How Russia fights

2018

The security policy of the Russian Federation has long involved elements of threat to neighbouring countries and forcing the hand of its political partners. In the last decade, Russia has used hybrid modes of warfare to instigate conflicts and instability in its neighbouring countries, while remaining below a certain threshold of violence, allowing it to dodge retaliatory consequences. The authors of the article indicate that the objective of the use of hybrid modes of warfare in Ukraine consists in blurring motives and actors in order to obfuscate a decisive and efficient response. This article argues further that these tactics, if used against a member of the Atlantic Alliance, would effectively allow such an attack to remain below the Article 5 applicability threshold, thereby making it difficult for alliance members to reach consensus on the characterisation of the attack. Even though the member states of NATO and the EU have not been direct targets of Russian actions, former republics of the Soviet Union can be considered to be in the danger zone, based on Russian political statements and its hybrid activities in these countries.

Given the situation with Syria and elsewhere, please see a draft of my latest peer-reviewed piece in the Royal United Services Institute publication, the RUSI Journal. The article attempts a comprehensive definition of contemporary Russian warfare which I hope will contribute towards a wider debate on the subject amongst researchers, academics, soldiers and historians. Here is the abstract: In this article, Robert Seely offers a comprehensive assessment of what has become known as Russian 'hybrid' warfare. First, he asks whether 'hybrid' is the most appropriate term to use when studying contemporary Russian warfare. Second, he introduces a method of categorisation to help make sense of the considerable diversity of Russian tools of war. Finally, he suggests that contemporary Russian warfare is more than just war, and amounts to a reinvention of strategic art, where the tools of state power are integrated into a single whole. This is a manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the RUSI Journal, 3 April 2017. The Version of Record is available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2017.1301634

2020

In the context of NATO and its member states seeking to enhance deterrence and defence postures and looking ahead to 2030, the article argues for a shift from seeing Moscow’s activities as “measures short of war,” blurring the lines between war and peace, toward greater clarity on Russian military strategy and the blurring of lines between the offensive and the defensive. 1 This article is based on: Andrew Monaghan, Dealing with the Russians (Cambridge: Polity, 2019); How Moscow Understands War and Military Strategy (forthcoming: Washington, D.C.: Centre for Naval Analysis, 2020). Introduction NATO is attempting to look to the future. Through the spring and summer of 2020, the alliance launched the NATO 2030 reflection process to make sure that the “alliance and its member states are prepared for new threats and challenges.” This process has three broad priorities: to ensure political strength, military strength, and a more global approach. It includes and seeks to enhance the allia...

A diverse picture of Russian warfare and influence, 2024

This volume has provided case studies of Russian warfare and influence in states at the intersection of the East and the West. Russian strategies for influence have been analysed in the cases of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Serbia, Kosovo and Georgia, as well as in relation to Russia’s role in and utilization of the unresolved conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine’s Donbass. A unifying theme of these studies has been to examine Russia’s targeting and exploitation of specific existing vulnerabilities, which are country- and context-specific, but also exhibit common features in a broader sense. Importantly, the chapters have also examined how the states in question have devised strategies of their own to counteract, counterbalance or exploit Russian influence depending on national interests and priorities in foreign and domestic policies. This volume thus demonstrates the importance of accounting for the context-specific patterns of government and elite interests, vulnerabilities and capabilities in any assessment of external influence and its impact. Moreover, this underscores the importance of applying a dynamic and time-sensitive perspective on the interplay between hybrid threats and efforts to counter them, as pointed out in the introduction to this volume.[1] This chapter outlines the findings and implications of the case studies. It concludes with a perspective, which must remain speculative at this point in time, on how the war in Ukraine and its future trajectory may affect Russia’s 184continued capacity for exercising external influence in states located at the intersection of the East and West.

This short analysis intends to identify the strategic and operative requirements of Russia's "hybrid warfare", based on studying the field experiences gained in Ukraine. The concrete aim of this research is to define, where, and against, which countries Russia may be able to use this new form of warfare in its full spectrum.

Henry Jackson Society, Research Paper No. 15 (2018), 2018

Peer-reviewed paper which aims to provide the first comprehensive and concise definition of Contemporary Russian Conflict. The report is based on Russian Military Doctrine, strategic and foreign concepts papers and writing by senior political and military leaders.

The paper provides an overview of how armed conflicts of the 21 st century are perceived in contemporary military thinking of the Russian Federation. The main question we intend to answer is to what extent Russian military thinking on contemporary conflicts has changed since Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov has published his landmark article, widely known as the " Gerasimov doctrine, " in the Voenno-promishlenniy kurier in 2013. More concretely, what effects the experiences gained from the war in Ukraine and in Syria have had on contemporary Russian military thinking. The analysis provides an overview of the state of Russian military thinking on the nature of armed conflicts at the time Gerasimov's article was published, it studies the discourse since then, and also applies a "reality check: " a comparison of the scenarios of the Russian military exercises with the ongoing theoretical discourse.

The Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies, 2025

This concluding essay for the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies seeks to use much of the historical and more contemporary analysis in this handbook as context to assess whether we can reasonably write about ‘a Russian way of war’ as figuring in the ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine. It identifies a number of tendencies in Russian warfighting with deep historical roots, including some relating to the adoption and use of technology. It also notes the tendency, linked with the wider cultural notion of ‘avos’’, in the way wars have been conducted by Russian forces in their early phases, where attempts to ‘rush’ objectives can be seen in the context of a desire to utilise surprise and maintain the initiative – often in the face of uncompromising orders from above. Such an approach does not, of course, always bring success, and in the face of initial failures, a period of consolidation frequently follows that sees a combination of centralisation of higher-level assets such as artillery, and a decentralisation at the tactical level in order to better exploit emerging opportunities on the ground. In tandem, these two elements are often used as part of an attritional strategy against a numerically weaker but tactically competent enemy. In recent Russian history, these elements can be seen both in the Chechen Wars and war in Ukraine – but have roots going back to the Great Patriotic War. I hope this conclusion inspires you to want to read the whole handbook! :)

Online Journal 'Modeling the New Europe', 2017

The term " hybrid warfare " has been used to refer to the combined usage of unconventional military tactics such as conventional warfare with irregular warfare and cyberwarfare, as well as the employment of other instruments and tactics (subversive elements), to achieve a double goal: first to avoid responsibility and retribution, and second to weaken and destabilize the enemy without direct involvement. The rigidity of the current international system pertaining to the usage of non-peaceful methods of solving an international dispute and/or furthering state interests, have made it increasing difficulty, without the support of the international community (humanitarian interventions and UN-sanctioned interventions) to employ the 'classical methods' which pre-date the provisions of the UN Charter, relevant to what we now consider as " acts of aggression ". Discussing the resurgence of the Russian Federation as a great power, we argue that because of the innate historical and traditional factors of Russian geopolitics, it was only a matter of time until the Kremlin's military doctrine pivoted from the defensive phase it entered after the fall of the Soviet Union, to the pro-active involvement at the limit of international law: Georgia in 2008, East Ukraine in 2013, Crimea in 2014, and Syria in 2015. Therefore, in this article we will contend, firstly, by discussing the example of the perception of the so-called Russian " Gerasimov doctrine " , that hybrid war can have two different connotations: " war during peace " and " neo-imperial ambitions ". Secondly, we will try to argue that the NATO military doctrine of deterrence has become obsolete, still envisaging the possible threats posed by a future Russian involvement in the Baltic and Eastern Europe in cold-war terms and not in terms relevant to the shifting international security environment.

Russian warfare and influence: States in the proximity of Russia, 2024

The turmoil descending on Europe with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has altered many of the pre-existing conceptions of Russia as an actor in European security. Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 served to reintroduce Russia as a main focus of security debates across Europe. Crucial insights that could have aided in anticipation were not deduced after the 2008 invasion of Georgia, that is that Russia was no stranger to the use of force in pursuit of its national security objectives. Nevertheless, in the perceptions of the threat posed by Russia, military options were understood to be reserved for states that the Russian regime claimed were within its legitimate sphere of interest. Other, non-kinetic and hybrid means of power and influence were thought to be the main cause for concern to the rest of the Western world. Russian interference in the 2016 US and 2017 French elections, as well as funding of right-wing populist parties across Europe; concerted activity in the cyber arena; and a range of influence operations seemed to vindicate the nature of the new security environment. Russia’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, followed by the unified Western response in the form of sustained military and economic support for Ukraine, comprehensive sanctions against Russia and decisions by Sweden and Finland to join NATO, has fundamentally altered the map of potential threats that the West needs to confront. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that Russia is both prepared to go further in retaining its influence and domination in its ‘near abroad’, and to accept larger risks in this regard, than previously anticipated. Moreover, the preparations, 2planning and conduct of the Russian operation have revealed surprising degrees of incompetence and strategic miscalculation, and therefore of recklessness, which has served to alter the conceptions of deterrence previously applied. Previous instances of post-1991 Russian warfare abroad, in Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, were all delimited in scope, utilizing a controlled amount of force in operations designed to avoid triggering third-party involvement and unwanted escalation. Yet as an effect of its failure to subdue Ukraine, and the significance of Western military support in this regard, the Russian regime now claims to be at war with NATO. And while the Russian regime likely understands that this is not really the case and what a war with NATO would actually imply, escalation beyond Ukraine is a scenario that remains unlikely but whose consequences would be too serious to ignore. However, while its engagement in Ukraine makes Russian military adventurism elsewhere unlikely at present, there is an extensive catalogue of other measures that Russia can employ in its conflict with the West. These capabilities have not receded to the same extent as Russia’s military capability and the risk of more brazen actions against states other than Ukraine grows in tow with the Russian regime’s desperation and the increasing threat to the longevity of the regime. A recent example is the apparent attempt to stage a coup in Moldova, disclosed in February 2023. Many of these are well known and have frequently been discussed in terms of a strategy of hybrid warfare or hybrid threats emanating from Russia (along with a whole range of similar but not synonymous terms).[1] While the conflict with Russia warrants extensive rethinking and funding of defensive capabilities, military and civilian, across the West, nowhere is this conflict felt more acutely than in the states geographically located at the intersection between Russia and the West. Moreover, these states have considerably longer experience in managing the implications of ‘living close to’ Russia than their counterparts located further away from Russia. In this context, the states emerging after the break-up of the USSR have followed radically different trajectories in their foreign and domestic policies, and they have developed diverse relations with Russia along with the former imperial power’s increasingly assertive external policies.