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2018, Psychological Science
, 1947), humans should have stable preferences that do not vary with context (i.e., the relative preference between A and B should not change when a new option C is made available) or with task framing (the preference between A and B should not depend on whether the decision maker is asked to select or reject one of them). Nevertheless, a variety of such choice-bias effects was reported in decision-making studies that used multiattribute alternatives (Berkowitsch, Scheibehenne, & Rieskamp, 2014; Simonson, 1989; Tversky, 1972) or choices between sequences of differently framed or temporally correlated payoffs (Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2012; Shafir, 1993; Tsetsos, Chater, & Usher, 2012). Choices between sequences of payoffs or evidence samples are encountered in many real-life situations, such as selecting a stock on the basis of fluctuating returns or deciding on the culpability of a defendant in a legal case on the basis of sequential pieces of evidence. Moreover, a number of prominent decision theories have suggested that even for decisions between static alternatives (in the domain of risk or multiattribute decisions), the decision mechanism operates by dynamically integrating sequences of internally generated samples (decision field theory: Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001; associativeaccumulation model: Bhatia, 2013; leaky competing accumulators: Usher & McClelland, 2004). Here, we focus on choices between externally controlled potential payoff sequences, which allow us to control the objective properties of the alternatives and measure their impact on risk preferences (Tsetsos et al., 2012; Zeigenfuse, Pleskac, & Liu, 2014). Do people prefer an alternative that is characterized by a broader (riskier) distribution of payoffs over a narrower (safer) one, or the other way 803643P SSXXX10.
PLOS Comp. Biology, 2019
A key question in decision-making is how people integrate amounts and probabilities to form preferences between risky alternatives. Here we rely on the general principle of integration-to-boundary to develop several biologically plausible process models of risky-choice, which account for both choices and response-times. These models allowed us to contrast two influential competing theories: i) within-alternative evaluations, based on multiplicative interaction between amounts and probabilities, ii) within-attribute comparisons across alternatives. To constrain the preference formation process, we monitored eye-fixations during decisions between pairs of simple lotteries, designed to systematically span the decision-space. The behavioral results indicate that the participants' eye-scanning patterns were associated with risk-preferences and expected-value maximization. Crucially, model comparisons showed that within-alternative process models decisively outperformed within-attribute ones, in accounting for choices and response-times. These findings elucidate the psychological processes underlying preference formation when making risky-choices, and suggest that compensatory, within-alternative integration is an adaptive mechanism employed in human decision-making. Author summary Decision-making under risk requires a selection between alternatives, such as lotteries, which offer a reward with a specified probability. Human decision between such alternatives is at the center of the normative decision theory, which assumes that decisions are rationally made by forming a value for each alternative and selecting the alternative with the highest value. To this day, there is still a considerable debate on how such values are computed. While the normative theory assumes that values of the alternatives reflect the statistically expected rewards, more recent theories have argued that alternative-values are not computed, and choices are only based on sequentially comparing the alternatives on amounts or on probabilities. Here, we carried out an experimental investigation of risky decision-making, in which participants chose between pairs of simple lottery alternatives that systematically span a range of probabilities and amounts, while we tracked their eye PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.
Experimental Economics, 2014
Experiments on choice under risk typically involve multiple decisions by individual subjects. The choice of mechanism for selecting decision(s) for payoff is an essential design feature that is often driven by appeal to the isolation hypothesis or the independence axiom. We report two experiments with 710 subjects. Experiment 1 provides the first simple test of the isolation hypothesis. Experiment 2 is a crossed design with six payoff mechanisms and five lottery pairs that can elicit four paradoxes for the independence axiom and dual independence axiom. The crossed design discriminates between: (a) behavioral deviations from postulated properties of payoff mechanisms; and (b) behavioral deviations from theoretical implications of alternative decision theories. Experiment 2 provides tests of the isolation hypothesis and four paradoxes. It also provides data for tests for portfolio effect, wealth effect, reduction, adding up, and cross-task contamination. Data from Experiment 2 suggest that a new mechanism introduced herein may be less biased than random selection of one decision for payoff.
