do we sacrifice military capability in order to decrease the chance of inadvertent conflict?

This paper examines the evolution of the United Kingdom’s (UK) approach to integrated military network systems, analysing its strategies, technological advancements, and partnerships, particularly within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and with European Union (EU) allies. The study underscores the UK’s commitment to Network-Centric Warfare(NCW) and multi-domain operations, outlining the development of foundational communication systems like Bowman and Network Enabled Capability (NEC), as well as newer projects, including Morpheus, TRINITY, and the Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems (LETacCIS) program. The UK’s integration strategy prioritises secure, real-time data exchange across land, air, maritime, cyber, and space domains, aiming to enhance interoperability and strengthen resilience against hybrid threats. A key focus of this paper is on the UK’s collaboration with NATO and the EU in advancing secure communication frameworks, cyber resilience, and satellite capabilities through projects like Federated Mission Networking (FMN) and the SKYNET satellite system. As cyber and space domains become more critical, the UK’s evolving strategies demonstrate an adaptable, modular approach to maintaining technological superiority and coalition interoperability. To conclude, the paper highlights future directions for integrated networks, emphasising the importance of flexible, cyber-resilient, and quantum-encrypted systems to address emerging security challenges in a complex, multi-domain operational environment.

Arising from fundamental changes in American society and business, military operations increasingly will capitalize on the advances and advantages of information technology.

Strategic Analysis, 2010

The last couple of decades have seen a colossal change in terms of the influence that computers have on the battle field, to an extent that defence pundits claim it to be a dawn of a new era in warfare. The use of computers and information in defence has manifested into various force multipliers such as Information Operations, C4I2SR Systems, Network Centric Warfare, to the extent that commentators are terming this information age as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). These advances have not only revolutionized the way in which wars are fought, but have also initiated a new battle for the control of a new dimension in the current contemporary world: The Cyber Space. Over time cyber warfare has assumed the shape of an elephant assessed by a group of blind people, with every one drawing different meanings based upon their perceptions. Under these circumstances there was a gradual paradigm shift in military thinking and strategies, from the strategic aspect to the tactical aspect of cyber warfare laying more emphasis on cyber attacks and counter measures. This resulted in the formation of a notion that cyber warfare or information warfare is a potent force multiplier, which in a sense downgraded the strategic aspects of cyber war to a low grade tactical warfare used primarily for a force enhancement effect. The author believes this is wrong, cyber war is a new form of warfare and, rather than cyber war merely being an enhancement of traditional operations, traditional operations will be force multipliers of cyber war. This paper tries to shatter myths woven around cyber warfare so as to illuminate the strategic aspects of this relatively misinterpreted notion. This paper will elucidate the scenarios and mechanisms illuminating the process of using the strategies of cyber war, so as to achieve conventional objectives. The paper will also analyze the doctrine and strategies including first and second strike capabilities with regard to cyber war. This paper identifies a paradigm shift from the conventional belief of cyber warfare acting as a force multiplier for conventional warfare to the recognition, that conventional warfare will be acting as a force multiplier around cyber war and hence making cyber war as the primary means of achieving grand strategic objectives in the contemporary world order.

Naval War College Review, 2010

Academic Journal of Accounting and Economic Researches, 2019

Cyber warfare is doing or preparing for military operations in accordance with the principles of information. Cyber warfare means to disrupt, if not destroy completely the information and communication systems that enemy relies on them to "know", that is, who is? Where is? Can do what at what time? Why fighting? What threats are top priority? And etc. In cyber warfare, we are trying to know everything about the enemy and at the same time let him not know anything about us. In other words, the main objective of cyber warfare is to disrupt the "balance of information and knowledge" for the benefit of the forces, especially if the "balance of combat power" does not exist. Therefore, cyber warfare can be managed by taking advantage of superior knowledge to compensate the weakness of capital and personnel and achieve a decisive victory. The main purpose of this article is to clarify the role of cyberspace in Air Force cyberspace capabilities in terms of offensive and defensive war in facing wars of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In a speech at the Reagan National Defense Forum on November 15, 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel unveiled the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII). Secretary Hagel called for an “initiative [that] is an ambitious department-wide effort to identify and invest in innovative ways to sustain and advance America’s military dominance for the 21st century. It will put new resources behind innovation, but also account for today’s fiscal realities – by focusing on investments that will sharpen our military edge even as we contend with fewer resources.” He then appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work to oversee the DII and announced a list of critical technologies that would provide the foundations for the new strategy. This article will discuss potential cybered conflicts in the context of contemporary U.S. defense policy, the recent forty-year period of military transformation, and the intensifying Sino-American peacetime competition.

Centre for Land Warfare Issue Brief, 2018

Information Warfare, uses elements of information and technology to disrupt thought processes and paralyze an adversary with non- kinetic mean, violating sovereignty and achieving objectives without using conventional forces. We need to defend against such warfare and develop capability to strike back in similar coin. The conceptual construct of National Security itself has undergone a transformation in the digital era, hence there is a need to redefine the concept of National Security and review security systems in the era of Information Warfare. Information Security has to include both defensive and offensive capabilities in the Information Domain and including IW as an essential part of National Security is the first step towards waging the war in infospace

Chief of Air Staff's Reading List 2011, 2011

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in the last decade has affected the way we live, work and fight. Advancements in the information age, coupled with the ongoing RMA, are poised to make a dramatic impact over automation, network centricity and communication security. Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) is an established theory of war that seeks to translate the gains of information gathered into a competitive war-fighting advantage through the robust networking of geographically dispersed forces. NCW is the military’s expression of information age warfare and its impacts across all the levels of war, and can be viewed as a war-fighting concept based on the premise that networking enables leveraging relevant information to maximise the mission effectiveness of diverse and geographically separated military capabilities

MultiMedia Publishing, 2024

Electronic warfare is a critical component of modern military operations and has undergone significant advances in recent years. This book provides an overview of electronic warfare, its historical development, key components, and its role in contemporary conflict scenarios. It also discusses emerging trends and challenges in electronic warfare and its contemporary relevance in an era of advanced technology and cyber threats, emphasizing the need for continued research and development in this area. The book explores the burgeoning intersection of artificial intelligence and electronic warfare, highlighting the evolving landscape of modern conflicts and the implications of integrating advanced technologies. The multifaceted roles of artificial intelligence in electronic warfare are highlighted, examining its potential advantages, ethical considerations, and challenges associated with its integration.