2003
A series of experiments is used to investigate the extent to which valuation of a risky prospect is affected by the values from which a participant selects a response. Three variables were considered: a smaller risk-free amount, a larger risky amount, and the probability of winning the larger amount. There were three conditions: in each, two of the three variables were held constant, and participants chose the value for the third variable that made the risky and risk-free options worth the same to them. This was done first by a free-choice valuation, and then, with different participants, by choosing one of four options that were either all below or all above the population free-choice median. The options presented had a strong effect on valuation of the missing variable. This effect remained even when the free-choice and multiple-choice conditions were presented within subjects. This demonstrates that people showing rational and consistent risk evaluation strategies could have thei...
2016
Little is known about how individuals make decisions when they must choose several options from a set of options when the outcomes are risky and the payoffs are rival. When researchers model these decisions, they assume people maximize their expected utility. We design an experiment in which subjects face either rival or independent payoffs. While theory predicts different behavior, subjects behave nearly identically under these payoff schemes. This suggests individuals are not maximizing expected utility. Additional treatments demonstrate that this behavior is likely driven by a heuristic used to simplify a complex math problem, rather than a preference for lotteries with the highest independent expected utilities. Our results suggest that using expected utility as peoples' objective function in these types of environments will lead to biased predictions.
2009
Experimental work on preferences over risk has typically considered choices over a small number of discrete options, some of which involve no risk. Such experiments often demonstrate contradictions of standard expected utility theory. We reconsider this literature with a new preference elicitation device that allows a continuous choice space over only risky options. Our analysis assumes only that preferences depend on the probability p and prize x; U = u(p; x): We then allow subjects to choose p and x continuously on a linear budget constraint, r 1 p + r 2 x = m, so that all prospects with a nonzero expected value are risky. We test …ve of the most importantly debated questions about risk preferences: rationality, prospect theory asymmetry, the independence axiom, probability weighting, and constant relative risk aversion. Overall, we …nd that the expected utility model does unexpectedly well.
Frontiers in Psychology, 2011
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2009
Decision by sampling (DbS) is a theory about how our environment shapes the decisions that we make. Here, I review the application of DbS to risky decision making. According to classical theories of risky decision making, people make stable transformations between outcomes and probabilities and their subjective counterparts using fixed psychoeconomic functions. DbS offers a quite different account. In DbS, the subjective value of an outcome or probability is derived from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons with a sample of other outcomes or probabilities from the decision environment. In this way, the distribution of attribute values in the environment determines the subjective valuations of outcomes and probabilities. I show how DbS interacts with the real-world distributions of gains, losses, and probabilities to produce the classical psychoeconomic functions. I extend DbS to account for preferences in benchmark data sets. Finally, in a challenge to the classical notion of stable subjective valuations, I review evidence that manipulating the distribution of attribute values in the environment changes our subjective valuations just as DbS predicts.
Information Sampling and Adaptive Cognition, 2005
Working Papers, 2009
In this study we propose an axiomatic theory of decision-making under risk that is based on a new approach to the modeling of framing that focuses on the subjective statistical dependence between prizes of compared lotteries. Unlike existing models that allow objective statistical dependence, as in Regret Theory, in our model the emphasis is on alternative subjective statistical dependence patterns that are induced by alternative descriptions of the lotteries, i.e., by alternative framing. A distinct advantage of the proposed general descriptive model of choice is its ability to adequately explain a wide variety of behaviors and, in particular, several well-known paradoxes of different types.
Research in Experimental Economics, 2008
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2008
We show that preferences depend on the attributes that can be directly manipulated when people need to integrate multiple sources of information because direct manipulation causes focusing bias. This effect appears even when all relevant information is simultaneously and explicitly presented at the time the decisions are made. Participants decided how much to save, what investment risk to take and observed the future financial consequences in terms of the mean and variability of the expected retirement income. Participants who manipulated only the future income distribution saved more and took less risk. This effect disappears when the risk-related variables are removed, which indicates that task complexity is a mediator of such focusing effects. A more balanced trade-off between the choice attributes was selected when all attributes were manipulated. However, when there is a dichotomy between manipulating versus observing choice attributes, then decisions were based mostly on the manipulated attributes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
We contrast two classes of choice processes, those assuming time-consuming comparisons and those where stimuli for each option act independently, competing for expression by cross censorship. The Sequential Choice Model (SCM) belongs in the latter category, and has received empirical support in several procedures involving deterministic alternatives. Here we test this model in risky choices. In two treatments, each with five conditions, European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) faced choices between options with unpredictable outcomes and risk-free alternatives. In the delay treatment the five conditions involved choices between a variable option offering two equiprobable delays to reward and a fixed option with delay differing between conditions. The amount treatment was structurally similar, but amount of reward rather than delay was manipulated. As assumed (and required) by the SCM, latency to respond in no-choice trials reflected each option's richness with respect to the background alternatives, and, crucially, preferences in simultaneous choices were predictable from latencies to each option in forced trials. However, we did not detect reliable differences in response times between forced and choice trials, neither the lengthening expected from evaluation models nor the shortening expected from the SCM.
Models and Experiments in Risk and Rationality, 1994
In view of the considerable evidence of systematic violations of expected utility by individual subjects, a number of alternative models generalizing expected utility have been developed. As P.Fishburn put it once [ ] 1988 , we have entered "a new era" in the domain of decision under risk, but "we shall have to wait and see"
Rationality and Society, 1996
We receive helpful comments from seminar participants at CIRANO (Montréal) and LAMIA (Paris).
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2006
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1999
A meta-analysis of Asian-disease-like studies is presented to identify the factors which determine risk preference. First the confoundings between probability levels, payoffs, and framing conditions are clarified in a task analysis. Then the role of framing, reflection, probability, type, and size of payoff is evaluated in a meta-analysis. It is shown that bidirectional framing effects exist for gains and for losses. Presenting outcomes as gains tends to induce risk aversion, while presenting outcomes as losses tends to induce risk seeking. Risk preference is also shown to depend on the size of the payoffs, on the probability levels, and on the type of good at stake (money/property vs human lives). In general, higher payoffs lead to increasing risk aversion. Higher probabilities lead to increasing risk aversion for gains and to increasing risk seeking for losses. These findings are confirmed by a subsequent empirical test. Shortcomings of existing formal theories, such as prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory, venture theory, and Markowitz's utility theory, are identified. It is shown that it is not probabilities or payoffs, but the framing condition, which explains most variance. These findings are interpreted as showing that no linear combination of formally relevant predictors is sufficient to capture the essence of the framing phenomenon.
2017
What should you do when confronting a sequence of decisions such that you make some choices and chance makes some others, i.e., a dynamic decision making problem under risk? Standard economic rationality requires you to look at the final choices, determine the preferred options, choose the sequence of decisions that lead to those and follow that sequence through to the end. That behaviour is implied by the conjunction of the principles of separability, dynamic consistency and reduction of compound lotteries. Experimental research on these dynamic choice principles has been developed within the common ratio effect theoretical framework. This paper experimentally investigates what subjects do when confronting such a problem within a new theoretical framework provided by the common consequence effect that manipulates the value of the foregone-consequence in the prior risks.Results suggest that reduction of compound lotteries holds throughout, whilst dynamic consistency and separability...
Management Science, 2007
This experiment tested two behavioral properties of risky decision making, gain-loss separability and coalescing. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) implies both properties, but the transfer of attention exchange model (TAX) violates both. Original prospect theory satisfies gain-loss separability but may or may not satisfy coalescing, depending on whether editing rules are assumed. A configural form of CPT proposed by Wu and Markle violates gain-loss separability but satisfies coalescing. New tests were designed and conducted to test these theories against specific predictions of a TAX model. This model used parameters estimated from previous data together with simple new assumptions to extend TAX to gambles with negative and mixed consequences. Contrary to all three forms of prospect theory, systematic violations of both coalescing and of gain-loss separability were observed. Violations of GLS were confirmed by analyses of individual data patterns by means of an error model in which each choice can have a different rate of error. Without estimating any parameters from the new data, the TAX model predicted the majority choices in the new data fairly well, correctly predicting when modal choices would violate gain-loss separability, when they would satisfy it, and when indifference would be observed.
2018
The high rewards people desire are typically unlikely—that is, risks and rewards are generally negatively correlated. Here, we investigated whether decision makers rely on ecological links between risks and rewards to simplify how they process risky options. In a learning phase, participants were exposed to options in which risks and rewards werenegatively correlated, positively correlated, or uncorrelated. In a test phase, their eye movements were tracked while they chose from two gambles with an emphasis on making either a fast or the best possible choice. In “best” trials, participants in a negatively correlated risk–reward environment satisficed their evidence accumulation (lower threshold in a drift diffusion model, faster responses, less expected value maximization). This suggests that the decision processes typically studied in the laboratory—almost exclusively using uncorrelated risk–reward environments—may be different than decision processes outside the lab, where a negati...
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